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WHAT CAN GERMAN 
HISTORY TELL US 
ABOUT THE GERMAN 
QUESTION? 
Gerhard L. Weinberg 
The University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill 
Two points must be clarified before there can be any useful discussion of the 
insights we might obtain from history about the "German Question." In the first place, 
what do we mean when we speak of the "lessons of history?" Most assuredly, the term 
does not mean that one can abstract from the past something on the order of a precise 
recipe for the future. While in a prisoner of war camp after World War II, German 
Field Marshall Ritter von Leeb noted in his diary what he believed the Second World 
War had taught as to the way Germany might defeat Great Britain in the Third World 
War--which he obviously took for granted and assumed would be waged once again by 
Germany against England and assorted other enemies. Such extraordinary persistence in 
old ways of thinking does not show that von Leeb had learned from the past; on the 
contrary, it demonstrates that he had been entrapped by it as well as captured by the 
Allies. When I refer to the lessons of history, I am suggesting that historical experience 
allows us greater insight into the range of possibilities and the range of possible dangers 
in the development of events and policies. 
The second point which must be clarified is the definition of the phrase, the 
"German Question." For the purposes of this paper the phrase will be sued to refer to 
the organisation of the German people into a state or states and the possibilities and 
dangers inherent in changes in that organisation. Only the period since 1815 will be 
taken into account here. This chronological constriction is dictated by two considerations. 
In the first place, the German Question as an issue of nationality really only develops in 
the upheavals at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
In the second place, the reorganization of central Europe at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century involved the disappearance of a form of state organization within 
which millions of Germans had lived in prior centuries but which we are unlikely ever 
to see revived on German territory: the church states so prominent in western and 
southern Germany before the great upheavals. 
The Congress of Vienna dealt with the German Question at length. It is worth 
noting that the very attempt to engage the German Question at an international 
conference was itself a novel enterprise and hence an indicator of the changing situation 
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in Europe. For the first time an effort was made to give the German people as Germans 
an organized entity of their own. It was called the German Confederation; and its 
membership, organization, boundaries, and basic procedures were incorporated into the 
instruments signed at Vienna. The Confederation was designed to be a structure for the 
Germans of Central Europe which would not only leave the other states of Europe 
unthreatened but was supposed to contribute to their peace and security, a double 
function which it appears to have performed in the subsequent decades. 
For many Germans, however, the German Confederation was not sufficiently 
German. On the one hand, the fact that portions of the territory of the Confederation 
belonged to the Danish, the Dutch, and the British crowns meant that non-German states 
were involved deeply and directly in the inner development and structure of the 
Confederation. On the other hand, while some German-inhabited portions of Prussia 
remained outside the Confederation, large portions of the Austrian empire which were 
inhabited by non-German people had been included. These real or imagined defects of 
the Confederation were partially reduced or eliminated by historical developments in 
subsequ~nt years. One should note the obvious signs of disintegration evident within the 
territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands with the Belgian revolution of 1830 as well 
as the end of the personal union of the Kingdom of Hanover with the British crown in 
1837 because of the differing succession laws governing the two states. Many 
contemporaries found this evolution far too slow, noted the failure of various attempts 
to alter the internal structure of the Confederation, and hoped for more rapid--and more 
drastic--alterations in the situation. 
The German Empire founded by Otto von Bismarck in 1871 looked to some at 
the time and to many later like a far preferable solution of the German Question to 
that offered by the German Confederation. In arriving at this judgment they tended to 
overlook that this new structure also divided the Germans, even if somewhat differently: 
this time the Germans of Austria were omitted altogether. Furthermore, the new state 
not only included millions of Prussia's Polish inhabitants but also brought into Germany 
additional non-Germans through the annexation of lands inhabited by Danes and 
Frenchmen. It is therefore at least open to question whether this new structure was 
actually more "German" than the Confederation had been. It is even more questionable 
whether this new construction under the autocratic central government with which 
Bismarck provided it was in the long run compatible with lasting peace and security in 
Europe. There is an especially striking contrast between the function of the 
Confederation as a defensive shield for Central Europe against possible incursions by 
France from the West or by Russia from the East and the implications of Bismarck's 
territorial expansionism for the relations of Germany with those two countries. The 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871--with its implications for German-French relations-
-was followed seven years later by Bismarck's secret treaty with Austria about North 
Schleswig as a bribe for his allegedly impartial role as broker at the Congress of Berlin-
-with its implications for German-Russian relations. Few Germans saw this contrast at 
the time, but many others did. 
The internal cohesion of the new German state was often contrasted with the 
weakness and incoherence of its predecessor, but in this regard there are also facets of 
the manner in which Bismarck operated that had implications which are too frequently 
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overlooked. The enormous annexations by Prussia which preceded the construction of 
the German Empire gravely compromised the future functioning of the latter. In view 
of the prior trading back and forth which had affected the history of the small state of 
Lauenburg, a case could easily be made for its annexation by Prussia at the end of the 
war of Prussia and Austria against Denmark. The massive annexations which followed, 
however, prejudiced the future of Germany; as between Prussian expansionism and 
German federalism, the former was obviously far closer to Bismarck's heart. The 
Prussian state would in any case have been disproportionately large in any federal system 
created for the German states (which or without the German-speaking portions of 
Austria), but the annexations of 1866 tilted the whole system in a manner and in a 
direction which would prove to be irremediable. One has only to give a moment's 
thought to the alternatives to recognize the fatefulness of the events of 1866. Without 
Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Nassau, Kassel, and Frankfurt, the disproportionate size of 
Prussia in the German federal system would have been much less. In the Bundesrat, the 
upper house of the German parliament, Schleswig-Holstein under the Augustenburg family 
and Hanover under its dynasty would have joined Bavaria, Saxony, and Wiirttemberg as 
mid-size states, while Nassau and Cassel would have joined such states as Baden, Hesse-
Darmstadt, Oldenburg and others as smaller units. A very different federal system 
indeed. And the implications of the annexations for the future of the new German state 
were not confined to its formal structure. 
Prussia had begun as an overwhelmingly Protestant state. In the century beginning 
with the accession of Frederick the Great in 1740, it had steadily increased its proportion 
of Catholics by terriorial expansion: Silesia, the Polish provinces, and eventually the 
western areas in the Rhineland as well as the portions of Saxony added in 1814-15 had 
been inhabited predominantly by Catholics. Though still the minority, and one 
discriminated against in a wide variety of ways, the Catholics were in fact approaching 
demographic parity within Prussia; whether in such a state Bismarck would have hurled 
himself into the Kulturkampf, the assault on the Catholic church, is at least worth 
speculating about. The lands annexed in 1866, however, were without exception 
overwhelmingly Protestant in population, and this reversal of the trend in the proportion 
of Protestants and Catholics within Prussia ought not to be entirely omitted--as it 
generally is--from discussions of the origins and impact of the Kulturkampf with its long-
term implications for the political health of the German state Bismarck constructed. 
Whatever one's views on these issues, one fact is beyond possible controversy: 
the Bismarckian Reich was erected as a result of victory in three wars and collapsed in 
the military defeat of the First World War. The unity of the German state was 
maintained only by the combined actions of the internal and the foreign enemies of the 
Second Reich. It was precisely those political movements which Bismarck had defamed 
as "Reichsfeinde," as enemies of the state--the Catholic Center Party, the Social 
Democrats, and the bourgeois left now organized in the Democratic Party--which held 
Germany together internally as the old ruling houses disappeared overnight. From the 
outside, the victors of the war, France, Great Britain, and the United States, made it 
possible for the youngest of the European great powers to continue to exist as a unit in 
the Peace Treaty of Versailles; one of the many advantages of that treaty for Germany 
which only became evident to most Germans after they themeselves had done everything 
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possible in order to destroy it. 
Just as many Germans did not consider the German Confederation to be 
sufficiently German, so large numbers of them did not believe the Weimar Republic to 
be sufficiently powerful and large. Even today many fail to recognize the great and real 
successes of the Republic; instead one can often read about the supposed successes of 
the National Socialist regime. It is regularly overlooked that the actual return of 
Germany to acceptance as an equal great power with a permanent seat in the Council 
of the League of Nations, the early end of occupation and reparations, and a whole host 
of other accomplishments were all real successes of potentially lasting significance attained 
by the Republic. Instead, attention is focused on such imaginary successes of the 
National Socialists as the creation of a new airforce in a world practically without heavy 
bombers with a resulting rearmament of others which had devastating results for 
Germany's cities, or the remilitarization of the Rhineland with its breach of the only 
defensive alliance Germany ever had with England before NATO as well as its 
encouragement to German adventures elsewhere and thus a new war. 
The point I would like to stress, however, is a portion of the program of the 
National Socialists which is generally overlooked in discussions of the German Question. 
From the very beginning the National Socialist Party called for a new division of 
Germany. Three points in the National Socialist program of 1920--the 4th, 5th, and 6th-
-called for a partition of Germany along religious, allegedly racial, lines. Loudly and 
unceasingly the Nazis asserted that only a new division of the German population would 
enable Germany to ascend to world power status; and the reports of the newspapers and 
police on rallies of the 1920's and early 1930's reveal that it was precisely these demands 
for a renewed division of Germany which evoked loud applause from the listening crowds. 
Of the many promises Hitler made, only two would be fulfilled--and in a manner 
he never anticipated. He promised to divide the Germans, and he assured them that no 
one would recognize Germany if he were given the power he demanded. The fulfillment 
of both promises could be seen in the ruins of the divided and occupied Germany of 
1945. 
When we consider the German Question in the post-World War Il era, we must 
do so under circumstances which oblige us to take into account entirely new and 
extremely important elements: the confrontation between super-powers in the middle 
of what had been Germany and the existence of nuclear weapons-both developments 
of the same year which saw the disappearance of the Third Reich. Under these 
circumstances, is there any possiblity at all of making changes without starting an 
earthquake that threatens to destroy the whole earth? 
It may be useful in discussing this general problem to cite first some examples 
from the past, examples which are all too frequently overlooked. I have already referred 
to the important way in which the change in the Hanoverian and British succession of 
1837 affected the German question: one has only to try to visualize its subsequent 
development had the two continued to be joined in personal union by the same king or 
queen. Another development of the early nineteenth century seems especially interesting 
to me because it indicates that it is possible to make a significant alteration in the 
German Question for reasons of security policy without necessarily causing major 
international complications. The first territorial change in the arrangements established 
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by the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna was a small enlargement of the German 
Confederation. A portion of Western Galicia was taken into the Confederation. Why 
was this change made? Because this portion of Austrian Galicia covered an important 
possible invasion route into Bohemia, and this alteration in the boundaries of the 
Confederation had the effect of involving all of its members in the defense of this 
potential invasion gateway. The details of the issue are not important today, but the 
concept is worth recalling. 
The nineteenth century also saw the only permanent enlargement of German 
territory in modem history, an enlargement which as far as I know is not called into 
question by anyone today. This was the acquisition of the island of Helgoland in the 
North Sea in the so-called Helgoland Treaty of 1890. The chancellor who secured this 
territory in a success which for once in German history truly deserves the term "einmalig" 
or unique was Leo von Caprivi. He was attacked most vehemently inside Germany for 
this action, but it is worth recalling for its demonstration of the possibility of adjustments 
being worked out in peaceful negotiations between major powers--in this case Germany 
and Great Britain--in a manner which satisfies the security requirements of both. 
The argument may be made that the first examples lie too far in the distant past 
while the last ought instead to be seen within the framework of the exchange and 
partition treaties which characterized the imperialist expansion of Europe in the late 
nineteenth century. Without trying to resolve the question of the validity of such 
arguments, we must now turn to the period since May 1945. When we consider this 
period, we ought to look first at a number of changes in the development of the German 
Question which were by no means foreordained or inevitable as many are inclined to 
assume today. The American zone of occupation with its three portions and the British 
zone and the two portions of the French zone were united into one political entity. This 
process was anything but simple and automatic; and even though the possibility of such 
a development could certainly not have been excluded in 1945, the process of unification 
could very easily have taken many decades. Only one example of how long such a 
reunification can take might be mentioned here: Spanish and French Morocco remained 
separated for many decades after the partition of 1912 until they were reunited a few 
years ago. 
An even more remarkable step in the situation since 1945 is the return of the 
Saar territory to Germany at the beginning of 1957. This is one development many 
would have considered impossible, or at least most unlikely, in prior years. Precisely 
because the French government had seen so many of its immediate post-war objectives 
in Germany vanish one by one, it might have been expected to hold with all the grimmer 
determination onto the one tangible acquisition of victory-especially in the face of the 
by that time obvious permanence of the transfer to Poland and the Soviet Union of 
extensive former German territories in the East. It is also worth noting that Konrad 
Adenauer's policy on the Saar question was subjected for a long time to even more 
vehement domestic criticism than von Caprivi's Helgoland Treaty, and that some of this 
criticism came from members of his own cabinet! All of the changes recited here have 
one extremely important element in common: they were all worked out in lengthy, 
complicated, peaceful-even if sometimes acrimonious--negotiations. And at the end of 
those negotiations . those who had participated in them found the results, if not entirely 
5 
South Carolina Historical Association 
to their satisfaction, at least preferable to the possible alternatives. 
In the years since 1945 there have also been changes in the border between East 
and West Germany, and these too deserve mention. The pieces of territory which are 
involved in these changes are minute, but one can learn from such events if one wants 
to. The territories to be discussed first are Eiskeller and Steinstiicken, two exclaves of 
West Berlin. The success of the settlement arrived at in the treaty of December 1971 
can be seen most simply by the contrast between two scenes in West Berlin. On the one 
band, the schoolchild from Eiskeller who could go to class only when escorted by a 
British tank, on the other hand the sign "Steinstiicken" as the attainable final station on 
a West Berlin streetcar. In 1988 there was a whole series of additional modifications in 
the borders between East and West Berlin and between West Berlin and the German 
Democratic Republic. One of the smaller pieces of territory transferred in this 
transaction had been leased for some time by West Berlin from East Berlin prior to the 
signing of the final agreement of March 32, 1988. Can anyone imagine such a thing 
happening in the 1950's or 1960's? The total area involved in all of these adjustments 
was small, but the very fact that such changes were made, and made by mutual 
agreement, deserves careful attention. 
The review of examples like the ones cited leads to the question, what is needed 
and what is dangerous for alternations in the status quo? The one thing needed least 
of all is a big ruckus. When anything is demanded long enough and with sufficient noise, 
there is always the danger of getting what has been demanded. For many years the 
Sudeten Germans yelled as loudly as they could that they wanted to go "Heim ins Reich", 
home into the Reich, until one day they were driven home into the Reich. For many 
years the German government and large numbers of German politicians, publicists, and 
scholars worked to persuade the world that contrary to the experience of many centuries, 
Germans could not live on both sides of Poles; this wish has also been fulfilled in the 
meantime. 
The Germans also do not need any of the so-called "successes" of the early 
National Socialist years, and no one should lead them toward great times, as William II 
once promised his subjects. Any new arrangements in the German Question which are 
to be of real and lasting significance will have to share a special quality with those 
arrangements of the past to which I have already referred. They must include careful 
consideration of the security of other involved and interested parties. A few years ago 
there appeared a highly interesting Festschrift with the title, "Die Freiheit des Anderen, • 
(lbe Freedom of the Other Person). This title was designed to convey the implication 
that the freedom of the individual can be assured only within a system which 
simultaneously guarantees the freedom of others. In the same fashion, any new security 
system for Germany must provide for the security of others. 
Currently the German people live in a system of peace and security in which the 
other peoples of Europe also live in peace and security--even if they do not all live in 
it happily. In the last five hundred years, in the centuries since the emergence of the 
modem state system on the European continent, the peace of Europe has never 
previously been maintained for as lengthy a period as in the years since 1945. The so-
called peace movement in Europe, and most certainly within Germany, has shown neither 
awareness of this astonishing fact nor interest in it. The Europeans who have been 
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accustomed for centuries to seeing a war on the continent every five or ten or, at the 
most, twenty years, and who have then participated in Europe's major sport-mutual 
slaughter, preferably on a very large scale--long seemed to be annoyed by their current 
deprivation in this regard. It is actually not so surprising that they poured out their anger 
at this deprivation on the Americans whom they consider responsible for it. Yet this 
peace has brought to the Germans, and I refer here to all Germans, some time: time 
to live and to grow, to learn and to love. Time is not a neutral but an active element 
in life, and perhaps additional time ought not to be considered such a disaster. One 
would hope that the world will not end tomorrow; but if it does, it will make very little 
difference whether the Germans lived in one or a hundred states. If, however, it does 
not end tomorrow, then there are two highly significant attitudes which one might well 
adopt in the face of the present situation in Central Europe in general and in Germany 
in particular. 
In the first place, it may well be appropriate to show a little pride in the German 
contribution to the long period of peace in Europe. This contribution entails many sad 
and costly and even tragic aspects, but there could all too easily be even more terrible 
possible contributions; one has only to consider the example of Korea. In that country 
a return to a division approximating that of 1945 was attained only after three years of 
bloody and destructive fighting, fighting which if it were to occur in Germany would very 
likely be even more terrible than that of 1950-53. 
In the second place, one ought to observe the unfolding of events with the greatest 
care and attention to possibilities for change. Historical development no more stands still 
now than in the past. Any such possibilities should then be explored with the care and 
caution and regard for the security of others already suggested. 
The changes which have swept Central and Eastern Europe in 1988 and 1989 had 
their impact on the German Democratic Republic (and changes there in tum affected the 
other countries of the region). Substantial numbers of people were allowed to leave East 
Germany legally, first through Hungary, then through Czechoslovakia and Poland. 
Demonstrations inside the GDR toppled the regime first of Erich Honecker and then of 
his successor. The dramatic measures taken by their successors to halt the crumbling of 
their system--legalizing emigration and opening the wall--have not stabilized the GDR. 
Without Soviet military power to back it up, the East German system turns out to be at 
its end what it was at its beginning: a roof without foundations or walls to support it. 
The German Democratic Republic once had the function of offering the Soviet 
Union an opportunity to try to extend its say into all of Germany; it has long since lost 
that role. It also once provided a source first for massive reparations deliveries and · 
subsequently for important machinery and technology transfers; the first of these ended 
years ago and the second has been greatly reduced. But there is a third function of the 
GDR, and that role remains. It is that of simultaneously providing from the perspective 
of the Soviet Union a military advanced position toward the West and a firm staple 
holding Poland in the Soviet bloc. Even if the former of these roles is not as important 
today as it once was, the latter has, if anything, grown in significance. It must be noted 
that developments inside Poland make a retention of a large Soviet military presence in 
the German Democratic Republic more, not less, important for Moscow. Anyone in 
Moscow who does not see this is not likely to last long. And it is hardly wise to 
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overlook this aspect of the situation. 
There are many possibilities, each with its own set of risks. Perhaps most of the 
people of the GDR will leave, come to live in the Federal Republic, and thus create one 
Germany in a Federal Republic that will thus have solved its problem of a declining 
population while the officials of the GDR will earn their living as tourist guides in a 
European nature preserve. In that preserve there would be ample maneuver grounds for 
the Red Army; the remaining population would be treated decently lest it also leave; and 
the aging factories would, like the Indian ruins in Mesa Verde National Park, be shown 
to tourists as monuments of a by-gone German Path to Socialism. 
It is conceivable today that the Soviet Union might allow some form of unification 
in which a re-united Germany could emerge with continued ties to NATO. The special 
status of the Federal Republic when admitted to NATO in 1955, namely that, unlike all 
other member states which are permitted to have units inside or outside the NATO 
structure, all German units must be under NATO's combined command, could now 
provid~ a new safeguard for everyone-ironically its original intent. Furthermore, the 
lowering of troop levels would save everyone trouble and money. The United States and 
Great Britain have long been pledged to the territorial status quo in Europe; a reunited 
Germany is unlikely to take us all on once again. Not only would its military be under 
NATO command, but the Federal Republic could very easily make and keep the one 
promise that would assure everyone that a German army was not about to head for 
Moscow again. They would just have to promise not to include the half a million or 
more horses they would need in their military apparatus; nothing would be easier to 
verify--and no one in the Federal Republic has the slightest interest in raising them. 
There are risks to this policy option, but the situation of the last 40 years, with well over 
a million solders with thousands of nuclear weapons facing each other in Central Europe, 
was hardly riskless. 
As we look to the future, we will do well to consider both the wide range of 
opportunities as well as dangers illuminated by the past, remember that we will never 
live in a rislcfree world, and meet new challenges with eyes alert to the possibilities for 
arriving at arrangements which offer more security, fewer risks, and a better life for 
all. What is called for is not a fixed recipe but rather an open eye for change in a 
constantly changing world. 
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BANKS, LAW, AND POLITICS: 
THE ORIGINS, OUTCOME 
AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THE DEVEAUX CASE 
W. Calvin Smith 
University of South Carolina at Aiken 
Historical mention of banks, law, and politics in early American history inevitably 
brings McCulloch v. Maryland to mind. For anyone with more than a cursory knowledge 
of the topic, Osborn v. The Bank of the United States may also come into mental view. 
Rarely would anyone, except the most serious legal or bank historian perhaps, express 
awareness of Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, an early predecessor of McCulloch v. 
Maryland that originated from the same issues as the later, more famous, case. The 
Supreme Court, presided over by John Marshall, heard this case involving the first Bank 
of the United States and state taxation thereof ten years prior to McCulloch. Yet at that 
time, for reasons explored herein, Marshall's court avoided ruling on the bank's 
constitutionality as well as the priority of a state tax on a federal instrumentality. 
That there should not be more awareness of the Deveaux case and the court's 
omission of a ruling on the first bank's constitutional legitimacy is hardly .surprising. 
Texts, monographs, and general studies on the bank have usually bypassed, sidestepped, 
or otherwise disregarded the case. In their early History of the First and Second Banks, 
John Holdsworth and Davis Dewey dismissed Bank of the United States v. Deveaux with 
the remark that it "was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, where it 
became involved in technicalities." 1 Their statement appears to have set the tone for 
subsequent bank historians James Wettereau and Bray Hammond. 2 Legal and court 
historians such as Charles Warren, Charles Haines, John Roche, and Kent Newmeyer 
have, of course, discussed Deveaux. Their usual interest in the case, however, has been 
primarily in terms of its role in federal corporate law development. This is 
understandable, since that Deveaux issue was part of the emergence of the said area of 
'John Thom Holdn,onh and Davis It Dewey, 77te Finl and Second &llllrs oftlte UnilLd Stata (Wuhington: GPO, 1910) 123. 
'•mca 0. WetteRau, "The Branc:beo of the Pint Bank of the United State&,' Joum,,J of EcOMnlic History 2 Supplement (1942): 
84; Bray Hammond, &llllrs and Polilks ill Amtrica from tlte Revo/ulibn to tlte CMI War (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957)1?7. 
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federal law. Their attention to the underlying historical and constitutional issue of state 
taxation of the federal bank has been generally confined, with little explanation, to the 
observation that Marshall waited until "a more propitious occasion" to "take this particular 
( constitutional) test."' 
Early works in constitutional history were not much different in taking note of 
Deveaux's significance in court history. Albert Beveridge and Edward Corwin, for 
example, gave the impression that the Supreme Court under Marshall, from Marbury in 
1803 to McCulloch in 1819, expressed a "tiger instinct for the jugular" refusing "to take 
a timid or obscure way to a merely tentative goal." 4 Such assertions of necessity had to 
overlook Deveaux because of the cautious element in the jurisprudence of the Marshall 
Court that it represented. 
More recent studies of the Supreme Court have used the Deveaux case, along with 
others of the same era, to re-examine the early Marshall Court from an evolution of 
Court power standpoint. Herbert Johnson, for example, has presented a circumspect 
Court under Marshall, careful to protect itself and build its prerogatives slowly by 
evolviqg the "rule of law" in its jurisprudence of the Jeffersonian period.' 
If one combines this more recent view of the early Marshall Court with the 
politico-historical realities of the final years of the first bank, it becomes possible to 
propose a comprehensive, though hypothetical, construct regarding Deveaux's outcome and 
significance. In so doing, the reasons why the constitutional problem of state taxation of 
a federal instrumentality was avoided in 1809 and delayed until "that more propitious 
occasion" of 1819 are provided. 
The events that would result in the Deveaux case began with the decision of the 
Bank of the United States to open a new branch in Savannah, Georgia. The parent 
bank, responding to a business downturn between 1801 and 1803 and the Jeffersonian 
treasury's debt repayment efforts, viewed Savannah as a likely new area for investment. 
That port's increasing volume of shipping and trade, the lack of any other banks in the 
area, and the eagerness of local merchants to assist in launching a branch of the bank 
enhanced prospects of financial success. By the end of summer 1802 the bank had 
completed its preparations and the Savannah Office of Discount and Deposit of the Bank 
of the United States began operations.• 
Over the next several years, the bank's ability to augment capital won it approval 
in the region from prominent businessmen. But there were problems. Traditional 
agrarian opposition to paper money and bank manipulation thereof gave a source of 
't:harlcs Wanen, 77w S"l""'M Cou,r ill Uniud Staus Jrutoty, 2 .ota. (Booton: l.iltlc, 1926) 1: l'JI.; Chula G. Hainca, 77w Rak of 
11w s"l""'M Cou,r ill Ammcai, GtNtmmffil Olld Politics, 17lf9.18JS (Bcrtdcy: U ol Califomil P, 11144) 278; John P. Roche A Stanley 
Bcrmtein, eda., Jolrn J,/onhalJ, /lllljor o,,;,,;a,.s Olld 0/lwr lfWlillp (lndilnapolil: Bobbs, 1967) llS-116; R. Kent Newmyer, 77w Su,,n,,w 
COIOf u""6 Nanhall Olld TONY (Arlinaton Heipu, Ul.: AHM, 1968) 76-n. The quotation ii from Haina, 278. 
~rd S. Corwin, John J,/anhall Olld 11w Constilulion; a Cl,ron;,:k of 11w Su,,n,,w COIOf (New Haven: Yale UP, 1919) 123, 130; 
Albert J. Bcvericlp, 77w 1-* of lolrn Monhall, 4 wll. {Booll,II: HoughlOII, 1916-1919) 3: v, 4: 282-339. The Quotation ii Crom Corwin, 
123, 130. 
'ocorge Lee Hukins and Herbert A. Johnson, FOlllldalions of p_., John J,/anhalJ, JIJOJ.J81S, wl. 2 ol Hist«y '1f 11w Su,,n,,w 
COIOf ofllw Uniud ~ ed. Paul A. PKund (New York: Macmillan, 1981) )116-399, 40S-406; Herbert A. Johnson, "J'he Ruic cl Law 
and Judicial Review in Ille Manh.111 C.O..rt, 1801-181S," AHA ~ntiOft, December 1978. 
'Weuerau 83-84; Hammond 137; C°"'1rtbiall J,/weum Olld SavannahA<iwnion; 25 June 1802; .lolcpb Habc:nham, letter lo Thomu 
Willill1, 23 April 1802, Gratz Collection, Historical Soc:iety ol Penuytvania; o-gitJ ~ 2 Sept. 1802. 
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suspicion and wariness. 7 Then, too, the bank directors' preference to make Joans to 
"gentlemen in point of fortune and respectability and character" as opposed to "young 
merchants of no fortune" alienated would-be entrepreneurs.• 
The alienated and the suspicious at length sought economic action against the bank 
through the state legislature. With their anti-bank sentiments strengthened because of 
the "Federalist" leaning of the bank's directors in a state with a growing Jeffersonian 
majority, the bank's opponents succeeded in placing a tax on the capital and issued notes 
of the Savannah branch in December 1805. To demonstrate their determination, they 
included a provision directing the tax collector to proceed against the bank's property 
should it fail to pay the tax. 10 Viewing the tax as exorbitant and shocking, the Savannah 
directors communicated the "very extraordinary measure [of] the party now in power" in 
Georgia to the main office in Philadelphia. In reply, they received instructions to follow 
"such measures as will bring the question before the Supreme Court of the United 
States." 11 
The Savannah directors, agreeing to take that step when necessary, refused to pay 
the tax voluntarily and, in the meantime, maneuvered in the legislature to have the tax 
repealed. Their efforts met only partial success. A memorial requesting suspension of 
tax collection until the bank could study the issue further was tabled, and tax repeal 
proved impossible in the face of strong opposition from the Jeffersonian majority. 12 The 
bank was not friendless, however. Its supporters did obtain a reduction in the tax amount 
and fought off an effort to reimpose the original tax should the bank fail to make a 
return of its capital within sixty days of the law's passage. 13 In a legislature with a 
majority convinced that a federal bank was subject to the taxing power of the sovereign 
state, the bank's friends had, in sum, achieved only reduction and delay. 
Its political efforts thus less than desired, the bank had to decide whether to pay 
this new, smaller, less burdensome tax or remain adamant and question the constitutional 
right of the state's action in federal court. It preferred the latter course. Compliance 
with the legislative decision, its directors feared, would encourage other states in which 
branches existed to follow Georgia's example, bringing ruin to the national institution. 14 
Accordingly, the bank continued to refuse to pay the tax, prompting state collection by 
force. On April 20, 1807 tax collector Peter Deveaux, accompanied by the local sheriff, 
entered the branch office and seized two boxes of specie. The bank thereupon directed 
its attorney to bring suit against the tax collector in federal court "for the purpose of 
trying the right of the state of Georgia to impose a tax on the branch of the said bank 
'I'. P •• Govaa, "Banking and the Cm!it Syltem in Geo,p, 1810.1860," lounuJ/ of SoutMnt Hislary 4 (1938): 165. 
'Habersham to Willing, 23 April 1802; Jacob Rud, letter to CleorJIO Simpoon, 9 Jan. 1806, Gnlz Collection, Hiatoriall Satiety 
ol Pennaylvania; Holdsworth and Dewey 124-125. 
~upllin S. <llyton, A Compilalio,I of tlte lAWl of tlte Stak of a-,ia, pas#d l1'j 1M uglslatvn Sinct tlte Polilkol Ytar llJ()() to tlte 
Ytar 1810, lncl,,.siw (Aupaa, Ga., 1812) 254; Read to Simpoon, 9 Jan. 1806; Thomaa Gamble, Savannah Dwb and Dudlisu, 1733-
l~Savannah, Ga.: Review, 1923) 1()1).110. 
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(of the United States) established at Savannah."" Litigation would now begin. 
When the Sixth Federal Circuit Court convened in December 1807, bank attorneys 
petitioned to have Deveaux and Sheriff Thomas Robertson appear and answer charges 
that they had financially damaged the "President, Directors, and Company of the Bank 
of the United States" to the extent of $3,000, an amount sufficient to give the circuit 
court cognizance. Lawyers for the state and local officials immediately entered a plea 
to the jurisdiction of the court. They contended that the bank was a "body politic and 
corporate" and could not sue or be sued in federal court by any constitutional or legal 
right 16 In responding to this jurisdiction plea, the bank's attorneys presented two points. 
First, they asserted citizenship diversity, i.e., that plaintiffs were citizens of Pennsylvania 
suing citizens of Georgia. Second, they claimed that since the bank was a United States 
corporation, any questions concerning it were federally justiciable. If this were not so, 
they concluded, then the very constitutionality of the bank's charter was at stake. 11 In this 
fashion, the two jurisdictional issues that the Deveaux case carried through the federal 
judiciary emerged. Yet behind both loomed the broader constitutional question of state 
taxation, and thereby possible destruction, of a federally-created entity. Should 
jurisdiction be accepted, the constitutionality of the bank and federal limits on state taxing 
power thereof would have to be determined. 
Justice William Johnson presided over the Sixth Circuit Court at the time, and to 
him fell the first ruling on these issues. Johnson had the distinction of being both a 
South Carolinian and Thomas Jefferson's first appointee to the Supreme Court. 
Jefferson's eagerness to alter the Federalist-dominated bench following his presidential 
victory is well-documented. Impatient that "few die and none resign," he had tried various 
means to bring the court under his sway. Thus, when he finally had an opportunity to 
appoint, he had chosen Johnson of South Carolina after careful scrutiny. Johnson was, 
according to the report on him to Jefferson, "an excellent lawyer, prompt, eloquent, of 
irreproachable character, Republican connections, and of good nerves in his political 
principles ... ."" This Jeffersonian justice opposed at the time "excessive" use of broad 
construction and believed that the legislature, not the courts, best expressed the will of 
the people. Further, he viewed federal jurisdictional power as carefully defined and 
limited by the Constitution. 1• 
Johnson's ruling in the Deveaux case on the jurisdictional issue reflected the above 
principles. He did not agree that the bank had proved federal jurisdiction either by the 
circumstance of the parties in the case or the possible conflict of state and federal law 
therein.,,, Instead he ruled that the bank had brought suit in its corporate capacity, not 
''Bank ol the United Statca v. Dcwaux, et. al., 2 l'ecleraJ Cua 692 (1800); Bank ol tbc United States v. Peter Dcwawc 111d 
lbomu lwberuon, Cue Pile, luconla ol tbc United States Circuit Court, District ol Georp. Cue B. Box 11 (Federal lucordi 
Ccatcr, Fat Point, Geoqia). 
"Bank ol the United Statca v. Peter Dcwawc and Thoma& lwberuon, Cue Pile. 
"But ol tbc United States v. Peter Dcwawc and Thoma& lwberuon, Cue Pile; Rq,ubl,con and Savannah Evrnlng L.,qt,, 9 June 
la 
•Cllanctcn ol the ln)>en ol s.c.,• ArchMS of tbc Department of State, quoted in Donald 0. Morpn, Justi<e William .lohnlon: 
11le Fust Dissffll6 (Columbia, S.C.: U of South Caroli1111 P, 1954) 50. 
"Donald Morpn, "William Joh111011," 77te Jldias of the Uniud SIDla S.-COUit, 17811-11¥11 ed. Leon Friedman and Pied lmacl, 
4 .olL CN- Yort: Bo,,ter, 1969) 1: 3.58-364. 
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as individuals; and corporations did not come under constitutional notice for federal 
cases. "A corporation,• he asserted, "cannot with propriety be denominated a citizen of 
any state, so that the right to sue in this court under the Constitution can only be 
extended to corporate bodies by a liberality of construction, which we do not feel 
ourselves at liberty to exercise.":u Therefore, citizenship diversity as an instance for 
corporations to enter federal courts was non-existent. Further, with regard to the possible 
conflict of state and federal law, Johnson saw no reason why a sovereign state should not 
tax property held within its jurisdiction, whatever the source of that property. The federal 
bank had not been granted any special tax-exempt status by the federal law creating it, 
and states had surrendered their taxing power to the federal government only in the 
instance of import-export duties. The bank, Johnson concluded, would simply have to go, 
as any other corporation, to the state courts if it believed its rights violated. 21 
Immediately upon learning Johnson's ruling, the bank petitioned for a writ of error 
to the Supreme Court. :u It wanted to have the case heard quickly in that tribunal before 
the end of the year. Its charter was to expire soon and it had already petitioned 
Congress for its renewal. ;io It obviously did not want to have its national corporate 
capability subject to state whim once rechartered. Instead it preferred protection as a 
federal entity from anti-bank state laws. Who better to do this than the Federalist-
dominated Supreme Court presided over by John Marshall, not unknown for his 
nationalist views? 
Scheduling delays prevented the Marshall Court from hearing the case until the 
February 1809 term. Even so, the timing, from the bank's vantage point, was not "totally 
unpropitious." Jefferson would leave office on March third and the more amenable 
Madison would be President next day. Further, the case, although mentioned in the 
press, had not aroused any great furor. Newspapers in general were much too busy with 
news of the embargo, its pending repeal, and the war in Europe to make lengthy 
observations on a jurisdictional appeal that seemed primarily to involve corporate 
citizenship. 25 In addition, the passing of the impeachment and Burr trial antagonisms had 
diminished personal hazards Marshall might have faced from Jefferson and his supporters. 
Further, the Court still retained a Federalist majority after eight years of the Monticello 
sage. 26 Might not the bank expect a favorable ruling on jurisdiction and a subsequent 
favorable hearing on the state tax question? 
When argument began before the Supreme Bench, bank counsel Horace Binney 
sought reversal of the denial of jurisdiction in the lower court on the two, now familiar, 
grounds of diverse citizenship and special tax-protected status of the bank. The spirit of 
federal law, he contended, demanded recognition of a corporation as a citizen for legal 
purposes. Since state courts could not be impartial in dealing with a corporation 
1'2 Federal Cues 693. 
"l Pedetal cases 693. 
~ ol the United States v. Peter Dewaux and Thomas Roberlllon, Cue Pile. 
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chartered elsewhere, federal courts must acknowledge diversity of "citizenship" in such 
instances and assume jurisdiction. On the second point, he argued that federal courts had 
cognizance over cases involving the bank through the act incorporating it. Since its 
charter gave it a right to bring suit in "courts of record and any other place whatsoever," 
the justices must assume that Congress had intended to protect the fiscal agent of the 
United States from arbitrary state action via federal courts. 71 
As expected, respondent's attorney, Philip Key, denied that corporations were 
citizens capable of bringing suit in federal court. State courts alone were their recourse. 
To rebut the second point, Key maintained that federal status gave the bank no special 
federal court protection by implication from state authority. The Constitution, strictly 
interpreted, would have had to grant such protection to federal entities expressly, and it 
had not done so. Federal courts could take cognizance only where state courts had 
disregarded or misconstrued federal law.» As the case concluded, it was quite clear that 
the bank was contending for a liberal interpretation of congressional power under the 
Constitution and the respondent for a narrow one. Undoubtedly, the bank must have felt 
confident that broad Federalism would prevail over strict Jeffersonianism. 
On March 3, 1809 Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin recommended to 
Congress renewal of the Bank of the United States's charter. On March 4 James 
Madison replaced Jefferson as President. On March 15 Chief Justice John Marshall 
delivered the Court's opinion in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, et. al"' The first 
two events pleased the bank. The third proved discouraging and something of a puzzle 
as the Chief Justice announced a strict, not a broad, jurisdiction basis for federal courts 
where the bank as a federal entity was concerned. He denied, as Johnson had, that the 
bank possessed any special federal-creation status granting it access to federal courts. 
Such a status had not been expressly given in the act incorporating the bank and could 
not be assumed by implication. Looking only at the exact wording, Marshall agreed that 
the bank would have to take its chances in courts that would ordinarily have cognizance 
of legal questions involving the bank, presumably state courts. 30 He did not even pursue 
jurisdiction on the grounds that a federal instrumentality could protect itself from state 
efforts to control, or destroy, it. This was neither a broad constructionist nor a nationalist 
speaking. 
Turning to the diversity of citizenship issue, Marshall took a generally narrow view 
of corporations as citizens under federal law and the constitution. He agreed with 
respondent that a corporation was not a citizen and had no jurisdictional access to United 
States courts under the diversity clause. He did, however, modify the circuit court ruling 
and quality corporations to have cases originate in federal court on one narrow basis. 
Having heard other corporate citizenship cases argued at the same time as Deveaux and 
realizing some need for federal intervention on behalf of national business growth, he 
conceded that the court could look behind the corporate name to the real persons 
"S Crudl 63-72. 
"5 Cmich 72-77. 
"Bdward C Carter, "The Birth o( a Political Eronomill: Mallbcw Carey and the Recharter Pight o( 1810.1811,' hNuy/wl,lla 
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involved. If all of them met the diverse citizenship test, the corporation could then sue 
in federal court. 31 Thus Marshall edged in some nationalism, but still denied the bank 
its day in court. It could not meet the test he prescribed because a few of its 
stockholders, those who were directors of the Savannah branch, were citizens of Georgia. 32 
With the ruling that jurisdiction was lacking in either instance, the bank had lost 
and faced the humiliation of paying the state tax. Deveaux had ended, and the 
Constitutional questions the bank had wanted to raise went unanswered. The case faded 
into legal history as a curiosity in the evolution of federal corporate law that was set 
aside in 1844.,, But, for the intrigued historian, Deveaux cannot end here. Knowledge 
of Marshall's generally broad-based, nationalist views makes the Deveaux ruling seem 
strangely out-of-touch with his attitudes. The question of why he was so "strict" where 
the bank was concerned in 1809 must be resolved. Marshall was not known for being 
a narrow legalist or a strict constructionist. So, could other issues have been at work 
where the bank itself, as opposed to corporations generally, was concerned? 
Since there is no record of behind-the-scenes deliberations in this case and no 
Marshall memoirs have been found for clarification, a hypothetical historical construct 
becomes necessary to explain Marshall's action. The construct is plausible, if not totally 
provable, and it must begin with the notion that Marshall did not want to accept 
jurisdiction and have to rule on bank issues at this time. One starts with this notion 
because circumstances so suggest. The Chief Justice, for example, was thoroughly familiar 
with, and approved of, Hamilton's 1791 opinion on implied powers, an opinion made 
available for his biography of George Washington.,. Surely the creation of a federal 
instrumentality implied its protection from harmful state action. In addition he could 
have established jurisdiction from the nature of the case, i.e., a controversy affecting a 
federal question.,, Finally, if Justice Story can be believed, Marshall was never happy 
that his Deveaux ruling had made very narrow the door for corporations to sue in federal 
court.,. Yet had he made it any wider, he might have had to accept jurisdiction in 
Deveaux on citizenship diversity grounds and rule on state taxation of the bank after all. 
Building on this view that Marshall avoided jurisdiction, the construct continues by 
looking at two categories of evidence that support it. One of them may be called a "rule 
of politics" and the other the "rule of law." In the first instance, the principle is to be 
wary of aggravating an irritant unnecessarily, particularly if your own political strength has 
been weakened. Marshall knew the unfavorable opinion of the traditional Jeffersonians 
on the bank. He also knew that the opinion had gradually changed as Gallatin, Madison, 
and many Jeffersonian-Republicans in Congress had come to favor the "usefulness" of the 
institution. He further knew that the recharter issue had been before the country since 
·~ Crancb 8Hl3, 86-92. Strawbridge v. ~ 3 Cranch 21,7 (1806), bad earlier dealt with I similar di.erlity illJlllnce, but in lhat 
case no corporate name wu i.........,. 
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the bank memorial of March 1808. n Finally, he knew that he and Jefferson remained 
as symbolic representatives of an older quarrel regarding the proper role of the judiciary 
vis-a-vis the executive and legislative branches. Should that quarrel be reopened by 
judicial pronouncement on the constitutional issues surrounding the bank at the very 
moment Congress took up the recharter request, would not that request suffer? Even 
Gallatin had delayed submission of his report recommending rechartering until the day 
Jefferson left the presidency out of careful respect for "symbol."31 Marshall, who was 
neither uninformed nor unimaginative, but shrewd, ·intelligent, and well-versed politically, 
undoubtedly reasoned that old partisan feelings should be left quiescent. The bank 
appeared to have an even chance of obtaining renewal of its charter in 1809,"' why should 
the "symbol" of Federalist judicial entrenchment jeopardize it? Let the charter be 
renewed now. There would be another case, given the jealousies of the states and the 
commercial development of the day. 
If these thoughts were in Marshall's mind, as evidence suggests, then his decision 
was politically wise indeed. It afforded no opportunity for politicians to fume against a 
Court that would dictate constitutionality to Congress. Even though the renewal effort 
failed, it did so by only one vote in each house of Congress where, during the debates, 
thirty-five of thirty-nine speeches dealt with constitutionality issues as administration 
workhorses led the fight for the bank which "Old Jeffersonians" opposed.'° 
The foregoing evidence is indirect, of course. It relies, as stated, on knowledge 
of Marshall as a politically aware person. The second category of evidence, though also 
circumstantial, does lean a bit more toward the direct since it relies on the earlier noted, 
recent interpretation of the pre-1815 Marshall Court.•• That interpretation, derived from 
an examination of numerous Court decisions during the Jeffersonian era, argues that the 
Court adopted the "rule of law" concept at the time, at least in part to protect itself from 
Jeffersonian retaliation. The politics of the period, it maintains, stimulated the creation 
of a juridical viewpoint that a careful distinction exists between law and politics. 
Threatened with political impeachment and subjected to manipulation of term and duty, 
the Court's members knew that survival during this era depended on establishing and 
maintaining prestige in a hostile environment. Resultingly, the justices had to create an 
image of a Court capable of self-restraint, above partisan politics, and concerned only 
with the "rule of law."42 Time and again in this period, their decisions pointedly denied 
the Court power. They used this method to create an institutional authority base which 
eventually would bring the Court respect and political independence. 0 Since the Deveaux 
case fell right in the midst of this institution building, Marshall's strict interpretation 
ruling can be seen as reluctance to discard lightly in 1809 what the Court had been 
painstakingly creating for over half a decade. "The duties of this Court," Marshall wrote 
in the Deveaux decision, "to exercise jurisdiction where it is conferred, and not to usurp 
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it where it is not conferred, are of equal obligation."" Through this kind of judicial 
restraint ruling. Marshall was clearly establishing that law was beyond mere politics, the 
essence of his "rule of law" task. 
Thus our hypothetical historical construct provides some satisfaction to the question 
of why Marshall ruled as he did. He did so, it asserts, because his concern for both a 
rule of politics and the rule of law concept at a crucial time in Court history required 
that he not accept jurisdiction. Leg~sts, as well as Ranke historians, would be unhappy 
with this construct. They would, and have, preferred to see Deveaux significant only as 
a small step in the evolution of federal corporate law and Marshall acting in the only 
manner which the law precisely allowed. But, seen from a broader historical perspective 
under this construct, the case becomes a grand example of the wise use of judicial 
restraint so that Judicial activism may carry the day on a "more propitious" occasion. 
Although such restraint meant deferring both legal federal citizenship for corporations and 
· the dictum that the power [of states] to tax involves the power to destroy [the national 
government], it also meant that Marshall could continue to build the court's institutional 
power base. From this base in the post-War of 1812 nationalist era, he could launch 
those well-known juggernauts of judicial nationalism, McCulloch, Darthmouth, Cohens, and 
Gibbons. Had he seized upon the Deveaux case to do so in 1809, it is unlikely his Court 
could have withstood an onslaught of the 1820s "Richmond Junta" variety. 
"s Cnnch f!I (ltalica added); d. JohlllOII 12. 
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"THIS ·SAD WORLD:" 
PREMILLENNIALISTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE DURING 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Richard M. Gamble 
University of South Carolina 
Many American evangelicals of the mid-nineteenth century believed that the bitter 
years of the Civil War were a prelude to glory. Post-millennialist in their eschatology, 
these reform-minded Protestants hoped to usher in the reign of Christ on earth through 
the preaching of a gospel of personal and social redemption. Building on the doctrinal 
foundation laid more than a century before by Jonathan Edwards, these. Christians fully 
expected the progress of a militant Church culminating in the arrival of God's long-
awaited kingdom. But the destruction brought by the war and the continued division and 
disappointment of Reconstruction betrayed this millennial hope. As historian Timothy 
Weber wrote, "postmillennialism was quickly losing credibility after the Civil War because, 
in the eyes of most people, things were getting worse, not better."' 
Into the void left by the weakening of postmillennialism stepped premillennialism. 
Premillennialism offered to evangelicals the solace that the return of Christ did not 
depend on the success of human efforts--which certainly seemed to be failing at every 
tum-but that His reign would be accomplished supernaturally and with cataclysmic 
abruptness. This is not to suggest that postmillennialism died; far from it. But as a 
general rule, postmillennialism became the domain of liberal evangelicalism which 
retained its faith in inevitable progress and the perfectibility of mankind, while 
premillennialism became closely identified with conservative, revivalistic evangelicalism. 1 
'nmochy P. Weber, Living in 11w Shadow of 11w S«ond Coming: Amtrican lfflniJlenniali llf15-1962 (Grand Rapids, Michipn: 
Zondcrvan, 1983), p. 41. Sec also George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culturo: TM Shaping of 1'wowth-Couuty 
Evangtlkalism, 1~1925 (Oxford: Oxford University Prag, 1'*1), pp. 48-SS for a detailed discussion of the decline of 
~nnialilm and the renewal of prcmillennialism among conservative cvanp:licals. 
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It was this premillennialism, this total dependency on the literal fulfillment of the 
apocalyptic teachings of the Bible to precede Christ's reign of peace, which conservative 
evangelicals brought with them from the nineteenth century into the twentieth. They 
faced the social, theological, and international circumstances of the new century equipped 
with a new world view: that one day, one day soon, world events would naturally flow 
toward a predicted and observable realization of prophecy. They pictured themselves 
as the realists of their generation who understood the true nature of man, the true nature 
of the world condition, and the proper relationship of man to that world. 
In the middle of the material and technical progress of the early twentieth century, 
both premillennialists and postmillennialists recognized the serious social problems which 
mocked that very progress. Conservatives and liberals alike pointed to concentrations of 
wealth, militarism, luxury, and other evils which threatened to undermine the physical and 
spiritual well-being of all Americans. 3 Many Protestant liberals, though, saw reason for 
hope, and held up examples of tangible scientific and cultural advancement as proof that 
man was indeed capable of applying his knowledge to practical problems. Conservatives, 
on the other hand, saw more reason for despair. 
The international situation preceding World War I provided the clearest indication 
to premillennialists that the world was in entropy and that it was only a matter of time 
before circumstances devolved beyond man's capacity to control them. R. A Torrey, a 
leading premillennialist and former co-worker with D. L Moody, declared in 1913 that 
"many of the greatest statesmen of England, America and Germany have forebodings 
which they scarcely dare to put in words of what lies just a little way ahead of the 
nations of the earth." 4 
Torrey, of course, was correct, and the war proved to be the greatest boost up to 
that time for the credibility of the ·premillennial position. Premillennialists had predicted, 
based on their understanding of the Bible, that a cataclysmic age known as the Great 
Tribulation' culminating in the Battle of Armageddon would precede the Second Coming 
of Christ. The war with its unprecedented suffering and destruction was undoubtedly 
qualified as a candidate for just such a tribulation , and its significance for the movement 
should not be underestimated. As Weber commented, "No event in the fifty years after 
1875 did more for the morale of American premillennialists than World War I. There 
at last was indisputable vindication of their dire predictions about the inevitable decline 
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of the age." 
The war ended in 1918, but the world did not, leaving premillennialists without an 
Armageddon. But this turn of events did not force premillennialists to modify their 
jeremiad against the world. A matter of weeks after the signing of the armistice in 
November, leading premillennialists came together for a large prophetic conference in 
Carnegie Hall, New York City. Its organizers called it "the greatest of its kind ever held 
in this country."" The speakers at the meeting pictured the war as merely the beginning 
of woes. The plight of Germany became an object lesson for them of what would 
happen to a nation if it was uprooted from a faith in the inerrant Word of God. After 
all, Germany had been, in their eyes, the fountain of higher criticism, which subjected the 
Bible to the scrutiny of modern science. Arno C. Gaebelein, himself a German 
immigrant, reminded the conference audience in his opening remarks that "it must be 
clear to every thinking Christian" that "the horrors of the past four years are connected 
with the rejection of this Book divine as God's Word and God's revelation. . . . 
Destructive Criticism and the new Theology robbed Germany of the faith in the Word 
of God and the Gospel of Christ; and then they were, under Satanic delusion, plunged 
into that which outraged the laws of God and man."' The point was not lost on the 
audience that America must avoid the folly of Germany. 
With the war over, the obvious concern for premillennialists, as for the majority 
of Americans and Europeans, became the issue of world peace and America's role in the 
achievement and preservation of that peace. At that same New York prophetic 
conference in 1918, speaker after speaker expressed his desire for peace but raised doubts 
about its durability. The situation would not improve now that the war had ended, they 
reminded the audience; the promise of the Bible that wars would increase in the last days 
had not changed, the precipitous course of the world had not altered, and man's nature-
-the key to it all--had certainly not improved. They rejected the plausibility of world 
peace and the idea of a league of nations not out of some perverse wish for human 
suffering, but because their understanding of history, the heart of man, and the prophetic 
passages of the Bible prevented them from doing any other.• 
Based on their reading of history, premillennialists repudiated both the hope of 
lasting peace and the efficacy of a league to build world peace. C. I. Scofield, famous 
at the time and today for his dispensational interpretation of the Bible• and for his widely 
popular study Bible based on that interpretation, reviewed the utopian literature of past 
"'optimists' [who] patter of peace when there is no peace" and observed that "when they 
have written, time counts out the days and years and they are still as before years of war, 
of the ruthless reign of the strong over the weak, of the delusions of a shallow optimism 
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which shuts its eyes to realities." He concluded that history is not silent on the potential 
for peace. If we would but look at the trail left by past civilizations, we would see that 
"there is absolutely no mystery about these evils. The oldest brick dug from a 
Mesopotamian mound bears the same record of ambition, pride, greed, which are making 
the history of to-day." 10 
This dark view of history was consistently held by premillennialists. At the 
Carnegie Hall conference, speakers cautioned their listeners to weigh carefully Woodrow 
Wilson's claim of making "the world safe for democracy." "As I read history," one 
commented, "the past is full of dead democracies, and the world was no safer with the 
democracies of the past than with aristocracies ... ." 11 Torrey called the dream of world 
peace "delusive" on the basis that alliances of the past had brought war, not peace. 
Would a league of nations work any better, he queried? "First peace," he predicted, "and 
then the most awful war that this world has ever seen, culminating in political chaos .. 
• • 
1112 Gaebelein summarized this pessimism by quoting Teddy Roosevelt's comment that 
the promise to end war based on a league "'is either sheer nonsense or rank hypocrisy,'" 
and remarked that the increasing problems in the world were rooted in "the dark shadow 
of lawlessness." Indeed, the war marked only the beginning of travail. 13 
At an earlier national prophetic conference held in May 1918, the fiery evangelist 
William B. Riley explained a second reason for the futility of a league: the nature of 
man. "Who will make democracy safe for the world'!" he asked, reversing Wilson's promise. 
He admitted that democracies "have been more satisfactory than autocracies", but 
wondered how fallen man could hope to be corporately virtuous when he was individually 
perverse. 1• At the November conference, W. H. Griffith Thomas did not doubt that some 
sort of temporary peace would be achieved--from sheer exhaustion if nothing else-but, 
he observed, "as long as sin is in man's heart there is always the possibility of the flame 
bursting out afresh notwithstanding all that our politicians may do." 13 
A third reason premillennialists rejected the possibility of world peace is that such 
a concept was outside the biblical prophecies concerning both the general increase in 
warfare and the resurrection of the Roman Empire in the last days. As early as 1910, 
I. M. Haldeman, pastor of the First Baptist Church, New York City, wrote that "universal 
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disarmament is impossible. . . . It is impossible because the Son of God has said that 
war will continue among men till he returns." Quoting a passage from the Bible popular 
among premillennialists, Haldeman believed that "there will be wars and rumors of wars, 
[and that] kingdom will rise against kingdom and nation against nation." Oearly, even 
before the war in Europe seemed imminent, premillennialists offered no hope for world 
peace because the Bible--regardless of how postmillennialists read it--offered no such 
hope.•• 
In 1913 Billy Sunday threw out the possibility of world peace along with the entire 
concept of progress because of his understanding of the Bible. "Many have the idea," he 
wrote, "[that] the world will grow better and better until the coming of the millennium, 
and everybody will be converted, and you hear that stuff preached, but the Bible does 
not teach any such thing."11 Just as a faith in world improvement had no basis in history 
or in the nature of man, neither had it any basis in general prophecy. Scofield picked 
up the theme in 1914 by reminding Christians that the "Lord paints no picture of the 
cessation of war in this age, not a hint of it." 11 
During the war the consensus was the same: the elusiveness of peace would 
confound peace conferences, those who promised an end to war were deceptive, and the 
prophetic promises of Scripture itself would have to be annulled in order to have peace. 
Nothing changed with the end of the war, either. Although some, such as W. B. Riley, 
claimed to support the goals of peace and called the war "folly", they saw only the 
renewal of wars in the future. America may try to end war, may try to teach the world 
how to live, as some hoped, preached Riley, "but such teaching is not according to my 
Book." "1llis war seems to be at an end," Riley continued, "but the peace that follows 
it will not be a lasting peace if the Lord be forgotten." This would not be the last world 
war. 1• 
In addition to these general prophesies concerning the increase of war that belied 
the possibility of world peace, premillennialists also believed that a league of nations 
figured centrally in the fulfillment of specific prophecies in the Bible. Its formation would 
be the prelude to the apocalyptic Armageddon; the league would be a supremely ironic 
confederation for peace out of which would spring the Antichrist, who would bring 
destruction upon all mankind. From their reading of the Old Testament book of Daniel 
and correlating this interpretation with the book of Revelation, premillennialists believed 
that a new empire would emerge in Europe which would actually be a confederation of 
nations, in essence the revival of the old Roman Empire, what Daniel called the "fourth 
kingdom." Furthermore, the "Beast", or Antichrist, would arise as the leader of this 
confederation. The Antichrist would eventually engage the nations of the world in a 
war centering on the nation of Israel--the restoration of which premillennialists had 
1'\¥. H. Griffith 1bonlM, 'The Prince of Peace" in Gacbclcin, ed. Christ and G'°'JI p. 222. 
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predicted--and culminating in the battle of Armageddon, at which point Christ would 
return to defeat Antichrist and establish his millennial kingdom.,,, 
Haldeman explained it thus: "Within the limits of the old Roman empire there will 
be a parliament of the nations, an assembly of ten kings. Out of this parliament of the 
nations will come the man of sin--the Antichrist." As early as 1910 he observed 
international events which he believed signaled the coming of a great confederation "as 
straws show the way of the wind." This cooperation was inevitable, he wrote, once man 
believed that the world could not survive without it. 21 Scofield, the organizer and 
disseminator of much of the dispensational and premillennial interpretation of the Bible, 
scoffed at the idea of a "United States of the World." If our own nation could not 
escape a civil war, he reasoned, how could we expect the world to do any better? "The 
peace which for a little time results" from such a federation of nations, he wrote, "is that 
of universal subjugation to earth's last and most hateful despot, and it ends in 
Armageddon." 22 The league would culminate in disaster. 
This view of the league and its role in biblical prophecy reveal a certain 
ambivalence in the views of premillennialists. This double-mindedness took two forms. 
First, if the formation of a league signaled the approach of the end of the world and the 
coming of Christ to set up his kingdom, then expectant, watchful Christians should have 
welcomed such significant events with outstretched arms. The United States' support or 
even union with an international organization would, theoretically at least, and certainly 
in popular opinion, ensure the success of the league. Why, then, did premillcnnialists not 
support a league if doing so would help push the world to the brink? 
Obviously, no Christian wanted to be part of the opposition to God by being on the 
side of the Antichrist. But, more subtly, these Christians were Americans who feared for 
their country, who believed that involvement in a league would drag the United States 
into every European squabble. As Torrey noted, "We have had holy alliances before. 
What came of them? Disappointment and calamity. We have had the trip~ alliance of 
the Central Powers, and the triple entente of France, England and Russia. And what 
came of them? The present war." For Torrey it was a matter of simple logic. 23 
A second expression of ambivalence was the premillennialist attitude toward peace 
in general. Again, world tensions were a "sign of the times" as was so often said. Should 
they not be welcomed then? But these Christians were also humans, humans who had 
shared the losses of war. At the time of the two major prophetic conferences in 1918 
they still had sons overseas, sons they feared for. At the Philadelphia meeting the 
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leadership read to the audience from President Wilson's proclamation for a week of 
prayer, part of which petitioned the Almighty to "bring us at last the peace in which 
men's hearts can be at res~ because it is founded upon mercy, justice, and good-will." 
They also offered a "special prayer in behalf of the boys at the front", asking God to 
"give victory, we beseech Thee-victory, victory--for the honor and glory of Jesus Christ." 
They prayed for deliverance in the midst of tribulation as any Christian or patriot 
would and did, but the focus of premillennialism remained on ultimate solutions to the 
world's problems. This approach influenced evangelism and social work as well as 
eschatology. Socially they sought to change the community by first changing the 
individual. "We believe in reconstruction," retorted one to the charge that 
premillennialists were indifferent to social service, "but reconstruction based on 
regeneration.""' In this same way, with an eye on the ultimate rather than temporal 
good, these premillennialists preached what was to them a very real hope. 
Writing of this hope in a book first published in 1898, W. E. Blackstone said, 
"there ii no hope . . . for the world, but," he added as the key to it all, "in the coming 
of Christ the King."" In a telegram to the Philadelphia prophetic conference, Scofield, 
who was unable to attend because of illness, expressed much the same idea when he 
asked God's guidance "in the putting forth of a fearless warning that we are in the awful 
end of the Times of the Gentiles, with no hope for humanity except in the personal 
return of the Lord in glory ... . "'If, 
At the same conference one speaker even held out the hope of international 
cooperation. But again, it would be an ultimate, permanent solution arrived at on God's 
terms. "This world is yet to have an international court of arbitration," he said, "from the 
decisions of which there will be no appeal. There will be just one Arbiter in that court, 
but he will be the King of kings."27 
Premillennialists did not offer despair to Americans as was so often charged. They 
had absolutes in a world of change, comfort in a world of turmoil, and security in a world 
of uncertainty. As the coordinators of the Philadelphia conference exulted, "in the 
shadow of the tragedy of world-wide war Christians everywhere have been burdened in 
spirit and bewildered in mind by the complex conditions of the hour. But with an 
eagerness springing from a sense of personal need and a newly awakened desire to know 
the purposes of God as revealed in His Word, many are turning with . . . restful 
assurance to the prophetic utterances of the Word of God for light."'" R. A Torrey 
graphically summarized the alternatives open to those who rejected the ultimate solution 
to the world's evils. "If the Lord Jesus were not coming," he said in 1918, "there would 
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be and could be nothing for this sad world to do but to build its merciless dreadnaughts 
[sic] and submarines and zeppelins and airplanes, and devise more and more destructive 
gases and more powerful and more frightful explosives and go on fighting one another 
until this world became transformed into one universal chamal [sic] house of maimed, 
tortured, dying and dead. War will continue, more frightful wars even than this, until He 
comes, but His coming, the Prince of Peace, will end it all."» Grim fatalism? Perhaps. 
But to these preachers it was simply sane realism. 
Striking in all of these statements is the fundamental agreement between 
premillennialists and modernists on the goal of world peace. Even though they 
represented the polarities of opinion of what path to take to that peace, they concurred 
on the necessity for a global solution for the predicament of modern man. One saw 
man's capacity for evil, the other for good; one saw cultural regression, the other 
progress; one saw mankind as individually salvageable, the other collectively. Both also 
recognized the same problems and the same needs, and both offered the same solution. 
As Timothy Weber noted, "they both looked for a millennium."30 But it was the means 
to achieving the reign of Christ that shaped the conflict between premillennialists and 
progressive theologians, especially during the war years, and it was the definition of that 
millennium which was the key to their controversy. 
Probably the most illustrative trading of barbs between the premillennialist and 
modernist camps was over the question of optimism. In an age which had ventured so 
much of its world view on the validity of optimism, it is no wonder that "pessimist" 
became the worst epithet imaginable and the one to be disowned with the greatest vigor. 
The modernists called the premillennial view "pernicious", and the premillennialists 
responded by calling unqualified optimism the "refuge of lies." 31 
This conflict surfaced as early as the 1890s in the work of W. E. Blackstone, but 
reached a crescendo in the war years that became deafening by 1919. Blackstone 
believed that premillennialists were under attack for being "opposed to the popular idea, 
viz.: that the world is growing better ... ." But, he claimed, he would rather offer what 
is called "despair" than "deceive [sinners] with the hallucination that they are 'growing 
better' •• . ." To do otherwise would be to deny that the future was indeed dark for those 
"who are full of unbelief." 32 
C. I. Scofield, commenting prior to America's entry into the war, drew a sarcastic 
analogy between contemporary optimists and the prophets of ancient Israel wb.o emptily 
promised fortune on the eve of disaster. "The false prophets," he jabbed, "had a sing-
song message. It was, 'peace, peace, peace', when there was no peace. They looked 
about them and they saw at the moment Israel at peace, prosperous, everything looking 
hopeful. They were the cheerful optimists of that time, and their message was a welcome 
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message."" Premillennialists were willing to view the world differently since for them it 
meant preserving a more basic belief, their belief that mankind was better served by a 
realism based on revealed truth than an optimism based on fragile hope. Aller al, 
they reasoned, didn't the war remove every foundation for such an elusive hope?. Before 
the tragedy in Europe, Charles Wimberly remarked in 1916, "anyone who presumed to 
see other than an undisturbed reign of peace was a pessimistic, disgruntled calamity 
howler." Wasn't the premillennial view of entropy the more rational, he argued? "Is it 
not better to be a pessimist in line with the truth than an optimist, and feel the sands 
continually being washed out from under us? Away with an optimism that can be 
satisfied sheltered under a 'refuge of lies'; better a thousand times be a green-eyed 
pessimistic calamity howler, and be on the side of truth." Man's heart, he admitted does 
desperately want to believe in a brighter future. 'There is something in us," he wrote, 
"that craves such a gospel. . . • Optimism is delicious ... ."" 
Many premillennialists claimed to be the only true optimists in the world. They 
recogiµzed the condition and destiny of the human race, but since they were waiting for 
a diviQely enacted millennium, they had reason for hope. Like their solutions, their 
optimism was also ultimate. R. A Torrey vigorously defended his optimism. "But," he 
claimed, "[the writer] is not a blind optimist. His optimism is not the result of shutting 
his eyes to unpleasant facts; his eyes are wide open to the awful injustices that rule in 
human society as at present constituted." "If he did not believe [what the Bible teaches 
concerning the Second Coming of Christ]," he continued, "he could not but be a pessimist, 
knowing what he does of social conditions and the trend of human society today." The 
coming of Christ, he concluded, was the "perfect solution."" 
Optimism had been appealing. It is difficult for us who live in a world which is 
more frequently minimizing losses than making gains, to understand just how powerful 
faith in progress was; it had even become the basis of values in the axiology of 
Pragmatism. By the late nineteenth century, many intellectuals, in Europe and America, 
had begun to give up on Progress; a darkness pervaded the novels of Theodore Dreiser, 
and a sense of personal and national failure began to haunt Henry Adams. Progress for 
these men had been supplanted by a crushing determinism. 36 But it was the religious 
progressives, the modernists, who held on to optimism most tenaciously, even throughout 
the most horrible war man had known. 
3\veber, LJwtt in w S"'1doo,\ p. 102. The politioft of William Jcru,inp Bryan on the Leapc illllllratea the ditroculty of 
eatabli&hin& a •runclamentalisl" opinion towa..i international cooperation. He called the League "the greatest llep towa..i peace ill 1,000 
:,ears.' (Quoted in C. Allyll Ruaell, Voices of Amtrican F"""4menlalis: S....... /Jiograpll#ol Sa,dies (Philadelphia: The Weatminller 
Prea, 1976), p. 167). Bryan wu also optimistic about the ruture and man', capacity £or ao<>d· "My raith in the ruture,• he WIOIC, 
•rea11 upon the belie£ that Christ'& tcachinp ue beina more 11udied today than cwr be£ore and that with the lalJltr lludy will aime 
an application of theK tcachinp to the cwry clay life ol the world.• Thi& quotatioll ii rrom the printed rorm of a popular Chautauqua 
lecture: William Jcuinp Bryan, 7lw l'ri1tu of l'Nee (Louisville, Kentucky: The Herald Prea, n.d.), p. 30. But apin. the pl ii the 
same: "fiitd peace through the "reign ol Christ", t,or,e,,er that wad defined. 
~r cbancleristic pRmillenlliali&I aen&i.livity conccmed practicality. Many of speaten and writcn went to peat le11atbs 
lo prOYC that pRmillellnialilm wu "practical.• lt ii intereating that • group which no doubt otrlCially rejected the philolophical buil 
of Pragmatilm spent 10 much lime proyin& that their belie& "woltl:ed. • W. E. Blackstone i11 Ja,u u C°"""' de,ioted an entire chapter 
lo the eity of premillennialilm (pp. 180-182). 
the e:a:ba.,.. betwee11 rullclamcntalilt& and medoemilt& during the qr, &ee Mande11, F"""'1mfflla/ pp. 146-148. 
, Jaus Is c-bt& p. 142, 144 (empha&il bil). 
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Shirley Jackson Case of the University of Chicago Divinity School was perhaps the 
most outspoken in his attacks on premillennialism, even to the point of suggesting that 
the movement was being financed subversively by the Kaiser. 17 In The Millennial Hope: 
A Phase of War-Time Thinking, Case defended the modernist belief that "permanent relief 
[is] to be secured only by a gradual process of strenuous endeavor covering a long period 
of years" against the "pernicious" view of the premillennialists. • Case was incredulous that 
at the time when the world most needed the efforts of everyone to work toward the 
prevention of another war, the premillennialists were abandoning the ship and perhaps 
even helping to fulfill their own dire prophesies. He consigned the outlook of these 
biblical literalists "to a prescientific age when primitive thinking derived the imagery for 
its expression from a purely mythological interpretation of the universe.":111 
Case went on to condemn premillennialists for doing nothing for the present ills 
of society and for considering anyone who did not accept their eschatology as eternally 
damned. These charges are demonstrably false, but the point here is that 
premillennialists were considered outsiders, or, in current jargon, they were not part of 
"mainstream America." 
This "outsider" theme was picked-up in the popular and religious press in 1919. 
The Literary Digest in March 1919 surveyed several denominational periodicals to judge 
their general opinion toward the League of Nations. The Congregationalists, as quoted 
in the article, believed that "no more important duty rests upon the churches and other 
organizations of right-minded men and women than to put themselves strongly on record 
as in favor of the idea of a League of nations ... ." It continued by calling for Christians 
to "fall in line." One Presbyterian paper believed that the day of "universal brotherhood" 
had come, and The Christian Centu,y joined the chorus by calling on Christians to 
"organize the world anew, making it safe for all the finer influences to run and be 
glorified. . . ." .. 
Later in March The Literary Digest once again reviewed the religious press on its 
response to how politicized the League issue had become. The Congregationalists blamed 
opposition to the League on a "prejudice against, or distrust of, President Wilson", and 
the editors of The Literary Digest concluded that "not one member of [the religious press], 
so far as we have observed, opposes the League in toto." The denominational papers of 
the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians, and the Methodists, all defended the League." 
By the following November The Literary Digest was reporting that, according to a survey 
by the National Committee on the Churches and the Moral Aims of the War which 
appeared in The Christian Work, only one pastor in twenty of 17,000 questioned-0pposed 
~ 'The Doctrine of tbe List Tllillp • Pcmtold in the Propbcla' in 77w C......., ON/ Kingdom of~ pp. «Ml. 
Scoficld continued by uyina, 'For aU I ~ Ibey may baY,: been peat on statiltics. They may baY,: been able to point out tllat while 
the population bad illcrealed IM> per cent, the ucrif,ca bad iDCJeMed tluce per cent.' This wu no doubt a poke at tbe acicntiric 
~ of moclerllilta to manen of Ille lleart. 
- - '"wimbcrty, Bdtold 1M ~ pp. 4< 2ai 
"r<llft)', 77w Ra,,,n of 1M Lani, pp. 7J. ~ Henry Adam'• olleasloa with dctamiallm - the last 11C¥Cnl dlaplen of 77w EdMeadon of Ho,,y Adturu. 
•'sec Minden, F~ p. 1-47, hi whicll C- ii quolcd aa uyina, 'Where the money «- from ii ~ but 
there is IIIOIII IUlpicion that it emanates from German 10Umes. In my belief Ille find _., be a profatable field for .,.eramcntal 
illYCltiption .• 
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the League. The surveyor held up as exemplars pastors such as the one in Kansas City 
who "by day and night" tirelessly spoke out for the League both in public lectures and 
in the city newspaper he owned ... 
Opinion, then, in the mainline denominations, had consigned opposition to the 
League by Protestants to those who were not "right-minded", who did not "fall in line", 
who possibly held a grudge against Wilson, and whose leaders were part of a narrow-
minded five percent. They were stubborn in the face of overwhelming public support, 
concluded The Christian Worlc, like the Senator who supposedly fumed that "if Jesus 
Christ appeared on earth and commanded that the Senator cast his vote in favor of the 
League he would refuse to do it."0 
Many of the denominations were active in their support of the League. Their 
journals urged readers to write letters to their Senators and make their opinions known. 
W. G. McAdoo, addressing the crowd in Columbus, Ohio, at the Methodist Centenary 
Celebration in 1919, called for "cooperation between all denominations of the Christian 
Church .... [The world's salvation] will require the mobilized effort of the Church 
militant to secure the fruits of the great victory for liberty, democracy and world peace 
which has been won. • . ." In supporting the league, he believed, the "Church faces its 
noblest opportunity and its greatest responsibility." .. 
Whether premillennialists were similarly active in their opposition to the League 
is another matter. Although they forcefully denounced the League as futile, or even 
Apocalyptic, it is fairly safe to assume that they limited their opposition to rhetoric, 
stopping short of direct efforts to defeat the League. Up to this point in their history, 
premillennialists had been concerned mainly with articulating and reaffirming the 
fundamentals of conservative evangelicalism, with the spread of the gospel through home 
and foreign missions, and with shaping and defending the doctrines of their eschatology; 
they had not been political. 0 But with the controversy between fundamentalists and 
modernists during the war and then in 1919 during the League debate, the issues which 
had divided these foes for so long were forced into the public arena. The year 1919 
marks a watershed for premillennialism and for fundamentalism in general. It was at this 
point, noted George Marsden, that tension between "cultural trends and the attempt to 
continue to respond only in the realm of prophecy and evangelism was more acute than 
ever." Premillennialism, as much as it had focused on individuals and their relationship 
to the world, had now taken sides not only over a national issue but over an international 
one as well. Having been reinforced by the controversy over the realization of world 
peace, the battle lines between fundamentalism and modernism were now drawn beyond 
the limits of pew and pulpit and out into society itself. 
°sbmcy JICbon C.C, 77w AliJJOlllial Hopt A Pita# of War-l"lnw '111i11kbtg (CbicaJ<>: The UniYenity of Chica&<> I',-, 1918), 
p. ¥, 
~C.C, 77w AliJJOlllial H"f#, p. 237. 
"1.n,e Cbun:b P,- on Ille Peace 1..eque•, 77w UWary ~ v. 60, n. 10 (Man:b 8, 1919) pp. 32-33. 
~ Church Rd>uklna Peacc-1..eque Politk:s', 77w UWary Di(pl'v.llJ, n.13 (Mardi 30, 1919), p. 32. There ii no indication 
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The United States had a very clear view of the world it wished to attain following 
World War II. Its leaders wished to have a more stable world than had preceded the war 
and they believed that the key to stability would be an expanding world economy. United 
States leaders hoped to avoid international economic warfare by using wartime conferences 
to do away with protectionism and closed markets. Their battlecry was "free trade."' Most 
politicians believed that the adoption of their definition of "free trade" would necessarily 
lead to U.S. dominance of the post-war economy since its economy had suffered least during 
the war. However a number of American political leaders were frightened of the world of 
open cooperation as envisioned by Henry Wallace and others, so too, a number of business 
leaders were frightened of a world of open competition. 
History clearly shows that commerce and technology are closely inter-related. 
Advances in transport technology have always led to commercial expansion, with its 
attendant advantages and disadvantages for the nation which was first to apply the new 
technologies. U.S. leaders were very aware of this fact. They were equally cognizant of 
advances in aviation technology which had resulted from World War II. They knew as well 
that no other nation had as vital an aviation industry or contained as many potential civilian 
transport aircraft as did the United States. Thus, it is no surprise that many from the 
lowliest spot welder in a Seattle aircraft factory to President Franklin D. Roosevelt were 
111te c:oaccpt that lbe United Slalel COllltructed a fmeip policy baaed oo expu1ion al trade and commen:e ia the interpn:tatloll ol 
tbe New Left or revilioailt lldlool ol diplomatic hilloriana. The rllll and best aample ol thia inte,pn:tation iol William A. Williant1, Tltt 
Th,pl), of Amri:a,, DiplDmat:y (New Yort: Dell Publication Company, 1972, 2nd ed.). Olber New Left worb which an: mme dolcly 
concerned with World War II and lbe Cold War Include Gabriel Kolto, Tltt Untia of p_. (New Yort: Ruper & Raor, Inc., 1972), Tltt 
Roots of Ammean Famp Policy (Bollaa: Beacoo Pn:a, Inc, 1969), and Walter l..aPcber,.A,-.ka, lb,s,w, ONl the Cold War (New York: 
Alfn:d A. Knop(, 1985, 5111 ed.). Ill Older to cowptdleild lbe a,mplexitiel ol American fon:ip policy pis durin& World War II aee Clabriel 
K.olko Tltt Pulilia of War (New Y OIi:: Randoa Hoolle, 1968), and Selia; Adler, Tltt bol4lionist In,p,,b,: Its :n.,,,li<d, Cfflllll1 Raxdolt (New 
Yort: The Pree Pn:a, 1966). 
The politics ol Pan American Airwa,o .. bat ...... n:c1 in Muylin Bender and Seli& Allldtul, Tltt aw-, /"""""°", ,_ »;,. """ 
Paa AINmcOIIAinw,p, Tltt Rbloltd Foll of •AINmcall ~ (New York: Simon and Sch-r, 1982) and Wesley Phillipi Newlon, 
Tltt Prtlla,,s Slly. US hladM ~ oNl Ll#llo AMri:a, 1919-1931 (Coral Clabla, Pia: Uniwnity ol llliaml Pn:a, 1 ... 1918). Par 
1 ,eneral lludy ol tbe politks ol air linea in lbe World War II period, aee Belly Oidwitz, Tltt l'olidcs of /lllffllllliafta Air ThDupo,t 
(Lexington, Mui: O.C. Halli & Compuy, Inc, 1980), Jolla Ou1111, Cltal#tl..., Horiztllts: QANTAS 1939-1~ (St. Lucia, Oki: Univenlty 
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extremely concerned that the United States retain its station as the leading nation in the 
aviation field and use that position to expand its economy.3 
The application of the "free trade" doctrine to the air would lead to one of the great 
debates concerning the U.S. position in the post-war world. This debate attempted to 
delineate the means by which the United States could dominate the field of international 
aviation. The use of American economic muscle was not debated, but assumed. The real 
question was how best to apply American leadership in aviation, first, to benefit the 
domestic economy and, second, to help bring about political stability in the world by 
knocking down trade barriers. 
During the course of the debate, the second objective was obscured by a great 
internal question raised by the first objective, namely, was the United States to enter the 
business of international civil aviation by means of a "chosen instrument," or was it to allow 
free competition among its commercial air carriers? On the central issue of the "chosen 
instrument" all other considerations hung, but it must be remembered that it was always a 
question of the means to an American-dominated world economy; the end was never in 
doubt. 
Nations other than the U.S. looked to the post-war period as an opportunity to 
establish their own international route systems. Many Third World nations saw aviation as 
a quick way to expand their economies, but they also approached their international carriers, 
many of them government supported, as a symbol of national pride. The imperial powers 
such as Holland, France, and most particularly Great Britain had suffered the loss of most 
of their commercial links with their empires during the war. These powers saw civil aviation 
as a means of re-establishing those links and, just as importantly, as a means of re-asserting 
the presence of the Mother Counuy in the most remote parts of their empire.' 
America's greatest rival in the field of international aviation was Great Britain. Air 
commerce was viewed by the British as an opportunity to regain their earlier status as a 
great commercial power. War-ravaged Britain was also in need of a morale boost and its 
leaders firmly believed that British civil aviation would soon give national pride the needed 
lift.• 
While the Allied nations had presented a common front to the Axis powers during 
the war, they had been preparing to fight for control of post-war commercial airways, 
American leaders, believing that the closed market system that had existed before the war 
could be avoided in the future, thought a free market would bring prosperity at home and 
peace abroad. The possibility that the imperial powers would use their carriers to foster and 
operate government monopolies within their empires was a direct threat to American 
3Adolpb Buie'• diary• quoted ill Smltb,A.....,. Abroad, pp. 150-52, indicatca Rooaevcll'I poaltloa mi Ille'* of c:lvll ftlMloa to aid 
tbe eljlUlioG of Ille American )IOlt4UCCDIIOmJ. The United Slates Department of Commerce publicatioa, CMIA"""*"' ad Ille Nlllnul 
Bmaomy(Waalllnpon. D.C: Oooenlmeat PriDlllla Office, 19'5). pp. v, vii·lii, 1-11, Allocmpllaaiza Ille impoltant role .--ollldala 
clMlionecl tor cMI nlalioa la wardiltc off ,__,. ad p,,,,,idlq for economlc powtll followins Ille war. 
'aaa.tc. 1. ltclly, 77tt Sky's 11w Utr1i1, 11tt "'-, of llw Airl'- (New Yon: OJnnl-McCann, 196.1), pp.lflS.109. 
'llca,yl.AddSmitb,~Allnood: 11tt S..,of~ WorldAirRDl<ltf (Madiaoft, W'-.: The Unlwnityof W'IICOUlll "'-1950), 
p. 94. Sec alao, 77tt P"""'-, ~ 5111 10rie1, wl. 125., Houle of Lordi (Hamard) 8th SaaioG of the 37111 Pai1iamcat of Ille United 
Km,dom of Great Britala ad Nortbcm Inland 6 ad 7 Gcorp VL. p. llllll If. (Hereafter mcrrcd to as: Lcm11, Hanaard, pp. ##). 
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interests and U.S. policy makers set out to overcome the threat. 
However, within the United States the means of overcoming this threat was not very 
clear. U.S. international civil aviation was being handled almost exclusively by one 
company, namely, Pan American Airways. The president of Pan American was the hard-
nosed, intelligent, and determined Juan Terry Trippe. Trippe had built Pan American 
literally out of his own pocket, and with the help of his ample business acumen and some 
important friends he had made his company a very respected air line. Pan American's list 
of firsts was impressive, but to Trippe it was the "only" that mattered. Pan American had 
been the only U.S. company to offer dependable international service before the war. 
During the 1930's, Pan American had grown steadily and had served as an unofficial arm 
of the government. It linked the U.S. to its Pacific possessions, it was used as an instrument 
of the Good Neighbor policy, and made THE big step by introducing routine trans-Atlantic 
service. As the war drew to a close the question before the country was whether Pan 
American would continue as the only American international carrier or whether other U.S. 
carriers would be granted the right to operate overseas routes as well. 
A business as successful as Pan American had been was bound to create adversaries 
and Trippe's determined business approach did not help the situation. Other companies 
also wished to engage in international commerce, but they were often deterred by the 
expense of the venture since it could not be carried out without an assured profit margin. 
Most air lines initiated their domestic service with a guaranteed profit gained by carrying 
the mail. Pan American's initial international runs would not have generated enough 
revenue for the air line to remain in business had not the government approved mail 
subsidies for it. Trippe was determined that his carefully built international route system 
not fall apart because of government sponsored competition and he vigorously undertook 
to stop competition. 
While Trippe was more than happy to carry nearly all U.S. international traffic, 
others were disturbed that there was no competition. President Franklin Roosevelt was 
among those concerned. Therefore, when tiny American Export Airlines applied to the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in April 1939 for a license to conduct commercial operations 
across the Atlantic, Roosevelt threw his support behind the application. Trippe mobilized 
his lobbyists and friends on Capitol Hill as well and the fight was on. The conflict that 
ensued was to be a microcosm of things to come.' 
Both men were determined to win the contest and both sent in lobbyists to either 
gain support or engender opposition towards American Export Airlines. Roosevelt had in 
mind to test the need for competition on the North Atlantic route, Trippe was determined 
to stop any attempt at American competition. As Trippe saw it, Pan American was already 
in a very competitive business because it was competing with Lufthansa and KLM in South 
'Bender Oo#JI 1-, pp. m-22. 
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America. and with Imperial Airways, QANTAS, KLM, and BOAC in the Pacific and Asia.• 
Everywhere Pan American flew, it was competing with foreign national carriers. Trippe saw 
no reason to have to compete with his own countrymen.' 
In Senate hearings on American Export Airlines' service application, Trippe brushed 
aside questions about the waiting lists for seats on his Oipper flights and the great increase 
in the amount of mail to be carried in order to emphasize his point that a second carrier 
would be wasteful competition. According to Trippe, it would be better to increase Pan 
American's service, which had proved itself, than to license an untried company. 1be Post 
Office seemed to support Trippe's contention by conceding that it would have to pay 
$1,388,400.00 more in subsidies to assist a new carrier than it would to double Pan 
American's service.• 
The Civil Aeronautics Board's ruling on American Export Airlines' application was 
a compromise. On 12 July 1940 the CAB disapproved American Export's application to 
serve Southampton, Marseilles, and Rome, but it did grant a temporary certification to open 
service to Lisbon via Bermuda and the Awres. This decision was quickly approved by the 
President despite the fact that it flew in the face of the Civil Aeronautics Act.' 
American Export still had to obtain its mail subsidies. Again, Roosevelt and Trippe 
lined up their respective lobbyists and sent them to Capitol Hill. Adolph Berle, Assistant 
Secretary of State, was detailed by the President to see through Congress the appropriation 
that Roosevelt had put into the budget for American Export Airlines. Roosevelt was 
determined to have competition and Trippe was determined to continue Pan American's 
monopoly. Berle was directed to line up support for the subsidy from the War, Navy, and 
State departments in the form of favorable testimony during the hearings of the House 
Appropriations Committee. Trippe also testified during these hearings and argued that he 
was already engaged in serious competition. He then called for government sponsorship of 
his monopoly just as other governments sponsored their international carriers. Only in this 
way, Trippe maintained, would the United States be able to get its fair share of the 
international traffic. Competition between U.S. carriers on the same routes would simply 
bankrupt all of them and leave the national economy vulnerable to foreign carriers. 
Trippe's plan narrowly failed to convince the committee which approved the appropriation 
by one vote.1° 
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The committee vote sent the budget to the Senate for final ratification and Trippe's 
last attempt to stop it. Roosevelt turned up the heat when he had Postmaster General 
Frank C. Walker call Trippe and inform him that any further •wrty business about American 
Export" in the Senate would be viewed seriously by the administration. The President went 
so far as to threaten to have all of Pan American's officers and directors indicted on anti-
trust charges.11 Trippe was undeterred and intensified his lobbying efforts. In the end, the 
Senate determined that both companies were attempting to milk the government. There-
fore, the government should get the most for its money from Pan American because that 
air line had demonstrated it could give the best service for the least money. American 
Export Airlines' proposed mail subsidy was struck out of the budget and Pan American 
continued to be the only U.S. international carrier to have government money behind it.12 
The intensity of this battle between Pan American and the administration has often 
been overlooked in the historiography of this period because it occurred in the shadow of 
larger world events. But it remains a significant event, for in addition to the obvious victory, 
Trippe won the support of several powerful anti-Roosevelt Democrats, among them Josiah 
Bailey of North Carolina, chairman of the Senate sub-committee on aviation and Pat 
McCarran of Nevada.13 The support of these and other anti-administration notables (who 
were by conviction anti-internationalist and anti-collective security) would figure prominently 
in later events. Their support of Trippe in the American Export business aided him in his 
successful bid to maintain his monopoly of government support and near monopoly of 
international service. However, his success was short-lived. The coming of World War II 
would forever change the face of U.S. international civil aviation as it would change so much 
else. 
The many far-flung theaters of the war necessitated long lines of supply. The most 
efficient way to service these theaters was by air and thus, as a result of war, long distance 
aerial hops became the standard, not the exception they were before the war. The pressing 
need for transport aircraft to support the armed forces caused the CAB to put the domestic 
lines under military contracts to carry out international service. The domestic carriers 
gained valuable experience in long-haul flying and were keenly aware of how quickly their 
military transports could be converted to civilian use. To the owners of these lines 
the combination of large numbers of long-range transports and experienced air crews meant 
one thing: post-war international service with its attendant profits.14 
By 1944 the CAB had received over 100 applications for new overseas service, most 
of which came from domestic carriers wishing to extend their service. With technical 
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problems in long-range service solved, there remained only the tricky and delicate problems 
of international economics and politics.is 
The expansion of the American aviation industry was seen by other nations as a 
threat to their post-war economic development in civil aviation. The British were perhaps 
the most concerned as they and their empire would be directly affected by American post-
war economic expansion. All the talk of "freedom of the air" did nothing to calm British 
concerns. Adolph Berle considered conflict with Britain over the nature of post-war civil 
aviation to be one of America's greatest post-war diplomatic concerns." One of the central 
difficulties to be overcome was the definition of the much-used phrase, "freedom of the air." 
The phrase was most often used by the proponents of collective security and international-
ism. Its opponents were generally those who had been isolationists before the war and had 
become ultra-nationalists as a result of the war. The former wished to promote stability 
through international cooperation; the latter desired the same goal but believed it could only 
be achieved by giving the United States its proper place (first) in the post-war world.11 
These "America-firsters" were determined to pursue policies which served the self-interests 
of the a,untry, and they did not hesitate to voice their opposition to the international-ist 
notion that cooperation served America best. 
Both of these groups were greatly disturbed by Britain's apparent determination to 
develop its own brand of post-war international civil aviation. As early as 10 February 1943 
speeches were heard in Parliament which called for a vigorous program of transport building 
and route expansion for British civil aviation. On that day, Viscount Richard Bedford 
Bennett stated in most emphatic terms that "ifwe [Great Britain] are not to sink to the level 
of a second-class power we have got to have an air transport service now."11 Viscount 
Bennett's use of the phrase "second-class power" was sure to spark a strong reaction in 
Great Britain, but his speech went further and identified the United States as being Britain's 
chief rival. Another member of Parliament, Lord Brabazon of Tara, furthered this 
sentiment when he indirectly accused the United States of taking unfair advantage of 
Britain's war needs to build up the American aviation industry for post-war purposes. In 
all fairness to Lord Brabazon, he could not publicly say that British industry was unable to 
produce at U.S. rates. His discussion of the great gap between the two air industries was 
correct as was his call for action if Britain was to have any chance to compete with the U.S. 
after the war.19 
As of 1943, twenty-five percent of all U.S. aircraft manufacturing was devoted to 
transport building. British industry was totally committed to building combat aircraft. The 
British received some of the American transports through Lend Lease, but the vast majority 
remained in U.S. hands. Great Britain recognized that at the end of the war most of their 
wartime aviation production would be instantly useless while the U.S. would already have 
1'aild. 
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a considerable portion of its aviation industry committed to building aircraft which would 
be immensely useful after the war. The United States was also busy training transport pilots 
and forging routes, while every available British aircrew was needed for fighting the war. 
Britain feared that at the end of the war the U.S. would have in place the machinery to 
dominate international civil aviation. 30 
The great amount of talk about "freedom of the air" coming out of the United States 
indicated to Great Britain that following the war the American goal would be to "fly to 
everywhere. Period."21 The American advantage in aircraft and aircrew experience coupled 
with the free trade talk appeared to the British to be a U.S. attempt to become the 
dominant trading partner with the dominions of the British Empire. To avert the disaster 
for the British economy that this would be, Great Britain began work on a plan for its own 
post-war international commercial aviation. British hopes were pinned to statements by 
Vice-President Henry Wallace that indicated his ideas that post-war air transport services 
could be operated as a peacetime function of an international air force regulated by an 
international authority. H this were not to be the case, the British hoped that the col-
laboration between the United States Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force that had 
been forged during the war could be continued by civil air services.22 
These hopes did not constitute a policy. However, a serious statement of British 
intentions was issued in 1944 in the form of an official White Paper. In this policy 
statement, the British outlined their reasons for the practice they intended to follow. The 
White Paper equated unlimited competition with large subsidies. These expensive subsidies, 
which would have to be borne by the taxpayer, would be necessary for British carriers to 
operate on unprofitable, but necessary routes. Therefore, Great Britain elected to use a 
form of the "chosen instrument" policy in order to avoid the risks to its economy that heavy 
subsidization would incur. The White Paper declared that operators which were allowed to 
run air services within the United Kingdom and between the United Kingdom and other 
nations would not have competition on their routes from other British carriers.21 
Great Britain favored an agreement with other nations that would work out a 
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cooperative system of scheduling and routing so that wasteful competition could be reduced 
and subsidies be controlled and perhaps eliminated. The formula for the scheduling was 
to be based on "a broad equilibrium between transport capacity and traffic offering a fair 
division of services between the national air lines engaged on international routes and an 
agreement as to freight and passenger charges.".. Thus, while the United States govern-
ment called for "freedom of the air", believing this would be most beneficial to its own 
economic expansion, Great Britain called for careful regulation and service based on 
formulas in order to protect her economy and the vital links between the United Kingdom 
and the colonies and Commonwealth nations of the British Empire. 
Officially, Great Britain opposed the idea of a chosen instrument since it believed 
that such an organization would be too large to effectively supervise all of the routes. 
Instead, it proposed a number of chosen instruments all operating in different trade zones--a 
common shipping policy. British carriers would be linked to the British maritime and land 
carriers already operating in those areas in order to give British economic presence stronger 
solidarity. British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) would be the carrier on the 
primary route, which included all the Commonwealth nations, trans-Atlantic service to the 
United States and Canada, and routes to China and the Far East. The other areas of the 
world would be served by new carriers whose management, initial operating capital, and 
some aircrews would come from BOAC.25 In effect, the new carriers would be BOAC 
under new names. 
The United States viewed the British White Paper with suspicion and disappointment. 
It seemed obvious from the plan outlined in the Paper that Britain would be using a "chosen 
instrument" and would thereby force American carriers to compete with the British 
government instead of with British companies. This was exactly what the "freedom of the 
air" proponents had desired to avoid. The "chosen instrument" method seemed confirmed 
by the conclusion of the White Paper: 
The Government ... are planning to bring into operation as rapidly as 
the exigencies of war permit a complete network of Commonwealth 
services in full cooperation with other Commonwealth governments. 
They are bringing into partnership on practical business lines these 
elements which, by rea-sons of their experience and organization, can 
contribute to the full and rapid development of Brit-ish air transport. 
In this way the· Government believe that they can best meet the needs 
of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient, and economical 
air transport, and enable British civil aviation, which has had to be 
subordinated to the supreme war effort, to take its rightful place on the 
airways of the world.• 
"'uritilb White Paper, pp. 8, 9. 
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This seemed to many Americans to be a declaration of economic warfare. The White 
Paper policy fed fears that the expected growth in the number of foreign international 
carriers would result in a rate war that would be detrimental to U.S. carriers. The United 
States could fight in one of two ways: either the government could heavily subsidize 
American carriers so that they could drop their rates in order to compete without paralyzing 
losses21; or it could create an American "chosen instrument". The latter option was a very 
popular idea within the Republican Party as well as among those Democrats who opposed 
Roosevelt's collective security policies. Many in the American business community also 
supported the "chosen instrument" method for American international civil aviation. This 
latter group was a strange mix of labor and white collar executives which included the 
American Federation of Labor, the International Association of Machinists, the Brotherhood 
of Railroad Trainmen, the United States Maritime Commission, W.A Patterson, president 
of United Air Lines, and, of course, Juan Trippe and Pan American.21 
The prospect of economic warfare among former allies was not at all appealing to 
the President. Roosevelt and other adminis-tration officials had pledged their loyalty to the 
doctrines of internationalism and collective security. Roosevelt did not desire the "chosen 
instrument" method, and objected to those companies that wanted "all of the business." The 
President had faith in the American system and believed U.S. companies could successfully 
compete with each other and with foreign carriers with a minimum of government 
assistance.20 
The idea that the major world powers should cooperate and divide the world into 
economic spheres of influence was not part of U.S. plans. Actually, it ran completely 
contrary to them. The United States recognized that following the war certain strong 
nations such as Great Britain would need economic security as much as they needed military 
security. The division of the world into commercial spheres of influence would not, 
according to American policy makers, aid that security; rather, it would tend to disrupt it. 
It was feared that if the division was allowed to occur, competition would exist between 
nations instead of companies. Furthermore, the smaller governments of the world would 
not be able to compete with chosen instruments backed by the economic might of the 
individual major powers. Thus they would be excluded, alienated, and disillusioned from the 
idea of internationalism."" 
In the spirit of internationalism, a conference on the future of commercial air 
transport was held in Chicago from 1 November 1944 to 7 December 1944. Th~ purpose 
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of the conference was to promote the internationalization of air commerce. It attempted 
to establish a group of international organizations and have those organizations set up a 
system of protocols for air commerce by peaceful arbitration much as those that had been 
established at sea through war. The American delegation was led by administration 
internationalists and at its head was Adolph Berle, one of the more visionary co-
operationists.JI He hoped that the conference would establish a system which could be 
activated as soon as the shooting stopped so that the carriers could re-start service almost 
immediately. Certain nations, most notably Great Britain and Canada, desired strict 
regulation which would assure that international service would not exceed actual traffic 
demands and thus give certain nations a higher presence in some areas than the demand 
warranted. The British and Canadians were fearful that without such controls the United 
States would use its advantage in the field to quickly dominate civil aviation to such an 
extent that no other nation's companies would be able to compete with iL 32 
The U.S., Great Britain, and Canada were the three major aviation powers at 
Chicago and each had its own agenda for the conference. However, the less developed 
aviation nations also had objectives they wished to achieve at Chicago. Their hopes for post-
war civil aviation were represented in the plan put forth by Australia and New Zealand. 
The Soviet Union was invited to take part in the conference, but its delegation was re-called 
os-tensibly because Switurland, Portugal, and Spain were in attendance. The Soviets 
refused to take part in a conference that also included what they called "pro-fascist states." 
Perhaps their stated reason for not attending was true, but it is more likely that their 
position on international aviation had more to do with their absence. 1bc Soviet Union 
considered "freedom of the air" to be a threat to national sovereignty and had informed 
other nations that passengers wishing to cross the Soviet Union by air would have to land 
at a gateway airport, board Soviet aircraft, and then be transported to an exit gateway 
airport where they could continue their journey.» 
The U.S. delegation approached the conference with an impressive list of objectives. 
It wished to establish a provisional program under which all delegates would request their 
respective governments to grant landing and transit rights to commercial aircraft of all 
friendly nations. It also wished to establish an Interim Council that would offer recommen-
dations for ratification of plans and protocols. This Council would gather, classify, and 
correlate the mass of information and test ideas. It would then throw out ineffectual or 
impractical methods and recommend to a permanent authority the best way to establish 
rates, services, and the many other aspects of international operations. Berle also desired 
an agreement of principles regarding a permanent international agency that would be set 
up at the end of the Interim Council's tenure. Finally, the U.S. desired a "convention" or 
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set of international regulations governing safety, navigation, and other technical matters." 
Great Britain's agenda was considerably different. It hoped to sec an international 
authority with power to control rates, frequencies of service, and amounts of subsidies. This 
agency would establish an equilibrium among the leading aviation powers, but its real 
purpose was to restrict U.S. international service. American domestic air lines carried more 
than eight times the amount of traffic carried on U.S. international routes. The lifeblood 
of American civil aviation was domestic service and those routes were closed to foreign 
carriers. European carriers thrived on international routes which were open to competition 
from U.S. carriers. Thus, from a European perspective, the United States was being greedy 
in wanting equal access to those routes while closing its domestic routes to foreign 
carriers."" 
The Australians and New Zealanders presented the most idealistic plan. They 
desired international control of world airways and operation of air lines and aviation 
factories as arms of the state. Their ideas were completely unacceptable to the major 
powers in attendance, but they did point out that other nations were vitally concerned with 
their own futures in the air." It is also important to note that these nations were not 
impotent in the field of civil aviation. Australia, in particular, had a well-developed route 
system for its national carrier, QANTAS. 
The various plans and objectives of the nations outlined their various strengths and 
weaknesses. Each sought to maximize its advantages while shielding its deficiencies. Great 
Britain used the ideas of collective security to cover its weaknesses while the United States 
used high-sounding phrases in an effort to exploit its strength. However, each of the major 
powers possessed an advantage not held by the other two. The United States was, at the 
time, making nearly all of the world's civilian and military transport aircraft. Great Britain 
had bases all around the world, giving it control of most of the potential refueling stops. The 
U.S. was unsure as to whether its wartime landing rights at these bases would be valid after 
the war. Great Britain was aware that it could easily use those landing rights as bargaining 
chips to safeguard its interests. Canada controlled Gander, the key landing point between 
the United States and Europe on the North Atlantic run until aircraft could cross the 
Atlantic non-stop.,, 
The basic difference between the American position and that of Britain was simple, 
namely, the U.S. wanted mutual or multi-lateral agreements binding all nations to the same 
terms and guaranteeing "freedom of the air .... The British stuck to their White Paper and 
called for less "freedom" in the form of traffic restrictions.• The U.S. strongly opposed any 
regulatory commission that might stifle traffic and limit expansion of commerce. Even in 
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technical matters such as standardized air traffic control procedures, aircraft airworthiness 
standards, and standardization of air navigation aids, 40 the Americans wished only for an 
advisory board and voluntary compliance.•• 
The conference finally addressed the problem that had brought them together, a 
definition of "freedom of the air." As one might expect, complications soon arose over a 
workable definition of the phrase. The Canadians proposed four "freedoms" and the 
American delegation added an additional one to these. The "Five Freedoms of the Air" 
were: 
(1.) Freedom of peaceful transit 
(2) Freedom of non-traffic stops (to refuel, repair, or refuge) 
(3.) Freedom to take traffic from the homeland to any nation. 
(4.) Freedom to bring traffic from any country to the homeland. 
(5.) Freedom to discharge traffic at intermediate points." 
Some of the nations at the conference would agree on only the first two points, and most 
would agree to the first four. But a small minority of nations, which included many of the 
Latin American states as well as the Netherlands and led by the United States, insisted that 
any convention to come out of the conference contain all five. 
The basis of the "Fifth Freedom" was the fact that unless through flights were allowed 
to pick-up passengers as well as discharge them at any point along their route they would 
not be able to afford lengthy flights with numerous stops. For example, a flight originating 
in New York City with its terminus in Singapore would make stops in the Azores, Lisbon, 
Rome, Cairo, Baghdad, Teheran, Calcutta, and Bangkok before landing in Singapore. H the 
flight was allowed to unload passengers at each of the intermediate stops but not allowed 
to board new passengers the aircraft would be almost empty when it finally reached Sin-
gapore. 
This insistence on the "Fifth Freedom" nearly broke up the conference. The British 
refused to sign any agreement which included it, simply because they feared acceptance 
would give the United States, with its plethora of aircraft, an advantage in carrying dominion 
traffic. This American invasion of traditional British markets would challenge Great Britain 
on the very routes upon which it was relying to rebuild its civil aviation industry. Generally, 
the colonial powers opposed the "Fifth Freedom" while the U.S. and smaller independent 
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nations desired it. 0 
The conference ended without a general agreement. The United States and Great 
Britain tried to establish a workable formula for the assignirtg of new air routes, fares and 
fare rules, and scheduling frequencies, but were unable to derive a means both believed 
equitable. The breakdown of cooperation between Britain and the U.S. signalled the failure 
of the conference. Thus, despite all the talk of collective security and internationalism. none 
of the delegations wished to place the fate of its nation into the hands of a multi-national 
regulatory body empowered to govern the future of air commerce." 
However, the conference was not a total failure. Though it did not come up with a 
general agreement, it did provide several lesser agreements. This buffet arrangement of 
agreements gave each nation in attendance something with which it could agree. There was 
a permanent Convention on International Civil Aviation which contained all five freedoms, 
though the fifth one was optional for each individual signatory. Additionally, there was the 
so-called '7wo Freedom Agreement" and the "Five Freedom Agreement", and an agreement 
on technical matters.45 
The Chicago conference had seen grave differences arise among the Allies, but it also 
emphasized differences within the U.S. camp. Adolph Berle's aggressive leadership and his 
insistence on multi-lateral agreements which granted general privileges to all nations had 
alienated a number of the U.S. delegates. A front page story appeared in the Chicago 
Tribune only three days after the conference opened which accused Berle's "White House 
dictated position" of being a "complete sell-out of American overseas aviation." According 
to the article's "top government sources" Berle's scheme would "junk the advantageous 
American method" of trade based on pre-war commercial agreements which would allow 
the U.S. to dominate the post-war aviation field. Instead, Berle chose to "'give America's 
shirt away' in the spirit of international camaraderie"." The obvious division in the Ameri-
can camp weakened Berle's negotiating position, but the destruction of his plans for total 
internationalization of the air was assured by the resignation of Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull on 27 November 1944. Hull was a firm believer in international law and Berle had 
fitted well into Hull's State Department. Hull's replacement had quite a different set of 
values. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Hull's Undersecretary of State, was the brother-in-law of 
Juan Trippe, friend of big business, and advocate of post-war expansion of the United Stat-
es' economy. He had close ties to those who had been isolationist, "America-firsters" before 
the war, and this political group saw its star rise with Stettinius' appointment." 
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The unsatisfactory ending of the Chicago conference sent the delegates scrambling 
home to attempt to find a method that would guarantee the commercial success of their air 
lines. In the United States, the question of how best to enter the field of international 
aviation was a particularly sticky one. Congress faced the problem of whether it should 
condone monopoly in American-flagged international air commerce while condemning it for 
domestic enterprise. This problem arose as a result of Pan American's pre-war success 
when it had been the primary overseas carrier and its obvious desire to continue in that 
role ... The combination of Assistant Secretary Berle's departure (as a result of Stettinius' 
promotion), the break-up of the Chicago confer-ence, the British White paper, and 
Stettinius' link to Pan American encouraged several congressmen to challenge Roosevelt's 
policy on aviation. 
This challenge came in the form of a bill introduced by Senator Pat McCarran 
(Democrat from Nevada) designed to strengthen and maintain the monopolistic nature of 
U.S. international air service. McCarran was one of the more powerful figures who did not 
believe that internationalism and collective security would guarantee stability and peace. 
Instead, these ultra-nationalists believed that the key to future national security was through 
an expanding economy. 
Senate bill number 326 was introduced early in 1945 and bore the title "To Create 
the All-America Flag Line, Inc., and Assure the United States World Leadership in the field 
of Air Transportation." Hearings on the bill opened before the Senate sub-committee on 
aviation on 19 March and continued through the first week of May.• These hearings 
proposed to prepare legislation that would "assure the United States its destiny in global 
aviation." The sub-committee as a whole believed that the country must "exercise its 
superior position in aviation" if it was to act as a great nation and maintain its primacy in 
the family of nations. They also linked security and "America's avowed mission of peace, 
friendship, and commerce with all nations" to an expanding civil aviation system."' 
The All-America Flag line would be incorporated to serve as a carrier in foreign air 
transportation and to carry passengers, mail and property throughout the world under the 
U.S. flag. Its main office would be in the District of Columbia so that it could easily call 
upon any department or agency of the federal government for cooperation or assistance. 
The bill legaliud any and all government assistance, short of direct financial aid, to the 
corporation, but there were exceptions to the proscription of monetary aid.St 
The corporation's financial base rested on two types of stock, class A stock and class 
8 stock. Oass A stock was to have bad a total value of $200 million and could be bought 
in increments of not less than $5 million and not more than $50 million by air carriers 
already holding carriage certificates from the CAB. This stock could not be traded or sold 
between the subscribers without the prior approval of the CAB and was not to be sold to 
the general public. Each carrier that bought into the corporation had to agree without 
<llu.s. Coapelii. Senate, Rapo,r 11111 l'Mblk l'ollcy *' ~ A....,., Seaale Documenl 56, ~ Coq., 1tt aea., p. 1. •...-..wmca,,,,,, u,.,,, p. 1. 
"Ibid.. p. 2. . 
Sllbid. 
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reservation to sell, transfer, and assign to the corporation for fair market value any or all 
physical properties and equipment, operation facilities, licenses, franchises, leases, good will, 
or other valuable rights owned by the carrier and used in foreign air transportation, to the 
full extent that the corporation required. Payment for these would be in class B stock 
having a par value equivalent to the purchase price of said properties and/or rights.s:i 
The linkage between the government and the corporation was clearly demonstrated 
in several features of the bill. First, the Board of Directors consisted of two members of 
the corporation, two from the carrier and one from the CAB. Secondly, the State 
Department was intimately connected to the corporation by statute. The Secretary of State 
would advise the corporation whenever any negotiations in which the United States was 
involved touched upon air navigation or air commerce. The Secretary of State was 
empowered to negotiate agreements with foreign governments in the name of the 
corporation, but was not allowed to act in this capacity for any other air line that might have 
an interest in opening new service. The State Department could also require the 
corporation to extend service to any destination at any time such service was deemed in the 
"public interest." The "public interest" was broadly defined by the bill to include air service 
for the maintenance of cooperative relationships between the U.S. and any foreign nation, 
or for the furtherance of national policy, or for the performance of any treaty obligation. 
The State Department had the right in these cases to compensate the corporation by means 
of direct payment.» 
McCarran's presentation of the bill was based on the premise that air transportation 
would determine the trade routes of the future. Furthermore, he, and his fellows, believed 
that one nation or a combination of nations would eventually control the field and that the 
U.S. should be the dominant power. McCarran believed that America's position as a pre-
eminent world power did not hinge upon its control of civil air transport power, but he did 
state that a strong position in the air was necessary for national security and for economic 
stability. The senator also believed that foreign competition would be real and dangerous 
and that competition among U.S. carriers would play into the hands of foreign carriers (i.e. 
governments) by weakening the U.S. companies. McCarran further argued that all the air 
lines that subscribed to the All-America Flag line Incorporated would benefit by the 
corporation's profit-sharing nature and that the stock limit would keep any one company 
from dominating it." 
The dream that lay behind all of this legal jargon and Senate testimony was that of 
having a carrier backed by the government. A national line would demonstrate to the 
world that the stability of the carrier was linked to the stability of the government and would 
thereby entice world commerce to the line. "In other words, [McCarran wanted] this to be 
the most powerful, the strongest agency that the United States of America can set up to 
carry the commerce by air."" 
»tbid., p. 3, .... 
"'Ibid., pp.4,S. 
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Of the nineteen air lines certified by the CAB in 1945 only two, Pan American and 
United Air Lines,"' supported the proposed government-sponsored carrier. The other 
seventeen discouraged the idea. These lines all hoped to enter the international field and 
begin making profits which they had no desire to share. American Airlines had a specific 
interest in the proposal Its application for international service had been approved 
pending American's acquisition of American Export Airlines.57 Pan American was outraged 
at this because it would allow American Airlines to have domestic and international routes, 
while Pan American was certified for international service only. Pan American's business 
required that it pick up passengers from the domestic carriers at gateway airports. If 
American was allowed to operate both domestic and international routes, Pan American 
would lose the passenger loads of the largest domestic carrier. Trippe presented statistics 
which indicated that if the merger were approved, American would have 231h percent of all 
U.S. air line business while Pan American would have only 131h percent of the international 
business if it was allowed exclusive control on all routes except the North Atlantic run 
(which {t would have to share with the American Airlines/ American Export Airlines com-
bination).'" 
The debate over the All-America Flag Line caused an interesting division within the 
country. Government departments were unanimous in their disapproval while most labor 
groups strongly supported the idea. State Department testimony at the All-America Flag 
Line hearings was typical of the official administration position. The State Department 
claimed that U.S. trade and commerce would benefit more by using several air carriers than 
by limiting it to one. State also indicated its misgivings concerning close links between the 
government and a company stating that the best interests of a company were not always the 
same as the best interests of the nation. The State Department report concluded by noting 
that the creation of a single company was an unnecessary step given the strong performance 
of the individual U.S. air carriers."' 
The War Department began its opposition where the State Department had ended. 
It emphasized that a strong competitive aircraft industry was necessary for a strong air force 
"'united IUppOlted Ille AB-America l'lq line for purely fUWICill - • did Pu Americu. Pu Americu bad cnio,ed a monopoly 
ol all U.S. oveneaa IIYiation before World Wu Dud Juan Tripp ialellcled for thil to coaliauc after Ille war. The AII-Ameria l'lq Uae 
offered l'M'nullCDI oupporl ol bil compaay. 
Ualted bad powa illlo Ille iu,.. ~ curicr duriac Ille war (ill profi1I bad p,wn bf - lllan 300'lli linl:e 1942) ud hoped 
to build cm ils ialerul mart.els bf feeder 10U1Ca iDto Ille pieway ai!pOl1L United aJao llad bidl bclore Ille Pcdcral Aviation Admiailtnlion 
for aervice to Hawaii ud Alalb, wllidl were comidcrcd domallc rou1C1, M well M for upaaded inlerul ICMCe. Uniled'I boanl feared 
tbat ope,, campetltloa would fon,e an Ille ailtiDm to offer unprofilablc ialemalicmal ocrvica lbal "°"Id dnift ,aourca from lllcir 
profttablc domallc IOUla. 
"r1lc earlier application bf 1bil carrier for llam-Alla,uic ocmcc - moclificd bf war ,equue-1&. Prom 1942 onwu* American 
Elport Ai!liDm bad ope,.ted over Ille Nortb Allantlc rouic ao a coatJaCt oarricr for the Ullited StalCI Amly. It hoped to coaliauc acmcc 
cm tbil route fallooriq Ille war linl:e it llad pro,cd it could ope,.te at a profit • a mnoequcna: ol iis war acmcc. The CAB, followia& 
Ille ,equircmeals ol lllc Clvil Aercmautlco Act ol 1938, ruled tbat for Americu Elport Alrti- to continue lucll acmcc after the war it 
would ba¥c to be ecpualCd from ill puelll c:ompaay, American l!zpoJt Una. Such a llituation "°"Id banknlpl the little oarricr, ud at 
thil point Americaa Airli- oft'eft:d lo eater into a mc,pr wltb American Elport Airti-. 
"Ibid., p. 130. 
'lbicL, pp. 6,8. 
44 
Philip Cockrell 
and that in peacetime this could only be obtained by having strong competitive air lines ... 
The linkage between civil aviation and military aviation was made very clear. The War 
Department's most persuasive statement was that multiple ownership would create 
maximum expansion of U.S. international air transport and would also produce larger, "more 
efficient and aggressive operations generally and thus better equip air carriers to maintain 
the over-all competitive position of the country.""' 
The other government departments echoed these sentiments. The Department of 
Commerce put it most succinctly in its statement that a stifling of competition means a 
stifling of business expansion. 62 The CAB's discouragement was more technical in its 
nature, but it repeated its parent department's misgivings in the statement that by allowing 
competition to exist, a broader and more intensive development of equipment, facilities, and 
services would result.• 
American labor groups supported the single instrument idea because they believed 
it was the only way to protect U.S. wage and labor standards in the domestic economy. The 
Maritime Commission strongly urged the adoption of a chosen instrument and used as an 
example the fate of American shipping companies engaged in competition with each other 
and foreign "chosen instruments". The American Federation of Labor stood four-square 
behind the All-America Flag line idea. AFL president George Meany spoke for labor in 
bis article "Freedom of the Air: What it May Mean to American Wage-Earners and Labor 
Standards": 
Who flies airplanes over our country is our business. 
Who makes the airplanes that fly over our country and 
at what wages these planes are made is also our business. 
Let us in this case decide coolly and calmly for ourselves 
what we should do in the air transport field of the future 
to protect ourselves ... 
The final result of the sub-committee bearings was to vote down the proposition in 
favor of multiple U.S. carriers, heavily subsidized by the government when necessary. Pan 
American was promised domestic routes for the loss of its international service ff\onopoly. 
Juan Trippe was not satisfied with this arrangement and set about on a three year crusade 
to ruin the international aspirations of American Air lines. On one occasion he attempted 
to buy American's subsidiary, American Export lines. Trippe tried several other schemes 
to protect Pan American's primacy in the role of national overseas carrier, but gradually the 
other airlines made their way into the field. 
"°Ibid., pp. 7• 10 • 
.. Ibid. 
Gn.id., p. 13. . 
81bid., pp. 18, 19 • 
.. Ge<qo Many, "Preedom ol lk Air: Wbllt It May Meo 10 Americu W .. l!amen ud Labor Standanla" Ammcal, Fedmldotlist 
St (April 1944):10-11 
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The assumption that the security of the world rested on its economic health was 
wide-spread, and American leaders were certain that the U.S. economy was central to the 
world economy. To them, the expansion of American commerce would naturally result in 
the growth of the international economy. No one in the United States ever questioned the 
right of economic expansion; indeed, it was heartily desired. On one level, these assumptions 
and desires led to a large degree to the Bretton Woods Conference that resulted in the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some historians have claimed that the 
later use of American economic muscle in the Marshall Plan is another example of the 
United States' constant attempt to gain its political initiatives through economic leverage. 
The air line business was simply another instance in which this predisposition to use 
American financial power for political purposes can be seen. But on a more realistic level, 
most of those who sought economic expansion were not seeking world stability for any 
reason greater than the fact that stability is good for business. 
Americans never doubted the right of their civil air carriers to dominate international 
routes; btdeed, they aspired to it as a means to expand the national economy. Within the 
nation, the point of variance was always how best to cultivate growth in the air line business 
and best apply the American advantage in aviation technology and equipment. This 
perspective of economic growth would lead eventually to a re-birth of more aggressive dollar 
diplomacy, this time carried on peaceful silver wings rather than with gunboats. 
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Until the 1880s country life was as appealing as that in town, perhaps more so. 
But the telephone, home mail delivery, electricity, street cars, and graded public schools-
-all of which appeared in Columbia in that decade--made an urban address infinitely more 
desirable. This contrast was further heightened by a troubled farm economy that would 
propel Edgefield's Ben Tillman into the governor's mansion. Amid trying times, state 
population increased 15% and both Columbia and Richland County kept pace, the city 
registering a 50% gain {10,036 to 15,353), while county population overall rose from 
28,573 to 36,821. 
Some changes of those years that tended to standardize American life were gradual 
and undramatic and went virtually unnoticed . . . for example, street signs and house 
numbers that appeared in the summer of 1887 in preparation for home mail delivery. 
In addition, for over two decades {1870-1890) the eyes of the Midlands were riveted upon 
the waters of the Congaree, not on everyday affairs. Once the canal was completed, it 
was said, factories would rise majestically on its banks and provide jobs for hundreds, 
even thousands. 
On 18 March 1881 Mrs. Fitz William McMaster, wife of a prominent lawyer, wrote 
to a son in Colorado: "Do you know the Canal is booming! over $60,000 has been 
subscribed in the city in the last two days.• As soon as $1 million was pledged, work 
would begin, and, in time, he would be able to find "a place as a factory boy" instead of 
roaming about the Rockies among people he didn't know who didn't care "one cent" for 
him. Perhaps he could become a spinner or a ward keeper. In any case, this mother, 
who obviously knew little about factory life, expressed the hope that something would tum 
up for Columbia so "all of her home-grown young men may find employment within her 
borders.•• 
Lost in a dream world, citizens from all walks of life, much like mother McMaster, 
largely ignored the growth of a dozen or so small industries. Even businessmen 
succumbed to these attitudes, although, conscious of a vigorous economy in the Piedmont 
and stag-nation in Charleston, in 1880 they revived their Board of Trade' In September 
of 1881 this group lashed out at deplorable highways and failure to malce the Congaree 
navigable, which could be done, members emphasized, with the aid of federal funds. 
Throughout the 1880s, well into the 20th century for that matter, cheap water 
~r Family l'lpen, South CaroliaiMa Ubtuy. 
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transportation was a popular topic. But, as usual, the seasonal nature of the Congaree-
-waters too high and dangerous or too low and rock-strewn--thwarted schemes to make 
Columbia an inland seaport, and in an age dominated by rail travel, neither canals nor 
roads fared well. The basic reason was an inability to sustain projects which, if properly 
carried out, cost a lot of money. One by-product was mud, perhaps that era's most 
irritating problem. In summer, when reservoirs were low, Colombians complained of 
muddy water; in winter, of muddy streets. Crack trains could whisk one from Charleston 
to Columbia in three hours and forty minutes, and an individual could travel about the 
capital city in relative ease by buggy and street car, but it often was well-nigh impossible 
to cross Main Street on foot!, On 15 February 1876 the Daily Register pleaded for a 
decent crossing .. ." anywhere in the business district of the city, so that citizens may not 
have to swim in the mud." Ten years later, in December 1886, the News and Courier 
vowed Main Street still was "a disgrace . . . a miry bog!" 
The street car, first proposed during Reconstruction, did not actually appear for 
another ten years. In February 1876 twenty-four citizens--merchants, bankers, and two 
well-known blacks (state senator William B. Nash and county school commissioner C. J. 
Carroll)--formed a company capitalized at $100,000. But the turmoil of 1876-1877 dashed 
their hopes. In January 1879 the Daily Register noted that Columbia had two one-horse 
omnibuses and about eighty hacks, but NO street railway such as just had begun operating 
in Greenville! Early in 1882 another company appeared and developed a system that 
began service in 1886. During the first three days, 4,000 passengers paid Se to experience 
the thrill of being hauled along iron rails. In March 1887 mules gave way to horses that 
could pull cars at a top speed of six miles per hour. Although electric cars did not 
appear until May 1893, there is no question that the "trolley" played a major role in 
development of suburban Columbia during the next two or three decades.• 
Other forms of travel, notably train and bicycle, also experienced change. On 1 
February 1883 a new Union Depot opened on Gervais Street with spacious waiting rooms, 
telephone and telegraph connections, sparkling chandeliers, large washrooms, and a 
refreshment stand-everything any weary traveler could wish for. Ten months later 
Columbia and the rest of the nation adjusted clocks and watches to "standard" time. 
Until then, Columbia had three times-its own, Charleston time (four minutes faster), used 
by the South Carolina Railroad, and Washington time (sixteen minutes faster), used by 
all other railroads. At noon on November 19th, the hands of local clocks were advanced 
twenty-four minutes to conform to the system adopted nation-wide. Three years after 
that, in June 1886, major railroads moved their rails to "standard" gauge (four feet, nine 
inches), that used by the Pennsylvania Railroad. In most cases, this meant an adjustment 
of only a few inches, perhaps three; nevertheless, this was an awesome undertalcing. 
The real importance of the bicycle, like that of the street car, lies in the 1890s, 
but its roots go back to 1869 when the first velocipede arrived. Soon there was a 
velocipede "rink" offering free instruction, but these ''bone-shakers" could not achieve 
3'n mlldl the. ume .......... in 1890 an 1,- Jaiclent could Fl lo C,olumbia in -11tee11 minutes on the c.olumbia, Newbeny, 
and Lnn,m line ptrMdffl lllat iadMduaJ could Fl lo the lbllion. n-. In eaence, the railroad IOMd the problem of ~
mwl, b,d lllort-diltucc tnrvel (Fttiaa about I city -ii u c.olumbia or lo I runl dcpoe) often WM imp:able in indement -thcr. 
'For ID ilMleptll ltudy of tllil lllbject, - David Cllarlea Mcquillln, "Tbe 5trat Railway and the G'°"'h of c.ollllllllil, South 
Carolina, 111112-1936, • MA Delil, USC, 197.5. 
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much of a following until transformed into the big wheel-small wheel "penny farthing." 
By the early 1880s bicycle clubs were appearing throughout South Carolina, and in 1883 
thirty daredevils from Charleston, Newberry, Greenville, and Columbia raced around a 
special track at the state fair. But these pioneer machines still were too expensive, too 
dangerous; and, as local cyclists discovered when they tried to ride to Winnsboro, country 
roads were not ready for this mode of travel. Within a few years, however, English 
inventors produced a chain-driven model with equal-sized wheels much like the "bike" of 
today, as well as rubber tires, and the great craze of the 1890s was born. By the turn 
of the century, at least 3,000 area residents were commuting to work on bicycles. 
Roller skates, a less spectacular form of transport, enjoyed greater popularity in 
the 1880s than the bicycle; in fact, local young people had been skating in public halls 
since the 1860s. This was, in effect, a winter sport provided by enterprising northerners 
who appeared each fall with skates, set up shop, and in the spring returned to whence 
they came, presumably to open summer rinks there. Other recreational pursuits of the 
decade included: tournaments, barbecues, cockfights, minstrel shows, shooting meets, 
dances and balls, church fairs and picnics, and, of course, traveling shows at the Opera 
House. Buffalo Bill and his troupe were there in 1881, and three years later--precursor 
of an attraction that still packs a wallop--Columbians enjoyed a full evening of Graeco-
Roman wrestling, also at the Opera House. 
Yet change was in the air. On two evenings in 1881, for a quarter (children lOe) 
one could enter an armory and listen to a wonderful machine developed by a Mr. Edison. 
According to the Daily Register, "It Talks, Laughs, Sings, Cries, Whistles, Plays Coronet, 
&c." By 1890 local residents were bragging that their city had more nickel phonographs 
in its stores than could be found in all of Charleston! However, if phonographs 
increased, cockfights did not. In 1887, the legislature banned cockfights within three miles 
of any chartered institution, and Columbia's lone legal cockpit became history amid a 
flurry of blood, feathres, and dollars--a three-day blow-out pitting South Carolina birds 
against those from the Tarheel State. 
If there was a common thread in recreation of the 1880s, it was organization.' 
Thanks largely to improved rail service, leisure activity often was provided by semi-
professional groups such as baseball teams and firemen or centered upon school 
commencements in May and the state fair in November. Baseball, made popular by the 
U.S. Army during Reconstruction, gave birth to town teams, factory teams, college teams, 
midget teams, black teams, lean teams, fat teams, even teams representing various 
boarding houses. In November 1884 a group of Yankee lovelies-the Blondes and 
Brunettes-swept into town and challenged a local nine, the Mechanics. They wore, in 
the words of the Daily Register (13 November), "fancy costumes after the pattern of suits, 
which gave free play to their limbs." Southern chivalry notwithstanding, the Mechanics 
won, 12-10, but that evening the victors graciously "devoted themselves to their visitors, 
'Lea orpnizecl ,em:ational punuiU hlduded nude balhin& at the encl ol OcrYU Street and sandlot l>Mcball, botll ol wllich railed 
the ire ol lOIIIC citizem. Out la the DOl1beM!cra put ol tlle county, the M<dlinl and Jacobi carried on a IMly fcl>CI, lbootma at eacb 
odler from time 10 time bcal- ol clillpccmcall <Mr roed ripll and other praumed impooitionl. 1n Febrw11y ol 1882, four Mcdlinl 
and 1C¥Oral odler Sud Hills raidcnll were ilMJlved in 1 ..._tionaJ• free-for-all at M<Crccry'1 wap yard. Thac country folk, 
camped for the aipt, p inlO a '°" that ilMllved cardl, liquor, dub&, tniwl, and p111. Several people (incll>dina onloobn) were 
injured before tea policcmcnt fillllly IUbducd the puticipanll ud put them behind ban. 
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who lodged at the Hendrix House."' 
Yet for every individual who crowded around a baseball diamond, ten applauded 
firemen, whether battling flames or going through competitive drills. At the outset of the 
decade, the city had two black engine companies, two white engine companies, and a 
white hook and ladder unit. These men, not baseball players, were the true athletes of 
the era, idolized by youngsters and their older sisters, and any inter-city tournament was 
an excuse for parades, banquets, and balls. Of course, each race organized its own 
outings, but this was one realm where the color line often was blurred. This is quite 
understandable since, if disaster struck, all firemen rushed to the scene. When blacks 
from Winnsboro and Greenville came to town for a tournament in June 1881, for 
example, the mayor was on hand to greet them, and so many whites attended a benefit 
fair for a black fire company in October 1882 that blacks thanked them publicly for their 
support. 
Nevertheless, racial cooperation was a fragile flower. In the fall of 1880 few black 
firemen participated in a parade marking the opening of the state fair. Why? According 
to the editor of the Daily Register, because of rumors that this this was a "political dodge" 
to massacre blacks. Although this gentleman railed against such "a mean and 
contemptible method" of exciting distrust, it is obvious that the heat of a national election 
had to cool before daily life would be normal once more. 7 Then, in June 1884, Mark 
Reynolds told his Stateburg sweetheart of a bizarre incident during a three-day meet 
sponsored by white firemen. When hundreds filled bleachers erected in the business 
district, a haberdasher decided to garner good will by tossing bits of clothing from the 
roof of his store. Reynolds, a young lawyer, watched as blacks scrambled for shirts, socks, 
and underwear. "Occasionally [roofing] slates would be thrown down-and several Negroes 
were cracked on the head. I was in hopes that I might get a case from some innocent 
bystander for damages caused by injuries sustained on this interesting occasion but was 
disappointed".• 
In May 1885 a conclave at Columbia's Trinity Church was split asunder when two 
black clerics took communion. Episcopal leaders approved; laymen didn't. A short time 
later, Alderman Tilman Watson scandalized the community when he horsewhipped a 
black man because of attentions to a mulatto girl. The mayor said the matter was "too 
disgusting" to talk about, although most of the town did. Within a week, Watson 
withdrew from politics. Two years earlier, another incident sent tongues wagging when 
Louisiana-born Ellen Vogel, described as "a colored courtesan," died and left most of 
her $10,000 estate to "a prominent aged businessman." Records at state archives reveal 
that he was a former mayor. 
But to return to Reynolds, who earned a special niche in local annals when he 
became the first person in Columbia to master a typewriter. In February 1885, his boss, 
John C. Haskell (Wade Hampton's son-in-law) returned from the North with one of these 
machines, and Reynolds taught himself the requisite skills. His first letter to "Lizzie" 
'Pood,eu - virtully ~ ID lllil dec:Me. AaxJrdin& to the Nt!ws tllfd C-. (2 Pebnwy 1884), USC 1tudcnta wanted IO 
.,..... • 'maid,• but oould fiad no oeller "uperta" i.n the II.lie. Trinity (Dute) beat l'llnnan 96-0 at the •tale fair in 1891. On 
C1111i11- e.e 1892, Purmaa IOIJcd .-r use 44-0 m a pme played in CharlellC>o'• bMeball part. 
'Ille fcllowlq :,ear, it mipt be IIDl*1, ilCIOftS ol black firemen mumcd u, a similar .-rac1e. 
'R.e,nolda family Papen, Soutb Cuoliniana U,,uy. 
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opened with these words: • Are you pleased to see your name in print?" Two years later 
Haskell raised Mark's salary to $50 a month, a princely sum that permitted him to ask 
"l.lzzie" to become his bride. 
Another wonder of the age, the telephone, arrived in January 1880 when a 
representative of the National Bell Company began installations-largely in stores, business 
offices, and public institutions-at a cost of $45 a year. By February 1883 the number 
of subscribers had grown to ninety-one, enabling the company to initiate night service. 
Electricity, perhaps because proponents still were debating the merits of direct and 
indirect current, did not exert much influence. No commercial company appeared until 
December 1887, although the following fall, just in time for the state fair, arc lights were 
erected in the business district. Two small generating plants were built in the early 1890s, 
but electricity for residential use was severely limited until after 1900. 
The education story, like electricity, is something of a mixed bag. The greatest 
improvement was a graded school system and teacher training institutes. Once the city 
became free of county control in 1880, city fathers launched a drive for a special tax to 
lengthen the ninety-day term. Largely because of reluctance to fund black classes, these 
efforts were thwarted until 1883. Meanwhile, the state inaugurated summer teacher 
courses, with whites meeting in Greenville and blacks in Columbia. With the aid of 
Tennessee-born David B. Johnson, appointed city superintendent in June 1883, classes for 
older white boys began three months later in the former Male Academy, with younger 
white boys and white girls attending the old Female Academy and all black children, as 
before, housed in Howard School.' The first eight grades of this ten-year program were 
free to city residents. Those living outside of the corporate limits paid one to three 
dollars a month, depending upon courses taken, those enrolled in high school classes a 
monthly tuition fee of $2.50. 
Another encouraging development was Winthrop Training School, an outgrowth of 
Greenville's seminars for white teachers. This institution, the personal creation of 
Superintendent Johnson (with the assistance of the president of the Peabody Fund, Robert 
C. Winthrop, hence the name), was launched in the chapel of the Columbia Theological 
Seminary in November 1886. Eventually it achieved collegiate status and in the mid-90s 
moved to Rock Hill. 
Two black schools-Benedict and Allen-were another bright spot. From the outset, 
they inaugurated some of the truly innovative work being done in this state. Benedict, 
founded by the American Baptist Home Missionary Society in 1870 and named for its 
major benefactor, Mrs. B. A Benedict of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, was a private 
operation that trained teachers, taught industrial trades such as shoe-making, painting, 
carpentry, printing. and dress-making, and provided classes at every level, grade one 
through college, all heavily imbued with theology. Allen, a Methodist institution located 
near Benedict on the eastern edge of the city, carried on a similar program, plus an 
unusual law school that graudated its first class in 1884. 
By contrast, old South Carolina College, Columbia Female College, the theological 
seminary, and various private academies were experiencing lean years. To some degree, 
'Al a ICIUlt cl lllil .,...mcnt, Columbia Amdemy 1n111ecs ...,,e Ible lo name IOIDC mcmben cl the city ocbool boud ualil 
..... law ended tbat practice ia 1972. 
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this was a reflection of political ferment and hard times, as well as an enhanced public 
school system and interest in practical studies that soon would be available at Winthrop 
and aemson. In October 1880 the oldest of these institutions opened its doors as the 
South Carolina College of Agriculture and Mechanics, a move that followed tacit 
agreement to share federal land-grant funds with Orangeburg's aaflin College. Although 
some departments of South Carolina College may have been doing good work, failure to 
develop a true agricultural curriculum, especially in view of rural demands and the 
bequest of Thomas Green aemson, was a fatal error. 
Some years earlier, in 1878--when the college was shut tight--Thomas Clemson 
suggested using convict labor to create "a charitable institution" near Columbia to 
encourage agricultural pursuits. 10 What he envisioned was an establishment of "practical 
benefit" filled with trees, plants, animals, birds, etc. for sale or exchange. However, few 
were listening, and even an honorary degree awarded to aemson by the college in 1886 
failed to deter him from his goal. 
The one event that each November melded together many diverse strands of 
everyday life--education, innovation, sports, agriculture, even politics-and encompassed all 
levels of society was the state fair. In 1886 the eighteenth such gathering featured a 
panorama of the Gettysburg battlefield (also shown successfully in 1885) and views of the 
earthquake that recently had devastated Charleston. There was a special WCT1J booth 
and, as usual, restaurants and bazaars staffed by church women. There was, however, not 
much of a midway, most games of chance having been banned because of unpleasant 
incidents in 1885. 
This five-day extravaganza concluded with a lavish Saturday night ball given by the 
prestigious South Carolina aub and presided over by the governor and his wife. On the 
following Monday, the News and Courier regaled readers with minute details concerning 
"the magnificent toilet of the ladies." Their escorts were listed by name under a simple 
heading: "The Chivalry." But while diamonds sparkled and elegant young couples 
danced, Ben Tillman planned; for he and his farmer friends, over three hundred of them, 
also gathered in Columbia that week to map strategy for the upcoming meeting of the 
General Assembly. The truth is, the specter of a troubled rural scene hung heavy over 
these festivities, and the News and Courier conceded that crowds at the fair were smaller 
than in 1885. 
This picture of affluence amid hard times is a hallmark of the 1880s, as is 
Columbia's rather confused portrait of itself. As Narcisco Gonzales of the News and 
Courier observed in January 1883, the city was experiencing "steady, comfortable progress." 
At that time, a hosiery mill and shoe factory were operating at the penitentiary, and by 
the close of the decade a small cotton factory had appeared, as well as a large compress 
and two cotton seed oil mills. Trade in cotton more than doubled, up from 24,000 bales 
in 1882 to over 60,000 in 1888, and spending at various state facilities increased 
somewhat. Firemen's tournaments, conventions, excursions, and, of course, the fair also 
aided the economy. 
But, caught up in "New South" rhetoric, "steady, comfortable progress" was not 
"Columbia DallJ Rip-. l Pebruuy 1878. 
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what Columbia wanted. It was searching for something smashing, a real show-stopper 
that would wake up Charleston and make the Piedmont green with envy-a huge mill, a 
big canal, steamers that would provide direct access to world markets. Somewhat 
paradoxically, while dreaming industrial dreams, Columbia also yearned to become a quiet 
winter resort like Camden or Aiken. Yet, as this decade closed, it had no public library, 
no hospital worthy of the name, and no first-class hotel. 
If Columbia was confused about the future, the same cannot be said of the 
immediate past, for recent history was being rewritten with deliberate speed. Two 
examples. In 1880, ex-Governor Scott, then living in Ohio, got into trouble when he shot 
and killed a youth who, he claimed, was corrupting his son. Several Columbia citizens. 
including F. W. McMaster, who once had Scott as a client, wrote expressing sympathy and 
concern. Four years later, when McMaster launched a bid for a seat in Congress, A B. 
Williams of the Greenville News unearthed his letter, updated it to 1884, and accused 
Democrat McMaster of consorting with Reconstruction Radicals. In reply, McMaster 
stated with much vehemence that, to the best of his knowledge, save for perhaps a 
servant, no Republican ever had entered his howel II However, as the News had hoped, the 
nomination went to a Greenville man, not McMaster. 
Three decades later, W. W. Ball, then editor of the State, dashed off a sketch of 
Columbia for a Chamber of Commerce booklet in which he related how, "after the war," 
the area of the city was diminished "in order that the danger of negro control in 
municipal affairs might be lesscned." 12 Ball's account is, like much of Reconstruction lore, 
only partly true. Boundaries were changed somewhat, but blacks never tried to control 
municipal life. Both McMaster and Ball should have known better than to speak and 
write as they did, but their words reflect what may have been the most important trend 
of the 1880s: the increasing rift between the races. In its wake, blacks and anything or 
anyone associated with the Republican party had to be portrayed in the worst possible 
light. 
Columbia soon got its big mill, even though river traffic and winter tourism never 
amounted to much. In time, some wonders of city living would spread to the countryside. 
But the racial split that began in this decade and was codified into statute in the 1890s 
cast a long shadow. Of course, this division of daily life was not initiated by Columbia, 
nor by the state of South Carolina, for that matter. The Jim Crow laws that evolved 
even can be viewed as part of an overall "standardization" process, an effort to create 
uniform conditions throughout a state, region, and perhaps a nation. Whatever the 
motivating force, their origin marks a dividing line in local life almost as potent as Fort 
Sumter and Appomattox. 
1lronoically, · family papen 11 the South C.IOlillll111 Ubnry mat that in 1879 another Republican from Reconstnictioa days 
(R. B. Carpcnicr) wro1e to Mc~ from lcldwle, Colotado, reallin1 "the -•y UlllnlCtM and dllrmin1 houn I blw paaed uocler 
your - hclpillble roof In the aocicty ol your _,plllhed wife Ind cllupter and ,.,.....11.' 
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'today sophisticated media wizards who surgically splice thirty second sound bites 
destined for the evening news dominate America's congressional campaigns. Cadres of 
word processor-equipped speechwriters methodically spit out stacks of position papers for 
use by image-conscious candidates. Political Action Committees vigorously advocate their 
agendas and, two years ago, spent $458,000,000 on favored congressional candidates. The 
quest for image, television access, and cash has transformed the nature of political 
combat. The average cost for a successful U.S. House of Representatives candidate 
soared from $87,200 in 1976 to $388,000 in 1988. A half century ago, however, 
congressional aspirants waged a far more personal and a far less expensive form of 
warfare. The stump meeting or, as it was called in the seven countries of South 
Carolina's Fifth Congressional District, "the Speaking," gave office seekers an opportunity 
to tour their district and plead their cases in face-to-face confrontations with their 
opponents. 1 
Usually, food preceded the politicking. After dining, women cleared away the 
remains of fried chicken, catfish stew, barbecue, potato salad, cole slaw, biscuits, and 
chocolate cake. Men sipped lemonade or iced tea, sometimes laced with whiskey. 
Candidates shook hands, slapped backs, kissed children, hugged women, and passed out 
small cards which proclaimed in bold type "dependable," "capable," "experienced," and 
"sober." In 1932, the food was less plentiful, but the candidates were as omnipresent as 
ever. The Great Depression had ravaged the farms, eroded the cotton fields, shut the 
textile mills, scorched the corn, emptied the bank vaults, and ruined the businesses of the 
Fifth Congressional District. Amid this chaos, incumbent U.S. Representative William 
Francis "Seaboard Bill" Stevenson headed home to defend his record "on the stump.02 
Born in North Carolina during the first year of the Civil War, Stevenson had been 
too young for military service in that conflict and too old for combat in the Spanish-
'lbc bell recent lludy ol Ille spinllD& COit ol campaip ii Joocpb E. Can1or'1 CoapeuionaJ Rcacarch Scmcc iauc brief 
'Campaip PIDucina,' publilbed in 1989 by tbe Ubruy ol Conpaa; tbroupout Rep,aentatiYC Richllrdl' tenu,e, tile Plhb Diltrict 
- compriled ol Oienme, Cbeller, Cbatcrfield, Pal.rfleld, Kenhllw, ~r. and York Counties, an uea ol Nonb c.en1ra1 Soutb 
CalOllu. 
"9temew witb Tyre D. Lee, Sr, .Janua,y S, 1987, Cbaler, S.C., 'ltUmp -inp• and tbeir picnic 11111mphe,e _,., not reatricted 
to juol tbe PIRh Dillrict. In Ille Pee Dec INI ol lbc 111ate Ibey _,., mucb the ume, intemew witb Benjamin P. Hardy, Jr, Aup,t 
lS, 1989, DIJllon, s.c. 
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American and First World Wars. Stevenson's battles were waged in the political arena, 
and his victories were numerous. He had been mayor of two South Carolina towns and 
had represented Chesterfield County in the state legislature. His colleagues selected him 
speaker of the house in 1900. Additionally he advised the influential Seaboard Railroad 
Company on legal matters and represented Chesterfield County on the executive 
committee of the S. C. Democratic Party. After two narrow defeats at the hands of 
Congressman David E. Finley, Stevenson's perseverance bore fruit in 1917 when he 
succeeded Finley upon the latter politician's sudden death.• 
One month after Stevenson trounced four opponents in a special March 1917 
election to fill Finley's seat in Washington, twenty-three year old James Prioleau "Dick" 
Richards, nephew of Governor John G. Richards, and member of a prominent Liberty 
Hill S.C. clan, enlisted in the U.S. Army. After training at Lexington County's Camp 
Styx, Richards headed for Europe. The trenches of France matured Richards as he rose 
through the ranks of the Old Hickory Division from private to corporal to sergeant and, 
finally, won a battlefield commission. By the time of his 1919 discharge, Lieutenant 
Richards had decided to study law at the University of South Carolina, a modest law 
school at the time, labeled by one historian "a phone booth operation.•• 
The university's yearbook Gamet and Black features a handsome young veteran 
who starred on the baseball diamond. An award-winning orator, student newspaper 
editor, and campus political leader, Richards' yearbook profile noted "He is a politician 
of the old order, knows the needs of his fellow citizens, and always has a remedy 
therefore--a political gift that is bound to accomplish for him every office that lies within 
the power of his people to bestow."' 
With his U...B. in hand, Richards moved in 1921 to Lancaster. The following year 
the young attorney outpolled an opponent and won the county's probate judgeship. Thirty 
years later Richards recalled, "They thought I was a young upstart." "Upstart" or not, 
Richards' 1922 victory was re-affirmed as he easily won re-election in 1926 and 1930. 
Amid the turmoil of the Great Depression, Judge Richards focused his attention on 
ousting William Francis Stevenson.• 
The University of South Carolina's yearbook revealed that Richards' motto was 
"The Bigger they are, the harder they fall." Caution would be required, nonetheless, in 
a campaign against Stevenson. As we have seen, the seventy-one year old lawmaker had 
an impressive political r~sum~. After service in state government, he had walked the 
halls of Congress since 1917. The district had a history of re-electing its repre5¢ntatives; 
1/Jiograpllical Dinctoty of llW Anwrlc1111C01f11U1171,#.1971 (Wllbift&ton, 1971), 1754-SS; Oilier biognlphical dala "" ~ ii 
found in Du and Inez Morris, lf'llo Wa, Wllo ill AllffflCIIII l'r1lili&, (New Yon, 1974), S43, J. C. Gulinpo,,'1 Sketches ol LMng 
Notables (Spartanburg, S. C., 1902), 403, and in Marie G. W",gins' Some~ of~ Colotly, SOllllo Carolilta (M--. N.C., 
1111D). 36. 
'A p,od 1lartin1 place for blopaphlcal infOl'lllltioa on Richards would be hil papen at tbe South C.roliniana Libnuy, additionally, 
I r=immend Wllo's Wllo ill SOlllll C""1liNI (Cllil:apl, 1947). 285, Oamtt Biograplly 1951 (New Yon, 1951), 516-18, and my "America 
Comes Pint With Me: The Polltical C.n:cr ol Coepasmu James P. Richuds, 1932-1957" Ph.D. diaertation, Uniw:nily ol South 
Cuolina, 1987, Columbia, S.C.; CDmmentl by John Cm,gle befoR the S.C. Historical Aaociation'• annual meeq Maldl 7, 1987, 
Benedict Colle,o, Columbia, S.C. 
'Gamtt tllld Blodr, 1IOI. 23 (Columbia, 1921) 108; ibid., 141; ibid., 147. 
'P.dward ff. Simi, "The 'Diet' Richards Story' in TM S,au Mo,aziM, A ....... 19, 1951 (Columbia, 1951); n.. Lllllaut,er News, 
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the last incumbent to be toppled lost bis seat in 1898. Thus, to send Stevenson into 
involuntary retirement, Richards must be careful in his confrontation "on the stump."' 
Dissatisfaction with Congress would boost Richards' chances. As legislative bodies 
sometimes do, the 73rd Congress was eager to adjourn and return home to campaign for 
re-election. A district newspaper advised "Stay on the job, Congress." The newspaper 
stressed the country's dire economic condition and added an ominous warning "Folks are 
getting peevish and there's no telling what they might do if things don't come to a bead 
pretty soon.•• 
Capitalizing on this anti-Congress sentiment, Richards told 300 citizens assembled 
in Camden in July, "1be two things most wrong are the tariff and governmental 
extravagance." The federal workforce bad become bloated at a time when many people 
were unemployed. Then, in a question be would ask repeatedly, Richards inquired, "What 
has Stevenson done in bis 16 years in Congressr Concluding bis speech, Richards 
divulged that Stevenson's top aide, A E. Hutchinson, bad two jobs: one in Washington 
and one as reading clerk of the S.C. House of Representatives. Stevenson could not 
answer . this barrage, however, because be was absent, "detained in Washington on 
business."' 
On July 25 Richards told a large hometown crowd that the incumbent had "bis 
hand in the gravy." Again Richards noted Hutchinson's dual employment. The 
incumbent completely missed the point of Richards' attack. The solon explained that be 
bad no "relatives" on his payroll. He reminded Lancaster's voters that he had protected 
seed loans, and be blamed the Republican Party for the county's ailments. He 
emphasized bis commitment to "economy" in government, a boast deflated by Richards' 
assertion that since 1917 the money sgent on federal employees' salaries bad skyrocketed 
from $350,000,000 to $1,350,000,000. 
Moving on to Fairfield County, Richards made bis most forceful and eloquent 
appeal so far. He told the crowd, "I am not one of those who take the position that just 
because a man bas been in office a long time be should be removed; but I do take the 
position that a man who bas been in Congress for sixteen years and bas developed no 
leadership in bis party, or bas done nothing outstanding for his constituents, should step 
aside for new blood." Age and effectiveness had masterfully been blended as a campaign 
issue. Therefore, it was time for the district to discard its usual practice of mechanically 
reelecting representatives. Richards remarked, "To help our people the driftwood must 
be cleared away and fossils replaced by new growth." Hutchinson's spectre was assailed, 
and Richards said, "This has been the case when we have about ten million unemployed 
in our country and when children are crying for bread because their father cannot find 
work." 11 
Seeking to explain the nation's economic collapse, Richards argued, • All this caMot 
'Gonta oll4 Bladr, 108; lntcnltlqlJ, - cl Ille diltricl'I polldcal leaden COlllldered Rich11dl a loaphot; Ibey """' p,,onuns 
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be traced to Hoover. . . ." The implication was that others, including Congressman 
Stevenson, shared responsibility for the economic paralysis. Then, Richards inquired, 
"What has Stevenson done? What can you expect of him in the future?" 12 
Stevenson ignored the criticism of Hutchinson. The incumbent spent his time "on 
the stump" criticizing the Hoover Administration's Smoot-Hawley Tariff. He contended, 
"Manufacturers destroyed themselves by the tariff and also destroyed the buying power 
of the farmers." He noted that he had opposed Hoover's moratorium on foreign debts 
and vowed, "I will never vote to cancel or reduce by a red cent debt owed this country." 
He concluded by saying that the major thing beleaguered America needed was 
"Confidence." 13 
Skillfully Richards hammered away at the issue of Hutchinson's two positions. 
Unemployed textile workers, businessmen, and farmers could easily become outraged at 
a Congressman who reserved two jobs for a top aide. For his part, Stevenson failed to 
grasp the significance and danger of this issue until a stump meeting in Rock Hill, the 
district's largest town. Before a crowd of 1,500 citizens, the incumbent said Hutchinson 
was paid by the state for his work in Columbia and by the federal government for his 
work on Stevenson's staff. Curiously, Stevenson admitted that the widow of a nephew of 
his first wife worked in his Washington office. The water sufficiently muddied, Stevenson 
announced, "I desire to state that neither my first wife nor my second wife was ever on 
my pay-roll .... "" 
During his visit to the lectern, the challenger praised the late Congressman Finley, 
a York County native, and told the Rock Hill voters that Finley accomplished more in 
three years than Stevenson had accomplished during his entire tenure. The town had 
gotten its new post office only through the generosity of the Hoover administration, 
without Stevenson's support, Richards alleged. Finally, in what may be the campaign's 
climax, Richards turned to Stevenson, a man who had never served in the military, aimed, 
and fired, "When he was rolling in fat, I was carrying a rifle at Camp Styx." The crowd, 
sprinkled with World War I veterans, exploded in applause. Even though Stevenson's 
political demise would not be official until Richards' 2,000 vote victory in the Democratic 
Party's primary later that month, William Francis "Seaboard Bill" Stevenson died that 
night in Rock Hill "on the stump."" 
In the York county hamlet of McConnellsville, the 1940 campaign's tone was set. 
During an early August stump meeting, Richards outlined his support of President 
Roosevelt and boasted "we brought back prosperity". His rival, Cherokee County Probate 
Judge Roy C. Cobb, understandably viewed the Richards record differently. Cobb, a 
former state legislator, said Richards was not "measuring up" in Washington. Furthermore 
the challenger accused Richards, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
of neglecting the district in order to dabble in the international arena. 16 
The 1940 campaign's climax came a week later during a confrontation at a 
"The Stare, August 2, 1932. 
"Ibid. 
"Evening Herald, August 3, 1932. 
"Ibid. 
"Evening Herald, August 10, 1940. 
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Lancaster County meeting. Before a crowd estimated at 1,000, Cobb swung away at the 
Richards record. The challenger alleged that Richards bad used bis influence to secure 
employment for members of the Richards clan, including the congressman's father. 
Misjudging the gravity of that charge, Cobb stepped away from the lectern, drank a glass 
of water, and sat down to listen to what be believed would be Ricbards's standard 
"prosperity" speech. 17 
Richards approached the lectern, quickly defended bis New Deal record, and 
paused. Like the judge be bad once been, Richards called upon Cobb to stand before 
him. Cobb rose, bis face reddened, and the crowd roared. No Richards clan member 
bad been employed by the federal government, Richards lectured Cobb, except for a 
second cousin who bad worked in a "sewing room project." Cobb apologized for his 
affront to the Richards family, but the damage to Cobb's candidacy bad been done. 
Richards bad defended bis family and won the admiration of the crowd which a Rock 
Hill newspaper said became "pro-Richards to a man." Six of the district's seven counties 
endorsed the incumbent in the August 27, 1940 Democratic Primary ... 
By 1952, the district had changed significantly. Gone were the multitude of stump 
meetinp in hamlets like Chester county's Hallselleville and York's Filbert. Now 
politicians concentrated on the area's larger towns. At a Lancaster Court House joint 
appearance, thirty-two year old Gaffney attorney Wade S. Weatherford blasted Richards' 
support of Communist Yugoslavia and Spain's Dictator Franco. He added that "in foreign 
policy we have been involved in some of the worst blunders in history." Richards, now 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, deserved part of the blame for these 
"blunders." 19 
Richards responded that "for the first time in 99 years" the district had a 
representative chairing a major House Committee. Defending his position on Yugoslavia, 
Richards explained, "Only after I had talked with General Eisenhower and General Omar 
Bradley did we decide to help Yugoslavia. .. ." He supported Franco because "We want 
airfields in Spain .•. to shower bombs on Russia should she move against us ... ." On 
July 9 the district's voters endorsed Washington influence rather than change, as Richards 
defeated Weatherford by nearly 10,000 votes.• 
1954 was Richards' last race for Congress and that year he saw a vigorous repeat 
challenge by Weatherford. Before 300 onlookers attending a Rock Hill political meeting, 
Weatherford lashed out at Richards' preoccupation with international affairs. The 
incumbent sought, as Representative Stevenson had two decades earlier, to ignore the 
challenger. Weatherford then accused the lawmaker of "giving him the run-around." 
Weatherford increased his attack during a May speech in Chester. With the incumbent 
delayed by business in Washington, Weatherford used Richards' absence to hammer away 
at a man who he considered to have lost interest in the Fifth Congressional District. 
Weatherford stressed his youth, World War II service, and, as Richards had done in 1932, 
"~ N-,, A ..... 20, 1940; Ridiardl ouppc,,Ud Ille New Deal '72% cl Ille time DI Ille Conpea. see Jad Illy Ha,ea' 'South 
Cuolilla ud Ille New Deal. 19»1938, • Pb.D. Dillertatioe, Uaivenity ol South Cardiaa, 1972, 48-S3. 
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called for new representation in the nation's capitol. 21 
Weatherford told the Chester audience that their Congressman was using his 
Washington staff as campaign operatives. He emphasized his own modest financial status 
and argued that Richards' use of staffers for political purposes was unfair. The challenger 
noted that the incumbent was an ally of Governor Byrnes who had supported Republican 
Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. Perhaps Richards was not, Weatherford suggested, loyal to 
his party. Z2 
Richards then arrived and spoke in his defense. He admitted that his Washington 
staff often accompanied him to the district because his duties "must go on no matter 
where I am." He acknowledged that two aides often worked in his Lancaster law office, 
but neither person "has anything to do with this political campaign. They are carrying 
on the work they would be doing if I were in Washington . .z• 
Shifting his defense, Richards questioned Weatherford's awareness of the day's 
complex issues. Among these issues were "that McCarthy humbug in Washington; Indo-
China on fire; that dangerous peace in Korea; the problem of the nation's farmers; taxes 
and the national debt." He voiced his support for the Democratic party and ridiculed 
Weatherford's call for "a younger man for my job." Experience and congressional 
influence, not reckless enthusiasm were in the best interest of the district, sixty year old 
Richards insisted. :11 
Before 300 onlookers at a May stump meeting in Rock Hill Richards commented, 
"If I can't take care of him (Weatherford) now, I can't take care of your problems in 
Washington." He urged the citizens to consider the larger issues of the day and warned, 
"What we face in war and peace is a tough load; what we do in Washington means a lot 
to you, to me, and to the world." While Richards promoted his fitness to continue 
serving the district, Weatherford yawned several times. :as 
After the congressman concluded his remarks, Weatherford told the voters, "I'm 
going to call a spade a spade." He endorsed lowering social security eligibility from age 
sixty-five to sixty. He advocated lower taxes for the poor. He again attacked the 
lawmaker's use of staff members for duties which Weatherford considered strictly political. 
He questioned Richards for spending "months away from office" on Foreign Affairs 
Committee fact finding trips. Reiterating his call for "a new generation," Weatherford 
concluded, "I will continue to say the truth. The truth wouldn't come forth unless I 
brought it out.•• 
At a Lancaster appearance held the night of the supreme Court's Brown v. Board 
of Education decision, Richards did not mention the landmark ruling but pleaddd "I am 
deeply humble and grateful for the confidence you have placed in me. If re-elected to 
Congress, I shall re-dedicate myself to the best service I can give my district, state and 
nation." For his part, Weatherford pulled from his pocket newspaper clippings which 
11~ Hffllkl, May 3, 19S4; CltesW Rq,one; May 5, J9S4. 
uC/lesUr Rq,onl,; May 5, 19S4 . 
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focused on Richards 1932 campaign against Stevenson. Just as in 1932, Weatherford 
contended, the district was ready for a change in Washington. r, 
Despite Weatherford's energetic assault on the congressman's record, the voters 
in the June primary overwhelmingly returned their lawmaker to Washington by a margin 
of nearly two-to-one. One Richards aide, however, remembers the legislator as being 
"bruised" by Weatherford's attacks "on the stump." Female members of Richards' family 
recall being banned from witnessing the combat occurring at that year's stump meetin~. 
Richards, as always, took bis opponent seriously and once sailed a boat to the middle of 
a pond in order to draft a crucial speech without being interrupted. 21 
In 1932, Richards lamented that his successful campaign effort had depleted bis 
finances. He had spent $1,000, most of which funded the printing of cards for 
distribution at stump mee~ and purchased fuel to travel to those meet~ in bis battle 
to topple Stevenson. The 1954 campaign cost $35,000, much of which was earmarked for 
radio advertisements and production of a slick brochure distributed throughout the 
district. The district's present incumbent spent over $300,000 to achieve success in 1982. 
Much of that money purchased expensive television time and the services of a leading 
campaign consultant. The face-to-face confrontations "on the stump" have disappeared. 
In their place, we now find a far less personal, a far more costly, and a much too sterile 
brand of political combat." 
111...anui#r Nftll, May 17, 1954. 
•Lalt<osw Nftll, June 10, 1954; interview wilh Holly M. Blanb, June 26, 19116, Cbaler, s.c.; interview willl .lolln M. Spratt, Jr, 
~ 21, 1990, WMlliap<,n, o.c.; interview with Jue Elliot and Dorolhy Ricbanll, No¥cmbcr 9, 1!189, Llacallcr, S.C. 
~tcrvlew witb Blub; llltcrview with Cblrlca H. Pant, Jr. Pcbruuy 21, 1990, Wuhlqlon, D.C. 
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SOLOMON BLATT: 
"A SEGREGATIONIST 
IN MODERATION?" 
Timothy D. Renick 
Fort Monroe, Virginia 
Known as "King Sol" to his legislative colleagues, as the "Barnwell Jew" by several 
unfriendly newspapers, and "Mister Speaker" to a majority of South Carolinians, Solomon 
Blatt, when he died at 92 in May 1986, was the oldest man serving in any legislative body 
in the United States. Elected Speaker in 1937, he remained in that position until 1973, 
a period longer than any other man in the history of any state in America. 
This paper will address three points regarding Blatt's political career. First, that 
he was an anomaly, a Jew from a small southern town, who was elevated to what is 
unarguably the most powerful political position in South Carolina. Second, the ironic 
aspect of a man born in America of poor Jewish immigrant parents, who was able to 
assimilate into southern society and rise to power while adamantly resisting the 
breakdown of racial barriers by another minority. Third, that despite the fact that Blatt 
himself characterized his position as being a "segregationist in moderation," he was in 
actuality an immoderate segregationist and remained that way long after it was politically 
fashionable. 
What then were the roots of Blatt's conservative racial attitudes and how was he 
so successful in assimilating into southern "white" society, to the extent that he· became 
one of the chief architects and defenders of a segregated state? Blatt often found it 
difficult to maintain his Jewishness in rural South Carolina and was often criticized for 
downplaying his Jewish heritage in order to facilitate his climb to power. It is also true 
that while most Jewish officeholders in the South tended to be moderate on issues of 
race, as the South grew more sensitive and insecure in its segregationist attitudes, a few 
Jews "turned stark white, with the slogans, phrases, and idioms of the white majority."1 
Blatt was one such aberration, becoming one of those "rare variety of Jewish 
segregationists." He is remembered by many as an "obstructionist racist politican who did 
his best to stop blacks from getting equal rights" and has also been referred to as "a 
Bi N. 8"ans, The l'roYlncilll: A Penonal Hiltory of Jews in the South (N,w Yort: A,....,,.,,,,,, 11113), l«J..42 
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leader of many pieces of legislation which were degrading to blacks and not in the best 
interests of race relations." 2 
The above characterizations of Blatt are all the more paradoxical considering that 
he frequently articulated instances where he himself suffered from racial intolerance and 
discrimination. "I happened to be of minority faith, and travel in the road of life in my 
early days was rough. It was the days when the Klan was pretty active ... they sort of 
stayed on me a bit."1 
One of the first manifestations of Blatt's staunch support of South Carolina's 
system of racial separation occurred in 1937 when he responded to a threatened NAACP 
lawsuit filed on behalf of a black applicant to the University of South Carolina law 
school. Blatt, who was on the Board of Trustees, was particulary concerned with 
maintaining the University's segregated status. He issued the following statement: 
The white people of South Carolina need not have any fear 
as to what the outcome of this application is going to be. 
The Board of Trustees will do everything in their power to 
maintain the University for white students only, and in so 
doing, will protect the other institutions for white students 
supported by the state.• 
A year later Blatt submitted a bill to establish a law school at South Carolina 
State College in Orangeburg to meet what he termed a critical situation. He urged 
immediate action by the House Judiciary Committee to forestall an effort to force the 
admission of a black to the law school: "We know of no other way to meet this than to 
establish a chair of law at the State Negro College," he said, and politely reminded his 
colleagues in the House that "negroes do pay taxes and therefore are entitled to 
consideration." He also pointed out that the NAACP had "someone at the head that is 
really smart . . . we have every reason in the world to believe that they will mandamus 
us in the next few days in hopes of having the negro admitted to the University."' 
It was not until 1943 before the legislature actually appropriated the funds for the 
law school. In the meantime it passed a resolution which denounced all organizations 
seeking "the amalgamation of the white and Negro races by co-mingling of the races on 
any basis of equality." Such acts were deemed "hostile to the existence and preservation 
of the American union of states." The legislature also reaffirmed its allegiance to 
"established white supremacy" and pledged its "lives" and "sacred honor to maintain it 
whatever the cost."" It also demanded firmly and unequivocally that "henceforth the 
damned agitators of the North leave the South alone."' 
A black law school was eventually opened at South Carolina State College in 
September 1947. Civil rights spokeswoman Modjeska Simkins characterized it as "that 
'cbartotte 06smw, 1S May 1986. 
"south Caroli1111 Department of A!dlna 111d Hiltory, 'Governor Rebert McNair Onl History Projca: lntemew 1/16/1 of 
Solomoa Blatt, Sr.• lntemew conducted 18 Januuy 1980 by C. Bleue Orallam, 1. 
•n, S~ 29 Aupot 1938. 
'17w s~ 19 Januuy 1939. 
'New Yort ~ 1 Matdl 1944. 
1Nftll Yort ~ 2 Maid! 1944. 
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little cheap, half-baked school.•• NAACP attorney Thurgood Marshall accused state 
authorities of setting "up a Jim Crow dump in South Carolina" and calling "it a law 
school."9 · 
After the United States Supreme Court struck down the "separate but equal" 
doctrine in 1954, the South Carolina General Assembly became active in the pursuit of 
policies designed to thwart the intent of this ruling. It enacted legislation at almost a 
"mass production rate," until by the Spring of 1958 there were a total of twenty-eight laws 
on the books opposing desegregation or defending segregation. '0 
Organized movements sprang up to mobilize resistance all over the South. Blatt 
became associated with one of these groups, called Citizens' Councils and known as the 
most "respectable" wing of the resistance movements in contrast to other more violent 
groups. Composed of only "the better class of southern whites," they were supposedly 
committed to strictly legal remedies for resisting and circumventing federal authority. 11 
On the night of January 26, 1956 Blatt participated in a rally in Columbia 
sponsored by the State Association of Citizens' Councils. An overflow crowd of 4,000 
turned out at the Township Auditorium to hear key speaker Senator James 0. Eastland 
of Mississippi. Other celebrities who appeared included Senators Strom Thurmond, Olin 
D. Johnston, and former governor James F. Byrnes. 12 Blatt spoke first, assuring his 
listeners that the legislature was vitally interested in continued segregation. "The public 
need have no fear, the legislature will fully perform the duties expected of them. We 
won't let you down." 13 
Following this event, Blatt increasingly expounded publicly upon the image of 
South Carolina as a land of tolerant people beset by outside influences. He further 
contended that the state's pattern of segregation was conducive to the maximum harmony 
in race relations. In a 1956 speech he said: 
As charitable as we are, tolerant of the views of others, 
all of the people of this Nation must understand, we are 
South Carolinians, proud of our heritage and we will use 
every reasonable, honest and lawful means at our command 
to protect our way of life.•• 
In another speech he declared that South Carolina "if permitted to do so without 
outside interference" would "properly attend to all of her responsibilities." He further 
warned that the people in South Carolina did not want "outside influences to come in and 
run the schools for them." i.s 
Blatt's portrayal of a tolerant state belied reality, though. The period from 1956 
'Palntdo S• National edition, 7:7 September 1947. 
'Marshall 10 Uniw:rsity of Qicqo lnr acbool profeaaor, William R. Kine. 2 October 1947. papers of tlte NACCP. Pt. 3, serica 
B, reel 14, rnme 315(). 
"HOMlnl H. Quinl, Projfk;,, Block ONl Wllilt: A FrallJc Ponrait of South Carolilla (Wubington, D.C : Publk Affairs Prcu, 1958), 
104. 
''Neil R. McMillcn, •atizcn'• Councils,• in 77w ~ Of SalUIWrn n-,.,,,,. eds. David C Roller and Robert W. 1wymaa 
(Baton rouge: The Louisiana State UlliYersity Prcu, 19'9), 2~216. 
"Ufa MtJFZW, 6 l'cbnlAly 1956, 22-23. 
"17w SW,. r, January 1956. 
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to 1960 was in fact a time in which dissident or liberal views brooked little tolerance 
from a political establishment bent on defending the traditional citadels of Southern 
society. Any criticism of the South's racial policies was attributed to foreign subversives 
and communist agitators. "All over the South," wrote C. Vann Woodward, "the lights of 
reason and tolerance and moderation began to go out under the resistance and demand 
for conformity." During this period, "books were banned, libraries were purged, 
newspapers were slanted, magazines disappeared from stands, television programs were 
withheld, and films were excluded." .. 
The mood in Columbia, as characterized by Alice Spearman, Executive Director 
of the South Carolina Council on Human Relations, was one complicated by the "present 
witch hunting" and influenced by "shades of McCarthy." The situation was "near hysteria 
with many people asking who is who and suggesting that many people, especially Negroes, 
are communists or fellow travellers.~ 17 White leaders who otherwise might have assisted 
in moderating the path that the state followed regarding racial issues were simply too 
intimidated to act. Those who did sceu out were many times ridiculed, physically 
threatened, or forced to flee the state. 
One particular case of intimidation occurred at the University of South Carolina 
in late 1957 after an anti-segregationist article written by a faculty member so infuriated 
Blatt that he was to play an instrumental role in the professor's dismissal. "'lbe Role of 
the Segregationist," written by Dr. Joseph Margolis of the Department of Psychology and 
Philosophy, appeared in the December issue of the bulletin published by the American 
Association of University Professors. 
Blatt immediatly fired off letters to Governor James Byrnes and University of 
South Carolina President Robert L Sumwalt in which he conveyed both shock and disgust 
at the article's content, charging that Margolis expressed his "views in opposition to our 
feelings about segregation." Blatt strongly urged that "positive action" be taken by the 
university to get Marf.olis to resign and if this could not be done, he recommended that 
"we should fire him." ' 
Newspaper editors throughout the state found themselves in the uncomfortable 
position of having to reconcile their genuine concerns for the defense of free speech with 
the actions being taken against Margolis for his criticism of state-sponsored-segregation. 
Blatt's own hometown paper claimed to "defend any man's right of having his own 
opinions," though it suggested that Margolis would be "much hafpier were he to quit the 
South as a place of residence and return to a Northern state." 
Blatt's advice did not go unheeded because on May 28, 1958 the Executive Board 
of Trustees for the University of South Carolina reported that Dr. Margolis had been 
notified of his termination. a This was allegedly in response to a letter from Psychology 
't Vu Woodwud, T1lt ,,,_,, C- of Jill, ODIi! Secoad Reriled PAitioa (Londaa: Oxfonl Ulliwnlty I'-, 1957), 1~166. 
"Speannu to Dabbo, 24 Juury 1958, General ~ Pila. Papen ol lllc South CuoUu CoullCU ol HulllU RelatJom. 
Soutla Cuuliniua IJbruy (SCOIR«1). 
"Wiulam Bepell, Dot,.-,,,. .. dw °"""""'4 (Columbia, Soath Cuoliaa: UIIMllity ol South CMollna I'-, lm), 140-
141. 
"man to Byrna, 30 December 1957. papen ol .i.- P. e,ma. !pedal Collectloal, Rebert Muldroll' cooper Llbraiy, CcllllOII 
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and Philosophy professor Dr. M. Kershaw Walsh to the Dean of the Faculty, Dr. W.H. 
Calicott, recommending that the services of Dr. Margolis be terminated in accordance 
with the tenure regulations of the University as well as a purported claim of serious 
incompatibility and friction that had developed in the department. Walsh also said that 
such action was taken "in the interest of the harmonious functioning and future 
development of this department."21 
Dr. Calicott communication to President Sumwalt stated that '7he effort to inject 
the issue of freedom of speech involving a controversial domestic problem should not be 
considered pertinent to the case in hand." He alluded to serious departmental problems 
and conditions involving Margolis that supposedly antedated the publication of the 
article... The matter was closed when Margolis left the state at the end of the school 
year to take a position at the University of California. 111 "So another light was put out," 
wrote activist Margaretta Childs. 25 
On April 6, 1959 Blatt delivered a speech before the Hebrew Benevolent Society 
that received national news media attention and proved to be one of his most 
controversial public statements ever on race relations. Hhe warned Jewish people not 
to become too active in the struggle for civil rights that was being waged in the South. 
There were dangerous "inclinations among some Jewish people in America to establish 
themselves as a minority force in the storm of political propaganda which surrounds and 
confuses the Negro question in the South." He went on to say that there "was no 
intolerance in public life in South Carolina and that "not the Negro race, nor any other 
race, is oppressed in South Carolina today, and I am a living example of the tolerance 
of the people of this great state." According to Blatt, "nowhere else on the face of the 
earth" were blacks "happier, more prosperous, more contented, more a part of the general 
way of life than in South Carolina."'" 
Following this speech the General Assembly adopted a concurrent resolution that 
formally gave "its stamp of approval" to Blatt's "forthright" statement on race relations. 
The resolution referred to Blatt as one born of Jewish emigrant parents who "called upon 
South Carolinians of all races to recognize that every race living in South Carolina has 
equal opportunity for happiness and p~ess and that each individual has the opportunity 
to prove himself for what he is worth." -
In reflecting on this speech twenty-five years after the fact, Blatt appeared 
unrepentant: 
In that speech I begged the Jewish people to be careful 
bow they dealt with the black program. I said you are 
the ones who are goint to suffer if you become active and 
I believe in fairness. But you are going to pay the penalty. 
"Wallh lo Calicott, 12 Fcbruuy 1958. F'de "Maup>lil.' Robert L Sumnlt papers- Unlvellity ol South Carolina Ald,i,,ea 9RLS-
USCA). 
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They are going to tum upon the Jewish people the first thing 
they do. • • • and I told them • • • you watch your stores and 
whatnot. And it wasn't six months after that before they began 
burning the Jewish stores. the merchants' stores in New York. 
and breaking the windows. It followed in line with what I 
said :II 
The year 1960 was a turning point in the southern resistance movement against 
desegregation. Up to that point most southerners had felt that the civil rights movement 
was due soley to outside agitation and that southern blacks were actually a contented lot. 
happy with the segregated way of life, and if only left alone would never consider 
protesting."' Massive resistance began to collapse everywhere but in the Deep South. 
though. a breakthrough in racial accommodation that was facilitated by a "growing 
rea.li7.ation among whites that black goals were indeed reasonable and their attainment 
would not mean the destruction of the social order." Even South Carolina. one of only 
three states that had not admitted any blacks into white schools by the end of 1961, 
began to move away from massive resistance towards a peaceful accommodation.,. 
Oespite the changing tide Blatt remained an intransigent segregationist who 
maintained that the problems in the South were distorted and exacerbated by outside 
agitators. In a speech before the Daughters of the Confederacy in 1960 he urged the 
"people of South Carolina and the other Confederate States" to stand "faster than ever 
by the traditions which Southern people hold so dear." He blamed the racial problems 
in the South on "misguided political agitation on the national front" in which the South 
had "for a number of years been subjected to malicious and contemptible 
misrepresentations of our history and traditions. While South Carolina segregated the 
races on buses," Blatt doubted that there were "as many Negro people in any other state 
of the nation" who enjoyed "the privileges of driving their own automobile, and of 
conducting their own businesses, and being taught by teachers of their own kind." He 
further alluded to "forces of all kinds that have been exerted to break the spirit of the 
South, to destroy the customs of the South .••• We have controlled practically every 
instinct to do violence."31 
In contrast to Blatt. those who prepared for the desegregation of Clemson and the 
University of South Carolina were moderates who had learned from the mistakes of other 
states. Thus South Carolina was ultimately able to adopt a more pragmatic approach. 
When confronted with a federal court order to admit a black student to Clemson in 
January 1963, "most of its political leaders. including two governors. united with college 
officials and businessmen to support voluntary compliance."32 
Blatt's name was conspicuously absent from the list of those prominent politicians 
who assisted in this behind-the-scenes effort to desegregate peacefully. There are even 
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indications that Blatt attempted to undermine the process. His disagreement with the 
position taken by the Kennedy administration is conveyed in a letter that he wrote to 
fellow segregationist, Congressman Albert Watson in 1963. "Don't worry about the 
Kennedy clan taking the patronage away from you. I think that you are making friends 
by your strong stand against their effort to destroy the white people of the South."» 
One of the more divisive issues with which the legislature had to grapple in the 
1960's involved attempts to reenact the state's school compulsory law. This had been 
repealed in 1955 so that white parents could not be legally compelled to send their 
children to schools in which blacks were enrolled. Things did not go exactly according 
to plan, because, as the Charlotte Observer pointed out, "South Carolina scrapped its 
compulsory school attendance law in 1954, fearing it would lead to forced integration. 
Integration came anyway and so did a marked growth in dropouts and illiteracy.",. 
Blatt remained steadfastly opposed to a reinstatement of the school attendance law 
in spite of the fact that many of bis colleagues had moderated their positions. The bill 
was brought before the House on March 23, 1966 and on that day Blatt made a dramatic 
and impassioned plea. One account reported that "the rafters practically shook in the 
House of Representatives . . . when Speaker Solomon Blatt let go with an oratorical 
explosion against a proposed compulsory school attendance law."1' According to the 
Greenville News, the proposed school attendance law "survived a tearful frontal assault" 
when Blatt "stabbed his finger at attentive House Colleagues and in an quivering voice 
demanded, 'Do you want some 16-year old so-and-so holding the hand of your little 
granddaughter in the classroom? Sol Blatt does not want that For God's sake help me 
out.'",. Asked if he would prefer having 16-year old illiterates walking the streets or in 
school trying to get an education, Blatt replied, Td rather have them on the streets. 
They can be avoided there. I don't want them sitting in class with my granddaughter 
holding hands during May Day activities, playing with her, and going places where they 
go."37 
The House heard him to the end in shocked silence and then voted against him, 
73 to 32. The speech was widely criticized and tainted Blatt's reputation in the eyes of 
many because his argument, which in another era would have been overpowering, was 
so "embarrassingly divisive.•• It was called "a wild-eyed tirade" by one black school 
organization which also felt that Blatt's remarks from the House floor did not represent 
"the increasingly enlightened thinking of both races in the state." They viewed ''with 
alarm the blind and reactionary vision taken by the speaker of the House of 
Representatives" and mourned "the lack of progress in the area of education due mainly 
to the perpetuation of a man of limited vision like Solomon Blatt in a position of high 
governmental responsibility.""' 
The Charlotte Observer characterized Blatt's speech as an attack that "took on race 
"'Blatt to Wai-a, 16 July 1963. Public-Oelletal File. Solomon Blatt Papen-SCL. 
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baiting typical of a Vardaman, Cotton Ed or Pitchfork Ben.• In the 1900's demagogues 
like "Misswippi's James Vardaman warned that educating the Negro would spoil a good 
field hand and make an insolent cook. Blatt departed only slightly from this reasoning.•• 
Blatt's diatribe against the compulsory attendance bill in effect left him "branded as a 
racist in the eyes of South Carolina's Negro leaders."" A former colleague called the 
speech "the be~ of the end for the speaker. It just took a few yean for the seeds 
to germinate.• 
Solomon Blatt, the son of Jewish immigrants, long-time speaker of the South 
Carolina House of Representatives, and one of the most powerful politicians in state 
history, spent much of bis life in a segregated society. He was, therefore, forced to 
reconcile the struggle of bis immigrant parents in a new country with bis own struggle 
against the demands of another minority. Blatt was not unlike most white southern 
leaders at the time who when faced with the prospect of desegregation reacted 
defensively. The characteristic that tended to distinguish Blatt from most southern 
segregationists was the degree of this displeasure in light of bis minority faith and ethnic 
background. 
Of the motives for Blatt's conservative attitudes on race, much can be attributed 
to political expediency. Any southern elected official before 1960 who wished to remain 
in office had to articulate anti-desegregationist themes. Perhaps Blatt summed his 
feelings up best when asked how he could have held these views considering "Jews are 
supposed to care about social justice and equality"? His answer was, "The same way 
those minorities burned those stores in New York, broke the windows. If that indicated 
how they felt towards my people, I wasn't going to open the door and tell them to come 
in."'° 
After 1960 increased black voter registration prompted many white elected officials 
to become more attuned to black concerns and interests. Blatt, though, held steadfast 
to the attitudes and vestiges of an unpleasant era far longer than many of his colleagues 
and did not begin to adjust to the new realities until very late in bis career. 
A manifestation of this belated "moderation" occurred in March 1974, when Blatt 
voted with the large majority of South Carolina House of Representatives to designate 
January 15 as Martin Luther King Day. According to a skeptical Columbia Record, "One 
individual vote and one which must have raised a few eyebrows among those with 
historical perspective was that of former House Speaker Solomon Blatt." The newspaper 
pondered whether the vote reflected a genuine concern for the sensitivities and 
sympathies of blacks or if it was only a decision based upon a pragmatic awareness of 
their political clout. 'Tunes have changed So, apparently, has Sol Blatt and a lot of 
other White House members."44 
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WHEN VOTES DON'T ADD UP: 
LABOR POLITICS AND SOUTH 
CAROLINA WORKMANS' 
COMPENSATION ACTS, 
1934-1938 
Bryant Simon 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Speaking before a throng of Spartanburg millhands amid the General Textile Strike 
of 1934, gubernatorial candidate Olin D. Johnston hitched up his pants and proclaimed: 
"I'm Labor's True Friend." He explained: "I went into the mills when I was twelve years 
old when other boys my age were going to school . . . I know the problems that daily 
confront those who work with their hands for a living." The candidate promised the 
crowd more than understanding; he vowed to "see South Carolina unsurpassed in the 
Union for the consideration shown her working people." 1 
Johnston rode to victory on the back of the labor vote and trounced Cole Blease, 
the erstwhile favorite son of the millhands and staunch foe of state action. Palmetto 
State laborers greeted his triumph with boisterous parades and street dances, and also 
with anxious anticipation of change. Shortly after Johnston's inauguration, for instance, 
the President of the South Carolina Federation of Textile Workers informed the new 
chief executive: "We trust that you will reward us for what we have done for you." One 
textile operative wrote: "You no how us mill people are treated . . . please help us wont 
you." Another stated: "We have supported you in all your campaigns in expectations 
of your help." 2 
Following closely on heels of the advent of the New Deal, the election of Johnston, 
along with a dozen other pro-labor lawmakers in 1934, inspired working-class hopes for 
a broad expansion of their rights within South Carolina society. Expectations, however, 
soon fizzled into frustrations. During the 1935 legislative session, representatives 
introduced twenty-nine labor bills, including measures to abolish the stretch-out, fix 
minimum wage and maximum hour levels, and bar anti-union discrimination. All but one 
of these propositions either drowned in committee or sunk on the Senate floor. The 
Workman's Compensation Act - the subject of this paper -- was the single bill which 
1 The above ii a compooite with ol Jobllllton'1 typical stump speech. For details see JoAnn Deakin Carpenter, 'Olin D. 
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labor supporters successfully steered through the treacherous waters of the General 
Assembly, but even it emerged so badly battered that it provided industrial workers with 
little protection.• 
In January 1935, when Johnston took office, South Carolina was one of only four 
states without a workman's compensation law.• Before this date, the principle of 
employer's liability covered workers' injury claims. Under this system, the law assumed 
that the laborer accepted the risks of employment and gave him the right to sue and 
collect damages in the event of management's negligence. When an accident occurred, 
a laborer first had to secure the services of a lawyer, typically one like, the young Olin 
Johnston, who had built his Spartanburg practice on the foundation of such cases.' But 
no jurist, however clever or cunning, could speed a case through the judicial system or 
guarantee a large, or even equitable, payment. Occasionally after months of litigation, 
the injured operative acquired a tidy settlement, a chunk of which went into his attorney's 
pocket; yet more often he received nothing at all, and was left penniless and unable to 
work.• 
Because of the capriciousness of employers' liability, workman's compensation had 
long stood atop labor and capital's legislative agendas. 7 Business leaders, for their part, 
opined that the old system discouraged new industries from locating in the state. On the 
other hand, labor wanted relief from the uncertainties of juries and court room delays. 
Nonetheless, the "lawyer-dominated" General Assembly, particularly the Senate, stymied 
repeated efforts to pass a compensation act. When the bill finally did gamer a majority 
in both houses, it did so only after five total revisions. Following these many rounds of 
negotiations, the law still bore the distinct imprint of management's hand.• 
Approved on May 24, 1935, South Carolina's first workman's compensation act was 
riddled with exemptions and marred by skimpy payments. To begin with, the intricate 
law, which filled thirty-seven pages of the statute book, excused the timber concerns, rock 
quarries, steam laundries, sand mines, and all other firms employing less than fifteen 
laborers.• Moreover, it stipulated compensation payments well under the national average 
and slightly below regional standards. 10 The total amount to be paid to a permanently 
disabled worker could not exceed five thousand dollars. In cases of partial or temporary 
disability, employers would be required to provide half of the employee's average weekly 
wage up to $2,500 with a minimum of $5 and a maximum of $18 per week. Periods of 
time during which salary payments had to be met were listed in detail: thirty weeks, for 
' Antbony B. Miller, "Palmetto Politician: 1be Early Political Career of Olin D. Jobnston, 1896-1945," (Pll.D. dillertation, 
UniYcnity of North Carolina 11 Chapel Hill, 1976), p. 148; Pro<eedinp of the Third Southern Re(lional Labor Conference, 1936, pp. 
3-5, Box 41, Pokier: Labor Comention, Olin D. Jobnaton Papers, SCDAH; The s~ May 22, 1935. 
' The other statea without I rompenaation law w,:re Arbnau, Milsiaippi, 111d Florida. 
1 William Hays Simpaa,, Wortman'.< Compt,ualiolt in $o,,lh OJmlina, (Charlotte, NC, 1949): 23-25. 
' On employer's liability see Miller, p. 147, Simpoon, pp. 29-30; and "South Carolina Should Adopt Accident Compenaation, • 1 
handbill produa:d by the American Aaociation for Labor Legislation 1tt1ched to I letter from John B. And,.,,.. to Jobnston, March 
35, 1935, Box 62, 06n D. Jobnston Papers, SCDAH. 
1 For information on plWioua attempts to pus workman's compenaation legislation refer to David Culton, Mill IJlld Town in SOUlh 
CaroliNJ, J880,J92q (Baton Roup, 1!1112): p. 241; Richlnl Burta, Richard lrviM MtlllNIII IJlld 11w ~ M-, in Soudt Carolina, 
(Columbia, 1974), p. 116; 111d Simpoon, pp. 28-37. 
• Miller, p. 147; 1be Sll1II, May 23, 1935; 111d the Andenon /~Ill, May 11, 1935. 
' South Carolina Acts of 1936, pp. 1231-1268, SCDAH. 
"For rompuiron see "CompuatiYc Benefits Costs of V1rio111 Wortman'• Compenaation Acts,• May 1, 1935, Box 42, Pokier -
Industrial Commiaion, Olin D. Jobnston Papers, SCDAH. 
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instance, for the loss of a big toe and ten weeks for any other toe; one hundred and 
twenty-five weeks for the loss of a foot and additional fifty weeks for the loss of a leg. 
Finally, the bill gave the governor the power to appoint a five-member Industrial 
Commission to administer the law and serve as judge and jury in all contested cases. 11 
Johnston allowed the workman's compensation bill to sit on his desk for two 
months before he signed it into law. During this time, he received a stream of letters. 
While business leaders pressed for the governor's signature on the act, labor groups 
quarrelled among themselves. 12 "Knowing that you came from the ranks of labor," wrote 
a Charleston trade unionist, "we ... ask you to use your full veto power to prevent this 
... law, we believe it will only serve to help big business and cause ... greater suffering 
to the working man."u A state AFL official added his voice to the chorus of detractors. 
"Entirely too many workers do not come under its provisions," he protested. Another 
opponent dubbed the proposed law a "nonsuit bill" designed to aid lax employers and 
grubby insurance companies. 1• Not everyone within the Palmetto State labor movement, 
however, opposed the bill. Textile union locals from Clinton and Newberry, for instance, 
wired telegrams of unanimous support to the governor. Others were more guarded in 
their approval. "Just a few lines to let you know that all of the people are wanting you 
to sign the Workman's Compensation Bill," one millhand instructed Johnston, "We realize 
that it is not a perfect bill. But it beats what we have got. An [sic] we can have 
amendments put to it later." Johnston listened to this advice. u 
The governor received another pile of mail after the General Assembly's approval 
of the bill. Apparently, the depression turned a large number of South Carolinians into 
office-seekers. Representatives from every comer of the state, and every trade group and 
occupational association hounded Johnston for an appointment on the Industrial 
Commission. Those not looking for a post for themselves recommended a friend or 
colleague. When the governor whittled down his list, he selected a commission of two 
business leaders, two labor spokesmen, and an insurance man. Industry representatives, 
who had feared that Johnston would stack the commission with trade unionists, applauded 
his restraint and his choices. 16 
On July 17, surrounded by labor leaders and his nominees to the Industrial 
Commission, Johnston signed the Workman's Compensation Bill into law. Conceding that 
it was not a "prefect piece of legislation" and that compensation rates were too low, the 
mill-boy governor, nonetheless boldly predicted, "the workers will receive full justice in 
every instance ... [and] ... fair play and fair dealing from the Industrial Commission." 
The head of the State Federation of Labor gushed: "This a great day for labor in South 
11 Spartanburg Hmll4, May 22, 193S. 
"See CD111pla or buei- IUJJPOfl for the JIIOPOICd legisLltion in Box 44, Folder: Wortman'• Compo-lion, Olin D. Johnston 
Papc11, SCDAH. 
11 PD. & P or America, Cllarlaloa Local 704 to Johllllon, May 21, 193S, Box 44, Folder: Wortman'• Compcnution, Olin D • 
.loblllloa Papers, SCDAH. 
" Miller, p. 149; Slmpeoa, pp. 38-39; The 5- May 19, and May 23, 193S; and Spartanbura Hm,Jd, May 23, 193S. 
" Local 1834 • Oiftoa to .loblllloa, May 29, 193S; Local 2118 • Newberry to Johllllon, n.d.; and J.B. Rhinhart to Johnston, May 
29, 193S Box 44, Folder: Wortman'• Compcautioa, Olin D • .lohllll<lll Papers, SCDAH. 
10 Miller, p. 149; and 77w ,S. July 18, 193S. The mcmbcn ot the commillloa Mre John Duka, Coleman C Martin, LL Hyatt, 
Jolul W. Duncan, and P.M. Camak. The r1111 two repreKftted bulinca inieresll, the IC<Olld two labor, and lalt the insunncc industry. 
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Carolina." 11 
Beginning almost the morning after Johnston signed the bill, laborers flooded his 
office with complaints. Of course, those not protected by the law grumbled, while those 
under its umbrella griped about the scale of payments. Although lawmakers maintained 
that half was better than nothing, most laborers knew that half of already paltry wages 
spelled hunger for themselves and their families. Still others felt trapped in the webs of 
the law and a few seethed as they watched firms slip through loopholes and dodge the 
Industrial Commission. Essentially, working-people lambasted the workman's 
compensation law because it failed to provide them with what they expected of such 
legislation - just restitution and equal treatment under the law. 1• 
Paul Murdaugh, for example, suffered a leg injury while working for the Robert 
Lee Construction Company. He made a claim for compensation and won an award of 
"temporary total disability" to be paid over six months. In addition, he received full 
reimbursement for hospital expenses and $500 for "permanent body dis-figurement on 
account of the alleged 1 1/4" shortening of his left leg." Murdaugh disputed the decision 
and petitioned for full disability. He was rebuffed. An investigation by the Industrial 
Commission discovered: "Murdaugh's leg was from 1/2 to l" short before the accident 
reduced it - thus the accident reduced his leg by only 10%, which does not constitute a 
permanent disability." Nor did the injury, the report continued, render the "appearance 
of the claimant obnoxious or repulsive in the eyes of his fellow man." Explaining that 
he limped badly and suffered acute pain, Murdaugh appealed to Johnston for help. The 
Governor replied with a form-letter." 
A B. Styles also voiced his anger over the workman's compensation law to the 
Governor. A long-time textile employee, Styles was hurt on New Years Day 1937 at the 
Franlclin Mills in Greer. He received compensation, and after several months rest, 
recovered from his injury. Eager to return to work and again earn his full salary, Styles 
applied with his former company, but the management refused to re-hire him. "I would 
like very much to no [sic) the man that got up such a law," he wrote to Johnston, "I 
would like to punch him on the nose." He concluded his correspondence by urging the 
state's chief executive to amend the law in order to remove it from the mill owners' 
clutches.~ 
Others were harsher in their attacks on the law. Mrs. G. S. Price of Calhoun Falls 
told the governor she lost her livelihood, her right to compensation, and her womanhood 
"on account of falsehoods sworn by eye witnesses" to the Industrial Commission in order 
to save their jobs. "I'm not through talking about it, because I'm not through suffering," 
she explained in a letter to Johnston. "Because you dont enforce justice with it," she 
continued, "your workman's compensation isnt worth a flap." Price did not blame the 
Governor, whom she deemed to be a "just and honest" man, for the defects. Instead, she 
maintained that the "big mistake" occurred when Johnston "signed it out your hands to 
the authority of some one that wasn't quite as interested in the working folks as you 
" 11tt Slat,; July 18, 1915; aod SpartanbtuJ Herald. July 18, 1915. 
11 For uamplc - D.L Goodnaupl lo Jobn11ooa. Pcbnluy 17, 1936, 8m 16, .Johmto11 Papen, SCDAH. 
,. Paul Mwdaup v. Robert l..ce a-tructioa Co., C.. No. 1428, December 12, 1937, 8m 42, Folder: lndustrial Commislioo, 
Olin D . .lobllllon Papen, SCDAH. 
• AB. Slylel to Jobn11ooa. D=ml>er 12, 1937, 8m 12, Olin D. Johmton Papen, SCDAH. 
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were." 21 
"Is the mill Co. greater than the government?"33 This and similar questions hung 
on the lips of Palmetto State laborers, who had been, during the 1930s, galvanized into 
political activity by conceptions of themselves as equal citizens. Many believed that the 
workman's compensation law had been drafted by their governor in order to assure them 
justice and fair-play. Something, they reasoned, went askew. They complained that all 
too often the law operated not for their benefit, but in the interests of management and 
existing power structures. Their grievances reached the governor's office. In 1937, 
Johnston and his labor allies sought to amend the act. The Governor called on the 
General Assembly to "change this law so it will . . . protect the interests of working 
people." The State Senate blocked the many of the proposed alterations, and a year later 
members of both houses tried, unsuccessfully, to repeal the Workman's Compensation Act 
altogether. 23 
For Johnston, ominous political signals accompanied the rejection of his 
amendments to the workmen's compensation act and they came from some unlikely 
places. Indeed, some laborers began to waver in their electoral allegiance to the mill-boy 
governor. A Graniteville textile operative challenged the chief executive: "Your haven't 
backed any thing you said in your campaign, you said you was for labor." After a survey 
of the local political landscape, Marvin Reese -- a magistrate and Johnston lieutenant 
from Greer -- discovered similar sentiments. "Outside of the bosses," he reported, "I must 
say that ... [the workman's compensation bill] . . . is hated by practically 100 percent." 
Moreover, he informed Johnston that his support was slipping because of the measure. 
"This law will hurt you in this section of the State," he predicted. :io It is unclear if Reese's 
forecast proved true, yet during his failed bid to win election to the United States Senate 
in 1938, Johnston did lose in the counties surrounding Greer and several other densely 
working-class districts to his opponent "Cotton" Ed Smith. Perhaps, the frustrations that 
laborers associated with the workman's compensation law turned some away from political 
mobilization as the main avenue of redress for their economic and social grievances. 20 
Whatever the electoral impact, Palmetto State laborers learned a harsh lesson from 
the administration of the Workman's Compensation Law. They were taught that their 
votes were not enough. In 1934, South Carolina workers carried one of their own to the 
Governor's mansion. Once in office, Johnston demonstrated a willingness to stretch the 
law in order to aid labor, yet at the end of his four-year term, the balance of state power 
remained tilted towards capital. To be sure, armed with the ballot, workers had the 
strength to occasionally pressure legislators into mitigating the harshest aspects of 
11 Mn. 0. S. Priace to Jobnatoa, Man:b 10, 1937, Box 12, Olin D. Johnston Papen, SCDAH. Soc allO Price to Johnston, 
Scpccmbcr 14, 1936 and December 28, 1936, Bo1 43, Johnston Papen, SCDAH. 
a Mra. Hallman to E!lcanor ~ Jaauuy 1, 1934, National Rt:co,,ery Adminiltration lletorda, R04, 3118, OranitCYillc, 
National Arcb~ 
D Statement by the Governor, 11.d, Box 10, and 'Tbc Governor's Allnual M.-ge, 1936,' 11.d, Box 44, Olin D. Johnston Papen, 
SCDAH; Carpe11ter, pp. 138-139; OreellYille NrM, Jaauuy 15, 1937; and Earle R. Britton, 'Propea in the Palmetto State,' Amtrican 
FtdmUiDnist, St (October 1947): »32. 
"P. E. Baupman to Johnston, September 9, 1938, Box 7, and M11Yi11 R. Reese to Jobllaton, December 17, 1937, Bo1 12, Oli11 
D. Johnaton Papen, SCDAH. 
" Por election n:tumo and a compuiloll ol Jolulston's 1934 and 1938 showi11p - Carpenter, pp. 103, 398. Also Prank E. 
Jonlon, The Primllty Sia/JI: A lrlJliDl1 ofllw Dmtocralic Parry in South Camlbta, Jl/96,1962, (Columbia: 11162): pp. 40-41, 74-7S. 
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industrial life, but in the end, they lacked the muscle to enforce their interpretation of 
the laws. This was a lesson that South Carolina workers would learn over and over again 
during the 1930s. 31 
• David <:alftaa, "1be Slate and Ille Womr In Ille South: A LcaJo Prom Soutb Carolina,' (unpublilbcd paper, 1988). In Ibis 
aulbor'1 pcaaaloa; and 1- Pint, "L.11,or, Liberty, ud Ille Law: Tnidc Unioum and Ille Problem of Ille American Conllitutioul 
Order,' }-,,al of Ammcall m-, 74 {J>-mber 1987): 906. 
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BE1WEEN CAMDEN AND NINE1Y SIX: 
MOTTE AND GRANBY -- TWO SMALL LINKS 
IN A VERY LARGE CHAIN 
James A. Lee 
Lugoff-Elgin High School 
On April 6, 1781 General Nathanael Greene ended his pursuit of the British 
General Cornwallis-a pursuit which had taken armies through many battles, including 
Cowpens in South Carolina and which culminated in the empty British victory at Guilford 
Courthouse, North Carolina. Following that battle, both generals made extremely 
significant decisions in the context of future events. Cornwallis decided to leave the 
Carolinas and move into Virginia, where in September he met General George 
Washington at Yorktown. Greene decided to leave North Carolina as well, but in the 
opposite direction. He planned to move south (as secretly as possible) and take British-
held Camden and a string of outposts from Georgetown to Augusta serving as supply 
posts between Charleston, Camden, and Ninety Six. 
When Greene reached Camden, he met Lord Rawdon in the Battle of Hobkirk's 
Hill. As at Guilford Courthouse, the British took the day and again the British victory 
was empty because of virtually equal casualties and the ensuing movements by Generals 
Greene, Henry Lee, Francis Marion, and Thomas Sumter. Having already lost Fort 
Watson on the Santee River, Rawdon was forced to evacuate Camden and turn to a 
defensive plan in hopes of holding the outposts of Forts Motte and Granby. 
Fort Motte sat on a high hill overlooking the Congaree River to the north just a 
short distance from the convergence of the river with the Wateree where the Santee is 
formed. The site is today in a secluded, rural area in Calhoun County, South Carolina, 
marked by a small granite monument not even visible from the nearby county road. In 
the early days of May 1781, this area became the focus of the American Revolution. 
The fort, commanded by Captain Donald McPherson, was built around the 
mansion of the widowed Rebecca Motte. The house was surrounded by a large trench. 
Inside it was a large parapet encircled by an abatis. The post was obviously well 
fortified. The garrison posted at Motte included 150 men. Fort Motte, like Fort Watson, 
served the British as a communication and supply depot between Charleston, Camden, 
and Ninety Six. 1 
'R.obcrt D. Bua, S-..p Fo«:Tltt Lift Oltd OJmpai{pu of ae.'01 Franei.r Manon, (South Carolina: Sandlapper Prea, IDC., 1972), 
pp. 187-189. 
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After Greene had forced the evacuation of Camden at Hobkirk's and the siege of 
Fort Watson by Marion and Lee, taking Fort Motte became the next American objective. 
Francis Marion and Henry Lee arrived at Motte by May 6. Lee had posted his cavalry 
and infantry in a small cabin which, in days of peace, served as slave quarters just north 
of the mansion. Marion had entrenched his militia on the eastern slope to the right of 
the mansion. Marion had in his militia 150 men and one six-pounder field piece, as well 
as Lee's Legion. The fort was completely invested on the 9th. Lee's men were able to 
advance to within 400 yards of the fort under the cover of the valley between the 
mansion and the cabin. 
During the day of the 10th, while the militia and continentals were digging 
trenches, Marion became involved in a dispute with General Greene over dragoon horses. 
In one exchange, Marion threatened to resign (a tactic commonly used by both Marion 
and Sumter). By the end of the 10th, the trenches had been dug to a point that allowed 
the American officers to summon Captain McPherson to surrender. The fort was · 
completely surrounded and there was no escape for the British without a hard battle. 
Lee says in his memoirs: 
A flag was accordingly dispatched to Captain McPherson, 
stating to him with truth our relative situation, and 
admonishing him to avoid the disagreeable consequences of 
an arrogant temerity. To this the captain replied, that, 
disregarding consequences, he should resist to the last 
moment. 2 
That evening, the Americans had received word of Rawdon's retreat and intended 
reinforcement from an intercepted messenger. After confirmation came from Greene, 
Lee and Marion pressed the operations through the night which were completed by 
morning., On that day, May 11, Rawdon reached the region known as the High Hills 
of the Santee. After holding out through the day, McPherson's men were reinvigorated 
when they could see the lights from Rawdon's campfires on the high ground across the 
river from Fort Motte. 
Marion and Lee were forced to resort to a more severe method by which they 
could expedite McPherson's surrender.• The American officers agreed that the mansion 
would have to be burned. Because there was no extra space within the fortress, the 
British would be forced into capitulation. In his memoirs, Lee explains in great length 
how distressing this decision was to him because of the hospitality and patriotism shown 
by Rebecca Motte during the siege, as well as the entire war. Mrs. Motte, having been 
removed from the mansion when the British took control of her home, had moved to the 
cabin in which Lee's forces had been posted. Therefore, Lee took upon himself the 
responsibility of informing her of their decision. Lee recalled the occasion as follows: 
'Hcmy (Uaht Hone Harry) Lee, 77w American Revolution ill the Sotllh, (New Yort: Amo l'ral, 1969), pp. 34S-346. 
11bitt, p. 347. 
'William Dobcin Jamel, A Slrdl:II of the Ufe of Bri(lOdier GeMraJ Fl'IJlfds Narlott, (Georgia: Continental Book Company, 1948), pp. 
120-121. 
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Talcing the first opportunity which offered. the next 
morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Lee imparted to Mrs. Motte 
the intended measure; lamenting the sad necessity, and 
assuring her of the deep regret which the unavoidable 
act excited in his and every breast. 
With a smile of complacency this exemplary lady listened 
to the embarrassed officer, and gave instant relief to his 
agitated feelings, by declaring, that she was gratified with 
the opportunity of contributing to the good of her country, 
and that she Rebecca Motte extended her hospitality to the 
officers of both sides. Together, the British and American 
officers, according to Lee, "partook . . . of a sumptuous 
dinner; soothing in the sweets of social intercourse the ire 
of which the preceding conflict had engendered."' 
James A Lee 
Following this campaign on May 12, Marion and Lee received their orders from 
General Greene. Francis Marion was instructed to move toward Georgetown with that 
British post as his objective. Lee was given separate orders. He was sent to besiege Fort 
Granby on the Congaree at a location near where the City of Cayce stands today. Both 
of these actions would result in British losses, but Lee's victory at Granby would prove 
to cause some of the worst feelings among American soldiers of nearly any event of the 
war. 
After Guilford. Greene had made the chain of posts in South Carolina his long-
term objective. On May 12, Greene saw himself well on the way to accomplishing this 
feat. Fort Watson had been taken, he had forced the evacuation of Camden, and Fort 
Motte had surrendered. On May 11, the day before the capitulation at Motte, Thomas 
Sumter had very easily taken the post at Orangeburg and its garrison of 80 men. 
Sumter's move to Orangeburg seems to be somewhat disputed as to whose initiative it 
reflected. Bass says that Sumter was involved in a campaign that he had designed back 
at the time of his recuperation from injuries sustained at the Blackstocks battle. The 
plan, designed on February 16, 1781 was similar to that of Greene's except for the fact 
that Sumter was going to avoid Camden and begin with Granby. The Gamecock .planned 
to capture Granby, seizing the supplies and stores which had been taken by Major 
Maxwell from the local Whigs, and proceed against the remaining posts, eventually ending 
up in Georgetown. On February 17, Sumter was at Granby. He soon realized that the 
post would not be easily taken and had given up siege. The Gamecock again attempted 
this siege in early May. He encamped on both sides of the Congaree controlling Friday's 
Ferry. Granby was defended by two twelve-pounders, several smaller guns, and 340 men, 
of whom 60 were regulars. Sumter again was unable to take the fortification. Not able 
to achieve an expeditious surrender, Sumter voluntarily took a small force against 
n 
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Orangeburg, leaving the remainder of his force to cany on the Granby siege. 6 This is 
the point where the disagreement appears. Thayer says that instead of moving on his 
own initiative Greene ordered Sumter to move to Orangeburg.' 
No matter whose idea the move was, Sumter's capture of Orangeburg was very 
untimely for his own personal reason. Having been so long involved in the siege of 
Granby, Sumter became highly angered when on the 13th he learned that Lee had been 
sent to bring to an end the standoff at Granby. 
In Lee's approach to Granby, he had left Captain Armstrong and one cavalryman 
along the road between Fort Motte and Fort Granby to watch the movement of Colonel 
Rawdon who had already reached the destroyed fortifications at Motte. Lee described 
the fortification at Granby as follows: 
Fort Granby was erected on a plain, which extended to the 
southern banks of the Congaree, near Friday's Ferry. Protected 
on one side by that river, it was accessible in every other 
quarter with facility; but being completely finished, with 
parapet encircled by fosse and abatis, and being well garrisoned, 
it could not have been carried without considerable loss, except 
by regular approaches; and in this way would have employed the 
whole force of Greene for a week at least, in which period Lord 
Rawdon's interposition was practicable.• 
Upon his arrival at Granby, Lee gathered information from his guides and began 
to erect a battery in the woods west the fort. Fortunately for the Americans, a foggy 
morning on the 15th gave time for the completion of this battery before it was detected 
by the enemy. Captain Finley had his six-pounder mounted and ready to fire as soon as 
the fog lifted. 
It is at this juncture in his memoirs that Lee points out the unsuitability of Major 
Maxwell as a military officer. "He was the exact counterpart of McPherson; disposed to 
avoid, rather than to court, the daring scenes of war. Zealous to fill his purse, rather 
than to gather military laurels, he had, during his command, pursued his favorite object 
with considerable success, and held with him in the fort his gathered spoil."' Lee then 
said that in order to hasten the surrender of the post, he sent a letter of summons 
"couched in pompous terms" to Major Maxwell. The summons was delivered by Captain 
Eggleston, who was authorized to negotiate the terms of surrender. 10 
When the fog lifted, Captain Finley opened fire which led to confusion among the 
British. At the same time, the Legion infantry moved into its desired ground, severing 
the British pickets from the fort. Eggleston then set out with his flag which suspended 
the American fire. When the American assault was halted, the British pickets and 
'Robert D. Baa, Golll«odc: TMUfaa11tlC:111npaig,,sofGmttoJT/toMasS-, (NcwYort: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), 
pp. 172-175. 
'rheodore Thayer, Nalltanitl Giwloe; SlrOlltfiUI of tire Alllmcan RM,ludon, (New Yort, TMyne Publishcn, 1960), p. 334. 
'Lee, Alllmcan RM,ludon, pp. 350-351. 
'Ibid. 
.Ibid. 
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patrols, which had been cut off, attempted to return to the fort. Lee's cavalry partially 
checked this movement, but Eggleston was ordered to "remonstrate with Major Maxwell 
upon the impropriety of the conduct of his pickets and patrols and to demand that he 
order them to resume their station; it being never intended by presenting him with an 
opportunity of avoiding useless effusion of blood, to permit the improvement of his 
capacity to resist." Eggleston's protest was dulr honored by Maxwell. The pickets were 
promptly withdrawn to their original position. 1 
The negotiations were then able to begin. Maxwell, proving to be what Lee knew 
of him, offered to give up the fort, but with three stipulations. Maxwell demanded: that 
he and his men be allowed to maintain possessions of their spoils as personal property; 
that the Loyalist militia should be held in the same manner as the regulars; and that they 
be given an escort, charged to protect people and property, back to the British army. 
Eggleston sent a letter to Lee listing the demands. (Since the demands were so great, 
Eggleston did not feel secure in granting them himself.) Major Maxwell also sent a letter 
to Lee requesting two wagons for the conveyance of his own baggage. Lee responded 
by granting all requests with the exception of all horses fit for service. Eggleston 
presented the response which was not well accepted by the Hessian cavalry officers. They 
demanded that they be able to keep their horses and Maxwell did not overrule this 
protest; so the capitulation was cancelled. Eggleston again deferred to Lee. About this 
time, according to Lee, he received word from Captain Armstrong, who was watching the 
movements of Lord Rawdon, that Rawdon was moving on Fort Motte. Lee claims that 
this drastically changed his response to the Hessian demand. He ordered Eggleston to 
accept all demands. The surrender was then signed and the fort was occupied by Captain 
Rudolph and a detachment of Legion infantry. By noon, Maxwell had removed his 
garrison and all possessions. u 
The American victories at Forts Watson, Motte, Orangeburg, and Granby, and 
subsequent victories at Georgetown and Augusta, struck a blow to the British unlike any 
other since Saratoga or until Yorktown. The stalemate at Camden resulted in the British 
being put on the defensive for the first time since their regimentation of South Carolina. 
Besides Cornwallis' decision to leave the Carolinas, the one factor which contributed to 
this series of American victories was the inability of the British to maintain effective 
communications throughout South Carolina. This can be attributed to the efforts of both 
Sumter and Marion in intercepting couriers. Two examples which support this statement 
are: first, the interception of Cornwallis' message to Rawdon in Camden ~lling of 
Greene's advance, which caught Rawdon without the support of the brigade from Fort 
Watson; second, the interception of Rawdon's orders to the various post commanders to 
evacuate and retire to the southern half of the state, which allowed the American forces 
to seize upon unsuspecting garrisons. The outposts were, thereby, taken much more 
easily. 
Many historians credit Washington's victory at Yorktown as being singularly 
responsible for the British defeat in America. It is true that this victory did give the 
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Americans the advantage, leaving the British only controlling the northern states with 
their base at New York City. If, however, the British had still controlled the south at the 
time of Yorktown, the Americans would still have been in an inferior position to the 
British. Therefore, the takeover of the British outposts in South Carolina, giving the 
Americans control of every part of that state except for Charleston, won for them the 
southern theatre of the American Revolution. 
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In July 1903 Herny Hughes Wilson wrote: "I have for many years advocated 
friendship with the French as against the Germans because in my opinion there is no 
legitimate cause to quarrel with the French . . . whereas the Germans, who have an 
increasing population and no political morals, mean expansion and therefore aggression."' 
For the next eleven years, Wilson pursued, in his own way, a policy of aiding the French-
-a policy not always consistent with that of the British government. 
Throughout his career, first as Commandant of the Staff College and then as 
Director of Military Operations (DMO), Herny Hughes Wilson consistently gave 
assurances to the French that the British would come to their aid in the event of war 
with Germany. Thus, the creation by Wilson of a moral obligation for the British to 
support the French is the traditional interpretation of his importance before the First 
World War and an implication that Wilson's influence was in Britain. 2 This, however, 
ignores certain key bits of evidence that clearly demonstrate that Wilson had far more 
influence in France than he had within the British command structure. The evidence 
includes his early contacts with the French military leaders; his personal powerlessness 
in the British command structure; and the belief among the French that Wilson was 
representing his government in an official capacity. 
Wilson had the right and the duty as DMO to make contingency plans. for war. 
Indeed. this was his purpose as DMO. The distinction, however, must be made between 
contingency plans and assurances of military action to the representatives of a foreign 
power. Wilson's assurances to the French, which only the British government could give, 
went far beyond the limits of his authority. 
Wilson began his contacts with the French as early as December 1909 when, while 
Commandant of the British Staff College, he initiated talks on joint strategy with his 
opposite number in France, Ferdinand Foch, Commandant of the Ecole Su~rieure de 
~ Tuchman, 1111 Gulls of Au~ (NY: Bantam Boob, 1980), p. 68; Basil Collier, Bross/tat: A IJiograplry of Fiad·ManhtJJ 
Sir Horry Hv..,,,, (London: Secker & Wuburs, 1961), p. 85 (italics in the oripnal). 
'-<ajor-Oeaenl Sir Cl!. CallMU, Fwld./,lanllal Sir If-, WILroft Ban .. G.C.B., D.S.O.: Jru Life and Diana Volume 1. (NY Cllarle& 
Scn'bner'a Som, 1927), pp.73, 90, lfll; Sir Andrew Macl'bai~ T1r« Pmons, (Loadon: John Murray, 1929), pp. 78-9. 
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Guerre. On another visit on 14 January 1910 to the Ecole Su~rieure, Wilson recorded 
in his diary that" ... we talked at great length of our combined action in Belgium. Most 
interesting."' The British government would have been "most interested" to find out that 
it was being committed to a military action by the Commandant of the Staff College to 
which they, the elected representatives of the British people, were not privy.' These talks 
are the genesis of the formation of French war plans based on the promised support of 
the British in the person of Wilson. Thus, as early as January 1910, the French military 
were committing themselves and their country to certain actions based on the supposed 
support of the British'-a support that was in fact not originating from the British 
government. 
Indeed, Wilson was so enthusiastic about Anglo-French co-operation that on 8 
June 1910 he was able to assert: "General Foch ... [is] going to command the Allied 
armies when the big war comes on."' 
In August 1910 Wilson was appointed Director of Military Operations in the Imperial 
General Staff. Now that he was OMO, he was finally in the position to carry out talks 
with the French in an official capacity--and in a much more concrete manner than his 
predecessors. Joint Anglo-French talks were originally started after the First Moroccan 
Crisis in January 1906 under the Liberal Government but had languished under Wilson's 
predecessors. Wilson, however, put them on a much higher plane. 7 
Before the year was out, after being OMO for less than three months, Wilson 
had reached an agreement with the French on the necessity of a close working alliance 
of their respective forces in combat. On 13 October 1910 Wilson met with Foch in Paris 
and had a long conversation during which Foch stated: " ... that, in the coming war in 
Belgium, France must trust to England and not Russia, and that all our plans must be 
worked out in minutest detail so that we may be quite clear of the action and the line 
Oilwell, p. 78, H.H.W. 
'Althousli Willon woncd, on hil own, to make the French believe the Entente Cordialc - a oolid alliance, Helbert Alquilh, 
the Prime Minillcr at the lime, could later MKrt: "1bc Entente, l repeat, - never c:om,ertccl into an Alliance. While woning 
cordially with Pnnce ud Ruaia to 11CCUre the international equilibrium, wc kept ounelYes free to decide, when the oa:uion atole, 
wbclhcr wc lhould or should not ao to -r. This - reapealcdly stated ill the Houac ol Commons both by Sir E{dnnl) ORf ud 
...,..ir.• Oxfonl and Alquilb, Helbert Henry Alquilh, Pim Earl or. n.. GeMsu of tJw War, (NY: Gcorp: H. Doran Co., 1923), p. 
9'J. Further, in lhe Houac ol Commolll, Alquith conatanlly MICrtccl that there cxillcd no formal bondage ol either British m,litary 
or nawl for<:e1 to Prance. Por •-pie, in the Houac ol Commons, on 24 Mardi 1913, Sir W-.Uiam Byles uked Alquith: •, •. whether 
be will ay if lhil couatry ii under uy, ud, if ID, what, obliplion to Prance to send an armed fon:c in certain contingencies to 
opcnle in Buropc; ud if ID, what are the limits ol our agRefflCOII, whether by Ulurance or treaty with the French nation?' 
PoDowiaa up on lhil q---, another Member ol Parliament, Ki111, ill'juircd: '. , , whether lbc foreip policy of Ibis country ii al 
the preiCIII lime unhampered by any treatia, apecmcnta, or obliphOIII under whi<h Britilll military for<:e1 -id, in certain 
...,ntualitia, be called upon to be landed on the continent and join there in military opcralioal. , , • ' With pcrfca aplomb, Alquilh 
- able IO amwer: 'M hu been repealcdly staled, lhil country ii not under any obliplion not public and k-.. lo Parliament which 
compcll it to take part in any -r. la ocher wonll, if war uila bclwccn European Powers there are no unpubii&hcd agreements whi<h 
will Jalricl or hamper the freedom ol thc Gcwenuncnt or ol Parliament to decide whether or noc Oreat Britain llhould participate 
in• war ••• • 77w P"""1IMnltlly °""'1#1 (Oflkial &pa,,). Fi/tJI S<ria-Volume L. Third Sasion oftlw Tlrini«Jr Parlianu,u oftJw UniUd 
,a,,,,,,,,,, of Grear Brilabl & mland. J 0-,. V. Holla of Commons. (London: Hil Majaty'1 Stationary Officc, 1913), pp. 1316-1317. 
tbil, "'-'1er, - noc what the Prencb military command, with whom WiilOn dealt, - made to believe. 
'!Jobn C. Cairns •'11* that in Pnn<e, befon: the Pint World Wu, the military bad a liffl>III inftucnce on the rest of the 
g<MOmment structure ud the dccilion making procaa in Prance, althousli, one cannot ea&ily quantify this inftucnce. John C. Cairns, 
'International Politics ud the Military Mind: The Case of the French Republic, 1911-1914', Jownal of Modms HistD,y, (September 
1953) 2S: lM-5. 
'Cauwell, p. 80. 
'Cok.el Huguet, Preach Military Altac:M, uted Wilson if he COlllidcred thac taln important, to which Willoft emairncd: 
'Important? But it ii vital! There ii no Olbcrl" C.U..:U, p. 89; collier, pp. 94, 111. 
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to take." Wilson makes it clear in his diary that he was in full agreement with these 
sentiments of close co-operation.• Once again, Foch demonstrated that the French 
considered British participation in what became Plan XVII an absolute certainty. French 
military planners counted on the BEF forming on their left flank with six infantry 
divisions. Indeed, General Auguste Dubail, Chief of Staff to the War Ministry, reflecting 
the beliefs of the French military command, told the Russians in August 1911 that the 
French already planned on "'the aid of the English army on its left wing.'"9 Failure to 
do so would cause a catastrophe. 
The Director of Military Operations was supposed to be the most important 
position in the General Staff next to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) 
and should have made Wilson " . . . the most influential soldier in the country."10 
However, Wilson's influence in the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was minimal. 
On 23 August 1911, a special CID meeting was called among certain members 
of the Cabinet and the CID to discuss, and decide between, the army plan and the navy 
plan of action in a possible continental war. This meeting of the CID is often presented 
by Wilson's biographers as a high-water mark of his influence on the Committee. His 
biographers accept his assertion that he skilfully and deftly convinced those present that 
the army plan of action was vastly superior to that of the navy. 11 However, based on the 
transcript of this meeting, Wilson spoke infrequently and, except for a brief presentation 
of his plan, usually spoke only when answering a question. Many of the politicians, 
particularly Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and First Lord of the Admiralty Winston 
Churchill, appear to have arrived at the meeting already convinced of the superiority of 
the army's plan for a continental war as opposed to that of the navy. Further, when the 
navy expressed its doubts about the army's plan during the presentation of its plan of 
campaign in the afternoon session, Wilson spoke only twice in six pages of transcript. u 
Wilson's involvement at CID meetings is characterized by his silence which calls 
attention to his powerlessness in the British command structure. He became DMO in 
August 1910 and began attending CID meetings on the 108th meeting, 26 January 1911;13 
however, he did not speak even once until the 114th meeting on 23 August 1911. 
Though many of the topics discussed were of a technical or legal nature or outside his 
purview, this was not the case for the 113th meeting. 14 This was the last day of a three-
day Imperial Conference, and the discussion, in part, revolved around Dominion 
contributions to the Staff College, a subject with which Wilson was familiar after serving 
as Commandant of the Staff College for three years. Secretary for War Richard Haldane 
did the talking, however, not Wilson. Wilson continued to be silent from the 115th 
'Callweu, p. 88, H.H. W. 
's. R. WiW.,,,-. 'Jolfrc Rallapa Prcnch Slnlel1, 191J.1913", Paul M. KellllCdy, ed., 77te War Plans oftJw Gttal ~ 18& 
1914 (Bo&loa: AUea & Unwin, 19115), pp. 146, 135. Por his put, ew:n 'Pocb lended 10 overcmpbuize tbe prcpondel'MCC ol tbc 
Britiab role ill Pl'Clldl militaJy lhoapL •. ,• Caimi, p. 175. 
'tower, p. 109. 
''see r« eumple, Beman! Alb, 77te Loll Dicla,r: A lJiatraplly of Fidd-Manltal Sir H-, lfflson Ban., GCB. DSO, MP, {Lolldoll: 
Caaell, 19611), p. 88; and CalJwell, pp. 99-100. 
'\:>nee be spote to say on what day ol mobilizatioll tbe army planned to embarlt and once to say that r..., d~ would be 
• aooc1 • "°' (with t11c l'CIMinilla dMlioft 1o aay 11ome io pro1ect apillll mc1s • tbe ....,, ud imisted). 114111 ao Meetiq, 23 
Au~ 1911, (CAB 38/19, 1911, No. 49) i-im, 
''CAB 38/17, 1911, No. 5). 
"(CAB 38/18, 1911, No. 42). 
83 
South Carolina Historical Association 
meeting on 14 December 1911 '-' to the 123rd meeting on 11 April 1913. 1• Again, this is 
rather amazing given the nature of some of the topics. For example, during the 116th 
meeting, 17 part of the discussion revolved around effects a neutral Belgium versus a non-
neutral Belgium (friend or foe) would have on British war plans. Haldane, John French, 
the future CIGS, the current CIGS William Nicholson, Churchill, and Asquith spoke but 
not Wilson. This was of tremendous importance to the plans which he was making with 
the French, but, once again, he chose not to speak up but rather to keep the Government 
and the CID in the dark. The French, however, were kept informed by Wilson of these 
discussions and the concrete ramifications of these discussions--namely, a request by the 
British to the Belgians that they fortify Li~ge." Wilson was not even present at the 122nd 
meeting on 6 February 1913. 10 He spoke once at the 124th meeting on 5 August 1913"' 
to say that troops had been allotted to defend St. Helena's in time of war. He returned 
to his reticence during the 125th meeting on 3 March 1914. 21 During the 126th meeting 
on 14 May 1914 22 he spoke frequently, but apparently only because the CIGS could not 
be present and Wilson was basically delivering messages. He was again reticent at the 
127th meeting on 21 May 1914. 23 However, he perked up enough at the next meeting on 
14 July 1914 24 to comment on the size of the garrison at St. Helena's. 
Wilson's importance and influence on the CID is also debatable based on the fact 
that he never served on any of the Standing Sub-Committees of the CID. Once again, 
many of these committees were of a technical or legal nature, or concerned with areas 
like Hong Kong or Egypt. However, some were of crucial importance to the effective 
and efficient dispatch of the BEF and Wilson's other concomitant plans. During his 
tenure as DMO, three Standing Sub-Committees were formed or planned of which Wilson 
should have been a member based on his position as DMO, but was not." Perhaps he 
was deliberately excluded from these sub-committees. On two of these committees, the 
CIGS, French, was assisted, not by the DMO, but by Brigadier General David Hender-
son, Director of Military Training."' Thus, Wilson's influence and prestige on the CID 
must be questioned. Since he did not influence British war plans directly through the 
'\CAB 38/19, 1911, No. S8). 
''(CAB 38/24, 1913, No. 19). 
"(CAB 38/20, 1912, No. 9). 
1-:iotrrc was able to U6C this information, which he clearly stated Wilson provided, to pressure the French government to make 
similar "rcpre<c:ntations" . .lo<cph Jaqua; Cesain: Joffn:, TM Personal MtmQin of loffre: Fkld Marshal of the French Arm:,. trans.: Col. 
T . Bentley Mott, (NY: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1932), vol. 1, p. 41. 
"(CAB 38/23, 1913, No. 9). 
"tCAB 38/24, 1913, No. 33). 
'XCAB 38/26, 1914, No. ll). 
'tCAB 38/27, 1914, No. 23). 
"(CAB 38/27, 1914, No. 25). 
"(CAB 38/28, 1914, No. lS). 
"He was not a member of the •sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence assembled to formulate Que,;tons 
connected with the Naval and Military Defence or the Empon: to be discussed at the Imperial Confen:nce, 1911" (CAB 38/17, 1911, 
No. 13). Based on his own assertions in his diarie,;, Wilson had a running debate with the navy on the best means of waging a 
Continental war. He chose:, hoM:Ycr, to avoid an opportunity to wrangle against the navy's aspirations and plans. Or perhaP' he was 
deliberately excluded. Another sub-committee on which he should have served was the "Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee 
or Imperial Defence: Attack on the British Isles rrom Overseas", initiated on 13, January 1913 (CAB 38/26, 1914, No. 13). He should 
have been then: to prevent the Admiralty from taking away two of hi& six divisions to be used for Home Defence. He knew that 
they desired this, but he did not serve on thil committee where he roukl directly thwart their endeavors. 
"A planned committee, "Coastal Defence,; or the United Kingdom and the Question or a Coast Watch" (CAB 38/27, 1914, No. 
19) propa.,ed on 16 December 1913 by the OGS, members or the Admiralty, and the Sccn:tary of State for War, Seely, excluded 
Wilion, once again, in Cavor of the Director of Military Training. 
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CID, his most important influence was on the other side of the Channel, where he was 
able to convince the French of British support. 
The final argument of this paper is that the leaders of the French military 
apparently believed that Wilson was representing the British Government in an official 
capacity and made war plans based on his commitments and assurances. In addition to 
those instances mentioned before, other evidence exists for this assertion. Joffre was able 
to note just after the Second Moroccan Crisis: 
This grave crisis had at least one fortune to result for France, 
for the Entente Cordiale emerged from it all the stronger. General 
Wilson came across the Channel to work with us and make the 
arrangements for disembarking, in case of necessity, a British 
Expeditionary Corps. He was one of the earliest and best architects 
of Franco-British co-operation. 21 
Joffre was probably unaware that Wilson did not have the full backing of the 
government to make such concrete plans. 
Completion of the so-called Dubail-Wilson Agreement demonstrates further that 
the French military command believed Wilson was representing the British Government 
in an official capacity. On 20 July 1911 Wilson and Chief of Staff to the War Ministry 
General Auguste Dubail completed an agreement that committed the British to dispatch 
elements of the BEF to Le Havre, Boulogne-sur-Mer, and Rouen in the event that 
Britain declared war against Germany. 21 Thus, the French would continue to make their 
war plans based now on this supposedly firm commitment of the British. io_ 
On 29 September 1911 Wilson met with the French General Staff and wrote of 
the encounter: 
They were most cordial and open. They showed me papers and maps •.. 
showing the concentration areas of their northern armies . . . 
[and] showing in detail the area of concentration for all our 
Expeditionary Force. . . . By 12:30 I was in possession of the 
whole of their plan of campaign for their northern armies, and 
also for ours ... 
Wilson blandly accepted the role which the French assigned to him and to his nation's 
army and gave his country's assurance of compliance. Unfortunately, the French 
apparently did not know that he was not in a position to offer these assurances. 
By February 1912 General Joffre, Chief of the French General Staff, believed 
"Jo!Tre, wl. 1, p. Cl. 
'"ructunu, p, (/J. 
".Joare, for Ilia put, - - lo iJlform General Nollitz, the Rlliiian milita,y attaeh~ at about the 11me time: "'AU the 
unq,cmeni. for the flasllm lancliq are made down lo the unallcSI detail, IO tblt the Enpsb army can - part in the finl bi& 
battle.~ Quoted in LC.P. Turner, "The Rullian Mobililltion in 1914", Paul M. lwuledy, ed., The War P"'1ts of r/11 Omit~ 
188f>.19U. (Bolton: Allcn & Uawin, 1985). 
"cau..on, p. 104, H.H.W. 
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that the joint Anglo-French plans had reached such a point that he could fully count on 
six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two mounted brigades, all of which was 
code-named "L'annee 'W" in honor of Wilson.31 
Wilson's actions during the crucial few days before Britain's declaration of war 
provide a final analysis of the impact of the individual on foreign policy. On 6 May 
1914 Wilson, still only the DMO, saw fit, on his own volition, to inform the French that 
Asquith had decided to send elements of the BEF to France in the event that Britain 
went to war against Germany. Further, Wilson told the French that the British would 
assume their position, as pre-planned, on the left flank of the French army--an important 
point that Asquith had not expresssed. This pre-ordained assurance of support was rather 
rudely thrust upon Sir John French, commander of the BEF, and Sir Douglas Haig, 
commander of the First Corps, weeks later when they suggested a delay in the 
deployment of the BEF to allow time to marshall the forces of the Empire. The French 
command was nearly apoplectic over a possible further delay which would have rendered 
its Plan XVII nugatory. :u 
·Wilson's own personal foreign policy led the French military command to make 
plans based on the support of the British--a support they believed was given by a 
competent member of His Majesty's Government, not a military sub-altern. 
For their part, the French military leaders believed that Wilson was their most 
important contact in the British command structure, not only for his unflagging support, 
but also for his supposed influence. 
On 8 October 1914 Foch conferred with Field Marshal Sir John French and his 
then assistant, Henry Hughes Wilson. Foch wrote in his memoirs of this encounter: 
My old friend Sir Henry Wilson . . . was with Sir John French. I told him 
. . . that I was convinced that the rapid and effective entry of the British 
Army into the war was due to the preparatory measures which he, when at 
the head of the British General Staff [sic], had made for that contingency. 
"3:I 
This is stunning proof that members of the French military leadership believed 
that Wilson had a major leadership role in the British command structure or government, 
which he in fact did not. This would explain why the French took his assurances of aid 
so seriously. 
In conclusion, Wilson's importance in the formation of the war plans of the 
Entente rests with his influence on the French military leadership, not, as has been 
1'ruclunu, p. 73; C.Dwell, p. 15L The figura quoted are illteresti"I- Gi.cn that Wilson had already conceded to the CID that 
only fiYe divi&iom (poaibly only rour) -re goin1 to be sent, apparently the French -re alao being led utray by Wilson. Bued on 
a memonnclum praented ill Ocldler 1910 that, • DMO, be must .._ helped draft, Wilson - clcUberately milleading the Prencb. 
In part, tbil memorandum IU,aated tbe dillinct p<*ibiUty that only rour ol the BEF1 au inrantry diviaion& would be sent to the 
Continent ill the CYeat ol a war (tbe other two would remain ill the United Kinplom for Home Ddcnae). 
'tallwcli. pp. 147, 157, IUld l.SB. 
~ bia melDllin, Podl - to recall all hil meetinp witb Wilaon be(ore the war, IUld he uaerted: "[Willon) wu to pn1"C bimaelf 
one ol the IIICllt acm,e mind& ol the Imperial General StalT ••• one ol the moving apirill ol the Britilb Army and one ol the IIIOll 
raithrul KMJIII or the common cause.• Ferdinand Poch, T1tt Memoirs of /tlanll/JI Foci,, trans.: Col T. Bentley Mott, (Garden Qty, 
NY: Doubleday, Doran and Co., In<., 1931), pp. llliii, 125. 
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previously asserted, in the creation of some amorphous moral obligation of the British 
to aid the French. The casus be/Ii for the British was the German invasion of neutral 
Belgium. British diplomatic documents in the days before the British actually declared 
war on Germany clearly state that they did not feel a moral obligation to aid the 
French. 34 Perhaps the frenzied reaction of the French to British delay in supporting 
them is explicable if we consider that they had been told for years by someone, who 
they believed represented the British Government, that this aid was pre-ordained. 
Indeed, they believed it was a forgone conclusion that the BEF would join them and 
protect their left flank. Therefore, combined with his early and frequent contacts with 
the French; his lack of influence on the Committee of Imperial Defence; and the belief 
among the French military leadership that he was a representative of the British 
Government, Henry Hugh Wilson's influence was not on British war planning, but on 
French war planning. 
"R.elcllut diplomatic -,ea include: "Sir &lwanl Orey to Sir P. Bertie, British Am-.tor at Paril", British Blue Boot utide 
No. B1, 29 July 1914; "Sir F.dwvd 01CJ to Sir P. Bertie, British Alllbuudor at Paris", British Blue Boot articla No. 116, 31 July 1914 
and No. 119, 31 July 1914; ud "Sir F.dwvd 01CJ to Sir P. Bertie, British Ambmudor at Paril", Britilb Blue Boot article No. 148, 
2 ausua 1914. James Broon, Scon, ed., Diplomolic Clocumo,a matbtg IO tlw Oudnak of tlte ~ Wa,; part 2, (NY: Odon! 
University Pras, 1916), pp. 948-9, m, 1111), 999-1000. lmmediately after the war, Haldane rouJd write, ill an apolosia, ~ the Eatcate: 
• . • ·""' bad entered into no commuai<:aliolll whicll bouad ,. to do IIIOl"C than lludy conceivable poaibilitics in a rMllion whicll the 
German General Staff would loot on • a men, matter ~ routine ror a row1try the shores ~ which lay oo near to thole olPnnce, 
but by l1'IIICMlll all material ca- ~ mctioll. • v-1 Robert B. Haldane, &fvrw tlw Wa,; (London: C..U and Co., I.Ad, 1920), 
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VICTORIAN ANGLO-SAXONISM 
John V. Crangle 
Benedict College 
Were the Victorian English Anglo-Saxons? The answer to this question is a 
resounding "no," wrote Professor E. A Freeman I in a series of publications during the 
quarter century at the height of the controversy. From the mid-1860's until the year of 
his death Professor Freeman argued that the cultural influence of the Anglo-Saxons on 
Victorian England did not mean that the Victorian English were Anglo-Saxons in any 
ethnic or racial sense. Along with Grant Allen and Goldwin Smith, Freeman tried to 
make it clear that cultural ancestry and genetic ancestry were not the same; and, insofar 
as his points were accepted, he helped to discredit Anglo-Saxonism. 
Freeman in the mid-1860's looked to the writings of Sir Francis Palgrave for 
support in arguing the ethnic mixture in English history: "We are deeply grateful to Sir 
Francis Palgrave for more than one energetic protest against the misleading use of the 
words 'Saxon' or even "Anglo-Saxon' as the proper term to oppose 'Norman' .. ." 
(Palgrave had said that the term "English" was correct and that "Anglo-Saxon" was 
incorrect in the description of the population of England at the time of the Conquest.)2 
In 1877 Freeman directed two articles against fallacious writing about ancestry and ethnic 
origins. In his article "Pedigrees and Pedigree Makers" he ridiculed the manufactured and 
far-fetched claims of many Englishmen who claimed ancestry in the army of William the 
Conqueror; such spurious claims "completely sapped every principle of truth" and were 
nothing more than "imaginary claims".' "Race and ~age" was a more vagarious and 
comprehensive attack on "ethnological theory run mad". "'lbe doctrine of race", Freeman 
wrote, "must have taken very firm hold indeed of men's minds before it could be carried 
E A. Freeman - one o( the major English billorian& or tbe late Victorian era. He IUCCeeded Bishop Stuffs u regiua pmteaor 
ol blltory at Oxford UDMnily iii 1884, bnlq completed bi& History of Ille N°"""" Owp,at In 1879. Robert llnlor, &oglaNI. llf1r>. 
1914 (Oxford: Clarendon p,_, 1936), p. 161. 
'E A. Freeman, "Sir Francis l'llp,rve'a Hillary of Normandy Olld &oglaNI. • EdJnbwg Review,xxJ (l""""'Y 1865), p. 19. 
'E A. Free111111, "Pedipea and Pedipa Maten,• COlllimlf0'011 ~ XXX (June 1877), pp. 14-1.5, and 41. Freeman made 
tbe P.)iat that it - Ulll&lly impoaib1e to tncc pedip-ee to the time o( tbe Conqueror iii 1066 due to lack ol source maleriall p. 12. 
'B. A. Free111111, "Race and Language. eon_,_.,,, ~ XXIX (Malffl 1877). 
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out in a shape . .• so grotesque as this".' In earlier times "the sentiment of race went 
for nothing at all", but "the new lines of scientific and historical inquiry . . . have a 
distinct and deep effect upon the politics of the age.•• Ethnography had been twisted into 
a pseudo-science for political purposes by some writers, Freeman alleged, creating "the 
doctrine of race ... an artificial doctrine, a learned doctrine" which was "distinct from 
the feeling of community or religions, and distinct from the feeling of nationality .. ."7 
The fundamental fallacy of a doctrine of race, whether of the Anglo-Saxon race 
or some other race, Freeman contended, was that it confused environmental factors with 
biological heredity--language with genetics. 'The popular doctrine of race," he wrote in 
1877, "confounds race and language"; the truth was that "scientific philologers . . . tell us 
that language is no certain test or race".• In reality, ethnologists were supposed to be 
concerned with physical differences between races; linguists realized that a given language 
could be spoken by a multiplicity of races. "Language is not an accurately scientific test 
of race," Freeman warned, allowing, however, that "yet it is a rough and ready test which 
does for many practical purposes ... a presumption of race".• 
Freeman also attacked the notion of blood as identifying race: "Our whole 
conception of race starts from the idea of community of blood ... yet it is certain that 
there can be no positive proof or real community of blood, even among . . . families and 
races". This inability to prove blood origins and identity knocked in the head the Anglo-
Saxon theory insofar as Anglo-Saxonism had any claim to scientific validity (as distinct 
from its uses as a political ideology supportive of ethnocentrism and imperialism). "No 
living Englishman can prove with absolute certainty that he comes in the male line of any 
of the Teutonic settlers in Britain in the fifth and sixth centuries", 10 that is, the age of the 
Anglo, Saxon, and Jutish invasions of England. 
Freeman argued against the use of race and in favor of culture in identifying 
groups of people: "We must leave off speaking of races and families at all from any but 
the purely physical side." Instead, he urged, "We must content ourselves with saying that 
certain groups of mankind have a common history, that they have languages, creeds, and 
institutions in common." 11 In Freeman's view, race was a biological rather than a cultural 
reality. Thus the identification of the English people as racially or physiologically Anglo-
Saxon was an absurdity: "No existing nation is, in the physiological sense of purity, purely 
Celtic, Teutonic, Slavonic, or anything else." The motion of a pure Anglo-Saxon race 
was preposterous: "Among the great nations of the world, there is no such thing as purity 
of race at all ..•. All races have assimilated ... foreign elements".12 
'Ibid., p. 713. 
'Ibid., p. 713. 
'Ibid., p. 717. 
'Ibid, p. 721. 
'Ibid., p. 722. 
"Ibid., p. 724. 
"Ibid., p. 725. 
"Ibid., p. 71!J. 
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If the English were not Anglo-Saxons as Dilke, Froude, Churchill, and Rosebery 
thought, then what were they? Freeman said, as Grant Allen would write in 1880, 13 that 
the English masses were a mixture of ethnic groups: "The actual forefathers of the 
modem Englishman may chance to have been, not true-born Angles or Saxons, but 
Britons, Scots, Frenchmen, Flemings, men of any other nation who learned to speak 
English and took English names". u 
Yet Freeman believed that there was such a thing as "the true essence of the race 
or nation, something which sets its standards and determines its character."u Thus while 
seeming to push popular racial theory away from the front door, the Oxford historian 
appeared to smuggle it through the back door: "These races . . . Celtic, Teutonic, 
Slavonic races of men are real." His theory strikes one as muddled, contradictory, even 
mystical: "These races which, in a strictly physiological point of view, have no existence 
at all, have a real existence from the more practical view of history and politics". 10 
Freeman seemed to be saying that those groups loosely lumped under the heading of 
races, i.e., European language and cultural groups, did function as socially cohesive forces 
in the historical process. Thus, he argued, that "within those races we find nations 
marked out again by ... language." Furthermore, "the feeling which was once confined 
to the mere household extended itself to the tribe .... From the tribe or city it extended 
itself to the nation, from the nation it is beginning to extend itself to the whole race."11 
Thus a race consciousness had evolved in England and Europe. 
If Freeman was opposed to the usage of the term "Anglo-Saxon race" to describe 
the population of England, he was not opposed to the use of terms identifying national 
and linguistic groups as progenitors of the Victorian masses. The controversy as to the 
proper terminology related closely to the ancient and medieval history of England even 
prior to the Roman invasions. Freeman was particularly active in 1870 in the controversy, 
reading three lectures before the Literary and Philosophical Institution at Kingston-on-
Hull (3,5,7 January 1870) in which he argued that the people who lived in England before 
449 AD. were not "English". Freeman set forward a Pickwickian definition of "England" 
in his lectures according to which "England" was portable--prior to 449 AD. the Isle of 
Britain was not "England," but the place where the ancestors of Victorian Englishmen 
lived in the ancient homeland of the lowlands of continental Europe was England. 11 
Freeman argued in 1870 that "the English people" of Victorian England "are Low-
Dutch ... we came from those lands where the Low-Dutch blood and the Low-Dutch 
speech abide to this day". 1• Admitting that his thesis "may sound strange, perhaps 
ludicrous," Freeman warranted that it was the "truest and most accurate name," adding 
that "I use it specially in order to avoid using the word German which may easily lead 
~-Allen --that the ancators ol lhe f!n&liab included "dart..tinned Silurca, blue..uiined Bripntcs• u ...,y u Celtic, 
Allpc, Suon, and Jute; but, in hill opinioa, the dominant cthalc clement "preponderantly if not overwbclminlfy Kymric and Claclic". 
Allen, Fonttigl,lly ~ XXXIV, old ICrica (Oetcber 1880), p. 473. 
"Praman, c__,_,,, ~ XXIX (Man:b 1877), p. 725. 
"Ibid., p. 730. 
"Ibid., p. 731. 
"Ibid., p. 7-40. 
"B. A. P- "Oripl ol lhe Enalilh Nalioa," ltl«Millmr's XXI (Man:b 18"10), pp. 415-418. 
11/bid., p. 419. 
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to misconceptions."30 (Freeman also believed in 1870 that "there was a time ... before 
the beginning of recorded history-when the forefathers of all the chief European nations 
. . • were all one people, speaking one language" which he believed was the Aryan 
language). 21 
While conceding that "physical purity of the blood ... can never be found in the 
case of any nation ... every nation had its blood more or less mingled", Freeman insisted 
that "in our speech, so in our blood, the Low-Dutch part of us is the essence . . . gives 
us our national being, our national character, our national history . . . which makes us 
to be Englishmen." Thus in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon racial school, Freeman offered 
a linguistic, but also quasi-genetic theory that "We are Low-Dutchmen who have been 
separated from the parent stock for thirteen hundred years .... We are Low-Dutch with 
a difference". 21 ·(As evidence he adduced the impression that Englishmen felt comfortable 
visiting Holland in his own day.) 21 
In another article published in July 1870 Freeman explicitly rejected the view that 
"the English are Teutonized Celts"." The Oxford historian argued that about 500 AD. 
"there was a conquest of Britain in which the Teutonic settlers displaced the Celtic 
inhabitants of what was to be England.""' (This Celtic survival theory, of course, was 
Grant Allen's 1880 proposition in revitalized form.) 36 Freeman also rejected the thesis, 
argued by Coote, 71 that Teutons lived in England long before 500 AD., were Romanized, 
and survived the later Anglo-Saxon invasions as a cultural and genetic ancestor of 
Victorian England. 21 
Freeman's "Low-Dutch" thesis fell stillborn from the press; and in spite of his 
salient criticism of the Anglo-Saxon ideology as unscientific and nothing more than a 
racial-political myth used to provide some sort of reinforcement and justification for 
imperial expansion, overseas domination and colonization, the most prominent politicians 
of the age, including colonial secretaries and prime ministers, continued to advance the 
notion that the English rulers of the Empire were Anglo-Saxons. Freeman, however, 
was not broken by the intractable popularity of Anglo-Saxonism. Nor was he 
overwhelmed in a controversy with James Stephen (1820-1894), the jurist and author of 
a legal volume,"" over the role of the Anglo-Saxons in the foundation of the Heptarchy, 
a question closely related to Freeman's efforts to discredit the thesis that the Anglo-
Saxons were the dominant factor in English history, .. and a topic related to Freeman's 
.. Ibid., p. 419. 
''rhil belier in the primordial "Aryu" IM&uaF ramily &bowl the inn- of the thinkina of Pmrcssor Mu Miller on Freeman, 
Ibid., pp. 419-420. 
"Ibid., p. 430. 
nlbid, p. 431. 
"E. A. Freeman, "lbc AJJep1 Pel'lllllnency of Roman Civilization in &gland," MacM""'1t 's, ,om (July 1870), p. 212. 
"Ibid., p. 228. 
•Allen, p. 486. 
"Coote arped that the Bclpe were the major Toutonic clement in ancient geopphical &gland and that the Roman mnqucat 
resulted in tbc acailturation of the Belpc to Latin culture. Hcruy Charles Coote, A Negl«/IJJ Fae, In English Hist,,,y (London: Bell 
and Daldy, 1874). 
~-. Modlilla,o's, ,om (July 1870), p. 212. 
"Jamca Stephen, QuaUa,,s for lAW Sllldna °" tht/ Sbrtll EdiatNI of Mr. ~ Stepltms N*"1 Commmtaria "" tht/ Laws of EnglaNJ 
(London: Butterworth, 1869). 
• ,.,,..,,_,,,,, No. 2329 (June 15, 1872), pp. 750-751. 
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18n publication of The Growth of the English Constitution from the Earliest Tunes.•• 
In 1885 Freeman took up the cudgels against the recently formed Imperial 
Federation League, a creature of some of the chief Anglo-Saxomist ideologues formed 
at London in 1884. :ta "1be phrase 'Imperial Federation' is a contradiction in terms . . . 
what is imperial cannot be federal", he argued. The idea of "1be coming union on equal 
terms of all the English peogle . . . all the English-speaking people-all over the world" 
was to his mind nonsense. (Although Freeman did not make the point, Imperial 
Federation smacked of the chimera of a great union of Anglo-Saxon colonies federated 
with the Anglo-Saxon motherland, an idea advanced by Churchill at a Tory meeting at 
Blackpool in 1884" and subsequently reiterated by Lord Carnarvon at an Imperial 
Federation League meeting in late 1889 when praised Australia as another "home of the 
British race" and "another support of the mother country".)• 
Anglo-Saxonism would not go away. After a quarter century of battling 
sporadically against the theory that the English people were Anglo-Saxons (but without 
much. impact upon the Conservative Party, the Imperial Federation League, and the 
zealots" of imperial expansion), Freeman turned for a final time to do battle with Anglo-
Saxonism: in 1890, two years before his death, noting "the high-polite style of a Lord 
Mayor's feast" in conjuring up the myth of "the Imperial instincts of the Anglo-Saxon 
race," Freeman sighed "one is sometimes tempted to ask in sheer weariness, will any man 
be able to say the last word on the question , . , the question of whether we, the English 
people, are ourselves or somebody else."• 
Freeman allowed that "there had been Angles and Saxons on the isle of Britain," 
but he repeated the view that Angles and Saxons . . . were only one element, perhaps 
a very inferior element in the population of Britain..,, (A contemporary book by 
Seebohm asserted that the settlers of medieval England did not come from the "land of 
Angles and Saxons" in Germany.)• Noting that "the latest doctrines . • . come to this: 
we are not Angles and Saxons," Freeman opined that the new view raised "the question 
... whether there ever were Angles or Saxons in Britain at all".• It was not that he had 
subscnbed to the notion that the Angles and Saxons had played no part in the cultural 
and biological ancestry of the English people, but, Freeman protested, he objected to the 
romanticized and ignorant ethnography of "1bese statesmen and princes of the Church 
who have lately taken in hand the nomenclature of that part of mankind whom plain men 
may think it enough to call English folk." 40 Popular political theorizing and the confusions 
'R A. Precmu, T1w ~ of 11tt &t;illl ~ ,- 11tt EattJat Tillla {Loedoll: ~ ·a. 1872). 
-~ July 30, 11184, p. 12. 
"E A. ~-. "Imperial Pederatioll,' Moc1'UIIIM'~ U (April 1118S), pp. 430, and 445. 
"Cbllll:llill dacribed F.aaland • 'Ille ae""' ccnier of Ille wiclelprad dominions •• • of tbe liberty sprading Aftak>-Samn .-. • 
~ Pcbnauy 25, 11184, p. 12. 
•D,rijj, T"""""' NIM:mber 16, 1889, p. 3. 
"E A. Freeman, 'Latest 1bearia on Ille Origi!IS of tbe Englilll,' ~ ~ LVII (January 1890), p. 36 . 
.. Ibid, p. 36. 
"Secbobm beld that liaoe Ille Germu ~ and SuJos had • one field ~ and 1U1CC Ille &glilb had • three field .,.aem 
Ille &glilb did not have Anpc and Suon uceston. Preclcric Seebolun, Tfw Ufllilll .,.,,,.,,. c-ily aamiMd ill its maliorul,ip IO 
1M ""'1IDrial llltd tribal~ llltd ,o 1M - Of' ope, fld4 ...,....... of,,,,._., (Load: l..oapulll. <men, 1864), p. 372. 
"P-,p.YT. 
•Ibid, p. ,o. The liftictll Jubiloc of Queen VICIOria ID 1887 bad been • time of pt popullt clilplly of calbllliNm ror Ille 
tDCNmdly and Bmpm. Slalldan( June 10, 1887, p. s. 
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of scholars had generated a tangle of theories; and it made as much sense to adopt the 
more farfetched as to subscribe to Anglo-Saxonism (" ... it may be better to declaim 
about the 'Suionic race' than about the 'Anglo-Saxon' race · ... it will lead fewer people 
astray," Freeman mused.) 41 
Freeman's final view of the matter, enunciated shortly before his death, was a 
common sense explanation: "there is an English folk, and there is a British Crown ... 
here by the border stream of the Angle and Saxon . . . in one of the homes of the 
English folk." Wearily going over again "the question of the origins of our people ... 
this great and abiding dispute" and, he added satirically, "leaving aside the Anglo-Saxon 
race or the British race; Freeman complained of the irresponsible use by politicians of 
the term "Anglo-Saxon race." After twenty-five years of his efforts to explain that Anglo-
Saxonism was fustian the historian asked: "When will men, statesmen above all, learn 
that names are facts ... that a confused nomenclature marks confusion of thought, failure 
to grasp the real nature of th~." In spite of his persistent and repeated complaints the 
politicians paid him no heed: "The other day one eminent person enlarged upon the 
glories of the 'Anglo-Saxon race', while another enlarged instead on the glories of the 
'British race'". 42 (Carnarvon had eulogized "the British race" in a London meeting of the 
Imperial Federation League a few weeks before the publication of Freeman's article.)0 
"In my youth the 'Anglo-Saxon race' was unheard of, and 'the British race' dates, 
I believe, from the speech of last week from which I quote. . . _... The tone of 
Freeman's article seemed to indicate that he realized that the terms "Anglo-Saxon race," 
"British race," and the like as used by politicians and imperialists were essentially 
mythopoeic rather than ethnographic or historiographic terms. Freeman's battle had been 
on the scientific plain and at that level he appears to have demonstrated for those who 
were willing to examine the facts that although the Angles and Saxons had indeed 
migrated to England in ancient times there was no such thing as an "Ango-Saxon race" 
either in medieval or modem England. But at the popular political level, where terms 
are often reified, where the abstract is treated as a material reality, and where emotions 
and wishful-thinking prevail, the Victorian concept of the "Anglo-Saxon race" seemed just 
as popular when Freeman died as when he had first attempted to eradicate it in the 
1860's. 
Perhaps Professor Freeman could count it as a limited victory that six years after 
his death Lord Rosebery, in commenting upon Dr. Waldstein's criticism of the "unsound 
ideas respecting our racial origins which the expression Anglo-Saxon conveyed", told the 
Imperial Institute that as a politician he was uncomfortable with the term "Anglo-Saxon" 
and wished for a more accurate term: "I do not plead for the word Anglo-Saxon," 
Rosebery told his audience, adding: "I would welcome any other term than Anglo-Saxon 
which in a more conciliatory, a more scientific, a more adequate manner would describe 
"Ibid., p. 51 . 
.. Ibid., p. 50. 
"Daily T~ NOYClllbcr 16, 1889, p. 3. 
"F--. p. 50. 
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the thing I want to describe." 45 There was a sense of physical and cultural identity which 
Rosebery, Dilke, Brassey, Churchill, Froude, and Carnarvon were trying to convey to their 
political audiences which was closely related to colonization, imperial expansion, and the 
rule over Asians and Africans. After nearly three decades of Freeman's attack on Anglo-
Saxonism, reinforced by the anti-Anglo-Saxon writings of Goldwin Smith and Grant Allen, 
Lord Roseberg who had been Prime Minister (1894-1895), reflecting a conflict between 
his academic sensibility and his imperialistic political emotions, admitted: "I hardly know 
whether you call it British or Anglo-Saxon or whatever." 46 
"Rosebery w,:nt on to talk about the religious, language, and other cultural factoR linking the English people together and about 
the ·British and American races•, evincing the fact term race had, to his mind, a variety of denotations, most of which were cultural 
rather than phyoical an biological. T"""', July 8, 1989., p. 8. 
"Ibid, p. 8. 
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SCOTTISH MILITARY EMIGRANTS 
IN THE EARLY MODERN ERA 
William S. Brockington 
University of South Carolina at Aiken 
From the late Medieval period until the outbreak of the French Revolution, over 
60,000 Scots1 emigrated to various areas of Europe to sell their fighting prowess to the 
highest bidder. They served in French, Dutch, Imperial (both Spanish and Austrian), 
Danish, Swedish, Polish, Prussian, and Russian armies, among others2• In addition, at 
least another 20,000 served in Scottish units for Great Britain in the century after 1660'. 
In a country whose population is estimated to have been about 500,000 in 1500 (and 
probably did not exceed a million until after 1800)~ this is a phenomenal number. The 
immediate question that comes to mind is-why? 
In the literature pertaining to Scottish military emigrants, a mono-causal reason to 
this question is usually given. Robert Monro, whose Monro, His Expedition With The 
Scots Regiment' is the only lengthy primary source extant, wrote of honor and reputation. 
-Pn>m Brockiaglon, William S. 'The u..,. of Scottiah Mercenaries by the AJlti-Imperial Fortes in the Thirty Years' War.• 
Unpublilhcd Malter'• Thesis ror tbc U11Mrsity of South Canllina, 1968; Calotdar of S- Papers of Ellgla1ld, 161/.1619. Domcotic 
Series. 25 wk. Varioul editors. 185&-1898; ~ofllwl'mly CowldJofSc«Ja,,d Three Series. 1569-1'707. Various &titon. YI 
Voll. 1890-1970; PIiion, Jama A. "Scottiah Mercenaries ill the Service of Denmart and Sweden, 1626-1632." Unpublished Ph.D. 
dislcrtatiolt, U11Mrsity of o....,..., 1972; and educated gucaca. 
'Pc,._., Jama, ed. Papers Jll,utrating 11w K.-, ofllw Scal$1Jritlade in 11w Sowa ofllw Uniud Nlthmalub, 1$71-1782 3 Voll. 
Edinburp: T.&A. Collltablc, 1899, dcall with the 1.- Countricl; Steuart, A. Francis, ed. Papers Rd4Jinr to 11w Scou i1t PoklNl, 1J76-
1"1l The Scottiah Historical Society. &tinburp: T. and A. Comlablc, 1915, and ScOIIUII lnjlum&a in Russian Hisloly from 11w End 
of 11w 16'11 C-, IO tlw &giM"'& of tlw 1~ C...,,.,,. Glup: J. MacLcholc, 1913, deal with Poland and Rulli&; P"IIChcr, ThomM 
A. [pocu. Emit Ludwig'). T1te Seal$ in &,-., alld Westms Prussia &tinburp: Otto Sdiulu, 1903, T1te Scou in Gtmta,ry, i,,;,,, a 
ct»IITilHuion 1-ds 11w H"ISlQfy of llw Seal$ Abroad. &tinburgh: Otto Sdiulu, 1902, and T1te Seal$ in Swum &tinburgh: Otto Sdiulu, 
1907, deal with the Baltic; Dow, James. RIIIAwll~A""Y in SlOWlm alld EstltonilJ. Hiltorikt Archiv 13, and Bnuinlki, Richard. "British 
Mercenaries in the Baltic, l.S60-1683 (])." Milita,y /1luJtraud Past alld hemil Vol. 4 (Dccanbcr 1986/January 1987), pp. 17·23, and 
' British Mercenaries in tbc Baltic, l.S60-1683 (2)" M",/ila,y llbutrar«l Past alld hemil Vol 6 (AprilfM.oy 1987), pp. 29-35, deal also 
with tbc Baltic. 
"Barnes, Robert Money and Allen, C. Kennedy. T1te Unifr,mu alld H"IMfY of ScOltUh &gintenls: Brilabt-COIIOlla-AIISlltllia-&w 
Zlaland&utll Africa, 1625 IO 11w l'taott Day. Londoa: Seeley, l!IIIO; Brander, Micbacl. T1te SuJaislt Hig/llaNlln alld llttir Rlgimal#. 
Londoa: Seely, 1971; and Prcderict. J. B. M. U-., Boole of Brms/1 LDNI Fo,us 1661).11178. Wakefldd; Yorultitt: Miaofom, Acadmlie 
Publishers, 19lU; att 11w JIOning po;,,a for Seal$ in 11w Brms/1 """-"· Tbc r,...,., ii III educated guess. 
'Plian, Micllac~ ed. ScOltUh l'opualiDt, Hislo,y from 11w l'lllt Couwy IO 11w 193'k Cambridse: Cafflbridp: U11Mrsity P,-, 1977, 
and Wbiningtoa, G. and Whyte, L D. Alt HislDricaJ Gtograp/ly of Scodand New Yort: Aaidemic P,-, 1983, are invaluable Cor 
popu!atioa llatisticl and trends. 
'Mamo, Robert. MIMt'O, His~ witJlllw WanM,Scoa ~(ca/WMac-Klya ~) IINildiltAugust 1626byS. DottaJ4 
Mac~ Lord Rh«s, ~ for llis Majeslio Slt!MU of Denmatfc • •• • ofta-d, IIIIMr lM l,n,wible Kind of Sw«len .•• • London: W. 
Jones, 1637. 
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James Turner, a very young soldier in the 1630s, wrote in his Memoirs" of the opportunity 
to serve under Gustavus Adolphus, the great Protestant military leader of the day. 
Monographs on the subject usually focus on religion, or pay and booty, or adventure, or 
fighti~ for the daughter of King James, or simply because the soldiers had no other 
choice . However, it is the opinion of this author that a more eclectic approach to the 
topic is needed. It is true that, at certain times, many went abroad, but many were 
needed. At other periods, many were needed, but few went. The purpose of this paper 
is to provide an introduction to the various factors-economic, political, social, and 
military--which encouraged military emigration. This paper will also place the emigration 
into a historical perspective. 
To understand this outmigration, the geography of Scotland must first be 
considered. The Highlands, which comprise two-thirds of Scotland, had little arable land 
for food production; and the bulk of the population lived in the Lowlands, along the 
eastern coast of Scotland. Despite recurring outbreaks of plague and of war, a growing 
population relied upon subsistence farming techniques for food. This left large stretches 
of the• countryside denuded of trees, and the annual rainfall caused severe erosion 
problefns. Ooudy skies, a short growing season, a lack of arable land, and poor farming 
techniques made it difficult to feed the growing population. Famine, both national and 
local, occurred frequently, and always meant large numbers of vagabonds looking for 
subsistence. Added to this was a lend-tenure system which was inefficient at best. 
Younger sons were forced to look elsewhere for their future. Thus, these population 
pressures meant that a surplus of men was frequently available for employment elsewhere• 
The nature of Scottish political and military history helped in their choice of 
avocation. Between 1295 and 1560 there was continual hostility between Scotland and 
England. Only rarely was Scotland victorious on the battlefield; and very frequently 
Lowland Scotland, which was readily accessible to any invader from the South, was 
invaded and devastated by the English. Adding to this hostility was the "Auld Alliance" 
between Scotland and France. As long as this bond existed, there could be no peace 
between Scotland and England. Indeed, Scotland's frequent military disasters were usually 
the result of French insistence upon a Scottish military show to complement a French 
military effort on the continent. The Scots always honored the treaty. Unfortunately for 
them, it always cost them dearly.• 
As if this were not enough, beginning in 1406 there were seven consecutive 
monarchs who acceded to the throne at an average age of six. Two reigns ended with 
the king being murdered, and two died while at war. One died abruptly after a major 
military disaster, and another abdicated. This series of minority kings, coupled with the 
'rurncr, Jama. /llanain of /,b °""' Lift oNI 1hG 1412·16'J'O. London, Reprinted 1829. 
'BIOCtinaU>n, Fallon, and Filchcr; sec: ala> Burton, John Hill. Tlw Scot Abroad New Edition. Edinburp and London: W. 
Blackwood and Soni, 11198, and Grant, Jame&. Tlw ScOltisll So/dim of F-. Loadon: GeorF Routledge and SoM, 1889. 
'l>onalclooe, Gordon. Sa1tJaNt: Jama V11> Jama nz Vol. m ol Tlw &linbu1ih H.-y of Sco/laNt London: David & Clwla, 
1974, and Ferp!IOD, William. Scot1M4 168911> lltt ht#ftl. Vol. IV ol Tlw &linbu7ih ff"""1 of Sco/lQNt Londoll: Oliver & Boyd, 
1977, aR eo<ellent inuoducdona. Houstoe, R. A. and Whyte, L D., cdL ScOltisll Soeiory, J~Jl(J(). New York: Cambridp Uni,,enity 
Praa, 1989, bas eo<ellent articles. 
'Dona1doon, Gordon, 'TIie Awd A11iucc: Ille Fruco Scottish Connedio. • Edinburp: Salti,e Society and L'lnltitut ~ 
d'B<oae, 1~, bas an o••:i,•icw. Sec footnote 8 for other IOUr<e. 
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continual warfare with England, resulted in a society which was designed for fighting and 
little else. With little central authority, local nobles developed strong, personal armies 
based upon familial relationships, or clans. Among these clans, warfare was quite 
common; and military skills were prized above all else. 10 This internecine warfare was 
finally ended during the reign of James VI (1567-1625), and the dynastic wars with 
England ceased altogether with the union of Scotland and England in 1603. 
Unfortunately, as peace was not something for which Scottish society was designed, this 
change left many Scots without work. 
Fortunately for the military emigrant, revolutionary changes in the nature of 
warfare on the continent made the service of Scots not only desirable but necessary. 
During the 100 Year's War the English had taught the French that non-noble infantry 
could defeat mounted, or dismounted, noble knights. New infantry tactics developed by 
Swiss pikemen, Italian condottieri, and German Landsknechte, coupled with the 
introduction of firearms, meant that the feudal system and the feudal way of fighting were 
now truly futile. This democratization of the battlefield meant that the tactics of the 
battlefield, as well as the composition of armies, would change. Trained, standing armies, 
composed largely of foot soldiers, would be the military machine of the future. 11 
This military revolution occurred at a time when the central governments were 
weak, revenues were limited, and bureaucracies were inadequate. Despite these 
limitations, the emerging dynastic, territorial states were engaging in intense competition 
throughout Europe and elsewhere. Every monarch desired a standing army to protect his 
realm and to expand it, wherever possible. To fill the military needs of these rulers, a 
new businessman appeared-the military entrepreneur. For an agreed-upon price, he 
would supply a fixed number of armed men to a prince for a specified period of time. 
With but few exceptions, all armies were contracted for in this fashion for almost two 
centuries. It was never an easy task to find enough volunteers to meet the virtually 
insatiable demands during the dynastic and religious wars of the period 1500-1800. 
Usually the best place to search for mercenaries was in the poorest and least politically 
stable areas of Europe. Scotland was certainly one such area. 12 
From the forgoing it should be clear that the economic, political, social, and 
military environment was ideal for massive Scottish military participation in continental 
wars. It might be said that the stage was set for an exodus of the nature described in 
the first paragraph of this paper. However, an analysis shows that the matter was far 
more complex than this. Scots did not always respond to recruiters, even when they were 
Scottish recruiters; and then, on other occasions, they responded overwhelmingly. Thus, 
an analysis of various factors at each period is required if the whys of the military 
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emigration are to be comprehended. 
Before analyzing specific examples of Scottish military emigrant participation, it 
would be useful to provide a few general statements regarding the period 1500-1800. 
First, when Scotland was involved in war with England or when Scotland was undergoing 
some other form of upheaval, few mercenaries left. Obviously, if Scotland were fighting 
England, all of her men were needed at home. This was frequently true in the period 
1500-1560 and again 1638-1660. Moreover, if there was a domestic crisis, such as the 
Scottish Reformation (1560s), people tended not to leave. If there were few problems 
at home and if food were in good supply, again people did not leave. If there was 
peace on the continent (which occasionally did happen), there was little demand for Scots 
(except in commerce or simply as settlers, which many Scots did do in the Baltic area). 13 
However, if the right combination occurred, that is if there were hard times and peace 
at home, and if there were a good (in the sense that Scots felt an interest or a kinship 
in it) war or two on the continent, then the mercenary life became quite attractive. 
While a detailed analysis of Scottish participation in continental wars is far beyond the 
scope of this paper, two examples should serve to illustrate the themes outlined above. 
In 1560 the "Auld Alliance" was finally terminated, ironically enough with the 
assistance of England. The Calvinist Reformation, coupled with the intrigues of Queen 
Mary Stuart, resulted in the abdication of Mary, the accession of her infant son James 
VI, and the establishment of peace between the two countries by the Treaty of 
Edinburgh. Political peace, however, was a mixed blessing, for the economy did not 
reflect it. The Scottish economy was simply too primitive to compete effectively in the 
European setting. Usually raw materials were exported, finished goods imported, and 
gold made up the difference. 14 This meant inflation. The period 15~ 1600 saw general 
prices increase 5oo-600% while wages increased only 400-500%. a 15~ 1562, 1572-1573, 
and 1585-1587 were years of severe grain shortage; while 1594-1598 were years of severe 
famine in Scotland as well as throughout Europe. In addition, there were several periods 
where there was localized dearth. During such periods of hunger, there was one sure 
export available in great quantities--men. 
An area in which Scots had a long-standing interest was the Low Countries. A 
commercial agreement between Scotland and the Low Countries had been reached in 
1427, with a Staple at Veere established in order to expedite this trade. 1• Large numbers 
of Scots had emigrated to the Low Countries, either as merchants or as settlers. 11 In 
1568, a rebellion of the United Provinces against their Spanish master began. First under 
William the Silent [c. 1584), and then under his son Maurice of Nassau, the Dutch 
created one of the best armies in Europe. Their success was due, in part, to their ability 
to pay consistently and promptly. Thus, a Dutch need coincided with a Scottish interest 
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and need. 
Scottish officers in Dutch service offered to raise units of their countrymen for the 
war. Between June 6, 1573 and September 7, 1579 no less than 20 commissions were 
issued by the Privy Council of Scotland for the levying of troops for service in the Low 
Countries. While the Register of the Privy Council for those years did not always list the 
number of troops authorized, at least 3000 mercenaries, and possibly as many as 5400 
soldiers of fortune, were raised during the period. That the Privy council was concerned 
with more than just the wars may be seen in the following statement issued in 1572 [in 
modern English, not Scots]: 
"Forasmuch as the present hunger, dearth, and scarcity of food within the 
Burgh of Edinburgh, [and] desiring nothing more than the safety and 
preservation of Scots people, being creatures of God; therefore that the 
pure and impotent persons shall not perish [let them) pass to the wars in 
Flanders, or other foreign countries where they may have sufficient 
entertainment." 11 
These initial levies were formed into the Scots Brigade, a unit which would exist 
in Dutch service until 1783. Levies were not issued between 1579 and 1602, but the 
records of the Brigade 19 show that the units were rarely under strength, attesting to the 
continued emigration to the Low Countries by Scotsmen. Only when the Dutch reduced 
the size of the units in service was the number decreased. One important note here is 
that many of the officers of the Scots Brigade, both initially and later, were from the 
Southern Upland region and from the Lothian region (Edinburgh). Of the 92 officers 
who served or recruited for the Low Countries, 61 were from the southern half of 
Scotland, 21 were from the northern half, and 10 are not identifiable. Hence, the main 
recruiting area for the Low Countries was, and would continue to be, these areas. A 
pattern that is discernible at this point, and will become ever more obvious, is the pattern 
of kin following kin, that is, family ties were significant in recruiting success.,., 
Perhaps the most interesting period in the history of Scots abroad is the Thirty 
Years' War (1618-1648), particularly the Danish and Swedish periods (1625-1634). Once 
again need and interest would meet with need. Imperial armies were moving northward 
through the German States, threatening the states of Denmark and Sweden. Denmark 
reacted first because she was most in the way (Sweden was initially involved ~ a war 
with Poland at the time). Scots supported first Christian N of Denmark, and then 
Gustavus II Adolphus, because it was a Catholic menace against Protestants. Or was it 
because they were supporting the deposed Frederick of the Palatinate, formerly King of 
Bohemia and loser in the Bohemian phase, as well as being the husband of the daughter 
of James VI/I? Or was it because of the adventure of fighting in a major war? Or was 
it the opportunity for advancement that a major war provided? Or was it due to long 
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standing Scottish interests in northern Europe? Or was it due to severe economic 
conditions at home? Or was it a combination of all of the above, depending on who was 
involved (officer or levy) and from where the men came?n 
Outbreaks of plague and dearth were widely reported in Scotland between 1615-
19. Bad harvests occurred in 1621 and 1622, resulting in famine in 1623 and 1624. 1629-
1630 and 1534-1635 also had localized shortages, particularly in the north and west of 
Scotland. Privy Council Records are filled with reports of vagabonds and with 
authorizations to mercenary officers for recruiting these vagabonds. Between 1624 and 
1634, 24 levies for northern Europe were authorized by the Privy Council of Scotland 
for 31,800 men. In addition, further levies of 4500 for the Low Countries, 2200 for 
service in France, and assorted levies for other areas were authorized. These are truly 
amazing figures, and at least one authority considers the number to have been 10% of 
the adult male population of Scotland. 22 What is even more amazing is that many of 
those levies during the early years were filled. 
Yet there is more to this than a simple enlisting to avoid starvation. Who and 
where are also important. The bulk of the levies left from the ports of Dundee, 
Aberdeen, and ports northward. This is significant for two reasons. These ports had 
long been established as Baltic trade ports, therefore the ties with the areas meant that 
Scots from this area had settled around the Baltic sea. 23 Records of clan names and 
trade records validate this. ao Hence, it is likely that Scots from this area served in the 
Baltic because that is where Scots from that area had long been living, trading, and 
serving. Also analyses of recruiting lists and recruiters note that clan names and clan 
recruiters follow very closely. Recruiters such as a Robert Monro of Foulis [Cromarty), 
or a David Leslie from Pitcairlie [Fireshire], or a Sir Donald Mackay from Farr 
[Sutherlandshire] usually had numerous clansmen to enlist for them. Flight from hunger, 
or adventure, or clan loyalty - all played important roles in the emigration. It should 
also be remembered that Hepburn, Home, Dundas, and other southern Scottish clan 
names do not appear in large numbers in the Baltic armies. Of the 139 officers [I have 
listed] who served in Baltic armies, 83 were from the northern half of Scotland, 34 from 
the southern half, and 22 were not identifiable. The same names appear as mercenaries, 
traders, and settlers. One final comment regarding the mercenaries. There were never 
enough volunteers, for whatever reason, to fill such enormous demands. Impressment 
frequently occurred after 1628; and, at that point, accurate analysis becomes virtually 
impossible. 
After the death of Gustavus Adolphus in 1632, and the annihilation of the Swedish 
army at Nordlingen in 1634, the Thirty Years' War offered little glory. Charles I's 
problems with Parliament, the two Bishop's Wars between Presbyterian Scotland and 
Charles I, and the English Civil War (1642-1660) also altered the focus of Scottish 
military emigrants. Scottish officers who had served foreign masters came home to serve 
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in Scottish armies. Levies which once would have served in foreign wars were now raised 
for use in Scotland, Ireland, and England during this unsettled time ... 
By the time of the restoration in 1660, the military climate in Europe had also 
changed. Jurists such as Hugo Grotius called for international law for the regulation of 
war in order to eliminate or reduce the atrocities evident in the total wars of the 1635-
1660 period. Monarchs themselves realized that smaller, better controlled armies and 
limited wars would yield more benefits to them for they would not destroy or waste 
nearly as much. Wars became affairs between small, professional armies having very 
limited goals. Thus, in the post-1660 period, the demand for mercenaries decreased as 
monarchs sought to recruit from their own territories,.supplementing with mercenaries 
where necessary. Scotland itself did not need to export men for, although there had 
been 17 dearth years in the 60 years before 1660, in the 40 years afterwards there were 
only four, 1695-1699. Thus the need for an outlet was lessened at the same time as the 
demand for troops was lessened. 
Important for the future, however, a new situation for Scottish military emigrants 
occurred. English kings [still Stuart] began keeping a standing army of their own. There 
were two lines of thought: first, don't let them out of the country because you might have 
to fight them; and ,second, use them yourself, don't lose them. Between 1660 and 1700, 
six Lowland Scottish regiments were established lll These effectively sopped up the 
potential military emigrants from that region as well as from the Highlands. In addition, 
in 1667, various Highland Watch groups were established. Although Highland regiments 
were not formally established until after the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, the first being 
the Black Watch, the skeleton of these units can be seen in the immediate post-
Restoration period. When wars now occurred on the continent, disrupting trade between 
Scotland and the continent, or when famine struck, unemployed Scots could volunteer to 
serve England in specific units in which they could continue their family allegiance. 
These British troops would play an ever-increasing role in Britain's rise as a power in 
Europe in the post-1700 period. 
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AND GERMAN UNIFICATION 
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"Freiheit, schoner Gotterfunken ... " 
(Beethoven's Ode to Joy as sung 
on both sides of the Berlin Wall, 
December 31, 1989). 
Revolutions were blazing across most of Europe. Established governments fell and 
were replaced by new ones whose emphasis was national and whose politics were liberal. 
It was a movement to give power to the people through the ballot box and to allow them 
to exercise their rights with freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the 
press, and freedom of religion. The nations wanted freedom internally from police 
oppression and externally from the intervention and occupation by tyrants. 
But in some cases within a few months, in others within a year, the old repressive 
powers reestablished themselves. Their power structures had only been weakened by the 
revolutionary disturbances, not destroyed, and between the old political leaders and the 
armed forces at their disposal, short shrift was made of the revolutionary movement. 
Real liberty and freedom had to wait for another day. 
Is this a description of the events of the past year? No, fortunately not. The 
description is that of the course of events in 1848, the only period in history remotely 
comparable to our own revolution of 1989 in central and eastern Europe. Possibly 
because of the historical analogy the justified fear was held for a while that developments 
in 1989 might be curtailed in equally fateful fashion. In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovalda, 
and East Germany, the Russians have armies of more than half a million men, ready at 
a moment's notice to restore Communism to power. Without a doubt such a step would 
undo the years of careful cultivation of the West by Mikhail Gorbachev, would begin a 
new Cold War and throw the millions of East Europeans into the dungeon of despair 
from which they are just now emerging. Of course it would not be the reformist 
Gorbachev who would order such an action, but the unregenerate reprobates of the 
Communist Party, the Red Army, or the KGB, fearful of losing their positions of 
privilege. Only as months passed without a growl from the Soviet bear has the prospect 
of intervention diminished to the point not of impossibility but of extreme unlikelihood. 
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Only gradually did it become apparent that Russia's internal problems with the 
economy, a calcified nomenklatura, a restive set of satellites, and a collection of festering 
ethnic dissatisfaction had grown so massive that only radical surgery can save Russia and 
the Communist Party from dissolution. The West had always known that Russia was a 
superpower in military terms only and at the level of a Third World developing country 
in all other respects, but few were aware of the truly ramshackle conditions of the 
country. In order to salvage what he can of the Communist Party and the Russian state, 
Gorbachev has initiated unprecedented changes in the Soviet Union, introducing glasnost 
and perestroika, changes which have assumed a dynamic of their own. There was a visit 
to the Pope in the expectation of pacifying the Poles, but it also led to the 
reestablishment of freedom of religion for the Russians themselves. At first strongly 
opposed to relinquishing the decisive and leading role of the Communist Party, 
Gorbachev has accepted the loss of its monopoly of power, adding demokratizatsiya to 
glasnost and perestroika. Russia is in the process of changing from one-party monopoly 
to a multiparty pluralistic state and will jettison its communist dreams which there and 
everywhere else have turned into nightmares. The need for a thoroughgoing reform of 
the economy in the direction of a free market has also been recognized and seems to be 
in the works. 
It is perhaps this last point which was Gorbachev's most powerful incentive for 
change. As the European Community was advancing toward economic and fiscal unity 
with increasing speed, thinking of 1992 as the first of many major steps toward complete 
unification, the prospects of a closed market must have been as disturbing to the Russians 
as they are to the Americans. Americans have a chance of participating and remaining 
competitive, but the Russians and their own dilapidated common market, Comecon, would 
be frozen out. Suddenly Gorbachev started sounding the theme of a "common European 
home." He wanted, indeed needed, access to the capital of the West, particularly 
Germany's. He wanted in, and as the past 45 years had demonstrated that he could not 
lick the West, he had to join it. 
Signals were sent out and picked up quickly. The Poles were permitted to have 
almost free elections, with the result that one house of parliament has no Communists 
in it, while in the other one only a proportional agreement safeguarded at least minimal 
representation for them. The Hungarians decided to allow vacationing East Germans to 
cross the border to Austria and the East German government was forced to confront the 
seething discontent of its population. 
That it would have to do so eventually was fairly clear. Visitors to East Germany 
could not fail to notice the signs. Two years ago there was the official tour guide who 
pointedly mentioned her membership in the Lutheran Church while not spending one 
second extolling the wonders of the Communist system. There was the instructor in the 
house of Johann Sebastian Bach who delivered her lecture without the slightest reference 
to the glorious achievements of her socialist state; the small crucifix she wore around her 
neck was much more telling. Yet another tour guide pointedly ignored a cemetery for 
Russian soldiers which was on the official list of things to be seen. 
And finally there was the group of workers in an East Berlin restaurant. As a 
reward for hard work in Karl-Marx-Stadt their factory had sent them to East Berlin for 
a week's vacation. Lodged in a cold-water flat in an East Berlin suburb, they had no 
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illusions that the better hotels were not for the likes of them. They marvelled at how 
much better than their home town East Berlin looked and how many more items the East 
Berlin stores carried, goods which were not available in their own region. One of them 
had just bought a Trabant, a car for which he had been on a waiting list for eleven years. 
They spoke of watching 1V programs like "Dynasty" and "Dallas," suggesting that although 
they were aware that these shows were not representative of the American way of life, 
nevertheless they were certain that the average American had a lifestyle of which they 
in their workers' paradise could only dream. 
When the discussion came to the question of German reunification, they shrugged 
their shoulders and sighed. It would not come about in their lifetime, they said 
regretfully. Only when Europe had become unified and had succeeded in transcending 
national sentiments would there be a chance for the two Germanies to come together 
again. They did not seem to realize that if the European Community proceeded on the 
path toward economic (and ultimately political) unification, the chances of German unity 
would QWindle to absolute zero. 
Qnderlying their conversation was a profound melancholy. When it was time for 
us to leave in order to beat the midnight curfew, we had the feeling of having been 
visitors in a prison. While there, everyone is equal and can mingle, but when visiting 
hours are over, no doubt is left as to who are the visitors and who are the prison 
inmates. We knew it, and so did they. 
So the signs were there, but they meant little as long as East Germany remained 
a police state, propped up by the bayonets of 20 Soviet divisions stationed in East 
Germany. Reunification might come some day, the Wall might be tom down some day, 
but that day was so far in an uncertain future that to think of it was like having a 
fantasy. Too many obstacles stood in the way, erected by the victorious Allies in 1945. 
There was never any doubt that the answer to the German Question-that open, 
troublesome, seemingly eternal question-until recently lay with the Allies. In various 
documents over the years the three western Allies at least were committed to produce 
German unity, pending a peace treaty, but no one had any illusions that their declarations 
were anything more than lip service. Both the British and the French for very good 
national reasons of their own to this day do not really want to see one Germany in the 
center of Europe. Their opposition is what might be called strategic. They know very 
well that a united Germany will dominate Europe economically even more than West 
Germany does now, and they also know that the political center of gravity, for so long 
located along the Paris-London axis inexorably will move eastward to Berlin. For them 
NATO and the European Community meant that West Germany's strength would remain 
harnessed to the interests of western Europe. 
The interests of the United States are, in a sense, more tactical. Of course, the 
United States wishes to retain influence in Europe; the only question is how. NATO, 
as the first secretary-general of the organization, Lord Ismay, once remarked, was founded 
in order to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. This 
aper~ was true only as long as the Russians themselves provided the continuing raison 
d'etre for NATO. Created in 1948 in response to the aggressive and expansionistic 
policies of the Soviets, culminating in the Communist usurpation of Czechoslovakia, 
NATO was designed to tell the Russians: "This far, and no farther!" Now, however, the 
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Russian threat is receding and in the face of a collapsing Warsaw Pact, NATO is losing 
its justification, requiring a new definition of America's role in Europe. 
Having come to terms with the fact that German unification can no longer be 
prevented, and may in fact not even be in Russia's long-term interest to prevent, the 
Russian opposition to it, such as it is, also has no more than tactical purpose. In the face 
of a collapsing Warsaw Pact, the Russians seem to be trying not to give up a Warsaw 
Pact quid without a NA TO quo. Differently put, they are not willing to vacate central 
Europe without America doing likewise. 
The Russian readjustment has become necessary in consequence of Russia's 
deteriorating domestic position, economically and ethnically, and, in equal measure, by 
the events in East Germany. The trickle of East German refugees first through Hungary 
and then through Czechoslovakia and Poland swelled to an uncontrollable torrent and 
indicated a hemorrhage of young and skilled people without whom the East German 
economy could survive only with great difficulty. The spontaneous peaceful 
demonstrations of millions of East Germans day after day in all parts of East Germany, 
defying their police state and demanding political freedom and human and civil rights, 
shook the Communist regime to the core. 
In astonishing short order the German Democratic Republic which, to paraphrase 
Voltaire's comment on the Holy Roman Empire, was neither democratic nor republican, 
was compelled to remove Erich Honecker, its aging leader, and replace him with Egon 
Krenz, a younger version. Krenz lasted longer than he deserved, and his place was taken 
by Hans Modrow, who was known as a reform Communist. Krenz was forced to promise 
a democratic system and free elections and open the border between East and West 
Germany. No one who watched people standing atop the hated Berlin Wall on 
November 9-a portentous date in German history, recalling the proclamation of the 
republic in 1918 and Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch in 1923-who saw suddenly smiling East 
German police and border guards, who looked at the stunned and tearful faces of East 
and West Germans alike could remain unaware that he was witnessing history in the 
making. The house built by Stalin and his Marxists was tumbling down. 
Even with free elections promised, the exodus of East Germans has continued, 
averaging two thousand people a day. East Germans, burnt too often by the treacherous 
promises of their leaders, do not trust the prospects of free elections and a true change 
in their conditions. Borders, in their minds, can always close again, and it is better to 
get out before they do. West Germany sensibly has been unwilling to commit assistance 
to a state whose political and economic contours will not be clear until after elections. 
Faced with the collapse of the state, Modrow moved the elections up to March 18. 
What kind of results will they produce? The East Germans will remember that 
it was the Comrades whom they have to thank for police repression, political prisons, 
economic shortages, dilapidated housing, pollution of unprecedented proportions, and a 
generally stultifying atmosphere. They now prattle of "socialism with a human face," but 
did not mention it during the past four decades. It will be the rare Communist who will 
be elected dogcatcher. Even Hans Modrow may have his difficulties. People will not 
forget that he wanted to preserve the Staatsicherheitsdienst, the Stasi, East Germany's 
despised and feared secret police. People will keep in mind that once a Communist, 
always a Communist. 
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Who will come out of the elections victorious? Probably not the amorphous 
organizations that were so active in demonstrations and opposition to the Communist 
regime; more likely it will be the East German versions of West Germany's Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Free Democrats. 
No matter, it will only be an interim parliament and an interim government. 
Talks will start immediately between the East and the West Germans, laying the 
groundwork for speedy unification of the two halves. The general elections scheduled for 
December 1990 in West Germany may well be elections conducted in a unified Germany, 
resulting in a parliament and an administration that will speak with the authority of all 
Germans behind it. 
It is these December elections which seem to motivate Chancellor Kohl in his 
shortsighted pronouncements on the Polish-German border. Pressed to commit himself, 
he has evaded the issue by claiming that only an all-German government can agree to 
the permanent loss of the territories east of the Oder-Nei.Be line. These are areas of 
Germany handed over to Poland in 1945 as compensation for the Polish territory taken 
by the Russians. The Polish population in the Russian-seized area was transplanted to 
the former German lands, from which the Germans had been expelled. From just before 
the end of the Second World War until two years after it, about 13 million Germans 
were driven out of East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and the Sudetenland. Some two 
million perished in the process. East Prussia was divided half and half between Russians 
and Poles, and the Sudetenland of course became totally Czech. It was ruthless surgery, 
but it solved the problem of German minorities in eastern Europe. 
Today, forty-five years later, the Poles settled in the former German territory 
regard it as theirs. The German expellees formed lobbying associations in West Germany 
and have been a political force, albeit steadily diminishing in political power over the 
decades. The irony is that although they continue to claim the eastern lands as theirs, 
only a minuscule number of them would be willing to return if given the chance. Just 
as the Poles made a life of their own after 1945 behind the Oder-Nei.Be line, so the 
Germans from there settled and began to feel at home in West Germany. A second 
and a third generation has been born and raised in West Germany, without any 
attachments to the land of their parents and grandparents. If given a choice, they will 
stay where they are and leave the Poles in peace. 
Chancellor Kohl ought to do the same. Both East Germany and West Germany 
decades ago in separate treaties with Poland recognized the borders of 1945 as 
permanent. Kohl only would have to affirm these agreements. To do so, however, would 
expose him to the charge of a give-away that might drive some Germans into the arms 
of the right-wing Republicans and endanger his chances for remaining German chancellor. 
Kohl's reaction is that of a politician, not that of a statesman. As the latter, he would 
know that without the developments of the past year there would be no talk whatsoever 
about the fate of the eastern territories; they would remain as elusive and lost as they 
were for the past forty-five years. It is only because of the totally unexpected and 
miraculous opportunity for uniting the two German halves that we hear any mention of 
the lost eastern territories. The Germans owe the Poles a lot. If their aquiescence to 
German unity can be obtained through a German confirmation of their western border, 
unity will have been purchased at a reasonable price. In any case, Germany's new 
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borders will not be those of 1937, and for that reason one can not speak of German 
reunification, but only of the unification of two Germanies. 
In a way, the German-Polish border is the easiest in eastern Europe to define. 
Moldavia is restive and would like to return to Rumania. No one so far has brought up 
the Polish territory confiscated by the Russians, no one has yet solved the minority 
problems along the Turkish-Bulgarian, the Rumanian-Hungarian, and the Polish-
Lithuanian borders. And if Lithuania actually gains its independence from Russia, 
northern East Prussia with its valuable port of Kaliningrad (Konigsberg) will be separated 
from Russia proper by a Lithuanian Corridor. These potentially explosive disputes are 
indicative of the many minority problems besetting eastern Europe and Russia. It 
remains to be seen whether they can be resolved with no more difficulty than the 
German-Polish border. 
The Germans will have their hands full with East Germany's problems. Will East 
Germany retain the artificial administative divisions (Bezirke) created after 1945 in place 
of the traditional provinces? This question pales in comparison to the problem of how 
the collective farms are going to be privatized again, or how best the state-owned 
businesses can be returned to the owners from whom they were expropriated 45 years 
ago. Not only individual justice demands that the confiscated property be returned to the 
rightful owners, but also common economic sense. Marxism and centralized economies 
have failed to work; only privatization can restore part of the former efficiency. Under 
the best of circumstances, it will take at least ten years and approximately 100 billion 
German marks annually before economic health is restored to East Germany. 
Another issue that requires resolution is the social security to which East Germans 
have grown accustomed over the past 45 years. East Germans knew that they could 
always rely on the state to help them out with their job, health, or housing problems. 
Most East Germans have become aware that their system of social security is 
incompatible with capitalist practices, but a sizable minority is afraid that it will lose out 
when united with West Germany. Yet the West German negotiators should have no 
serious difficulty persuading their East German partners that the West German social 
market economy bears little relation to the raw capitalism that many East Germans 
erroneously expect in the West. West Germany's economy and social legislation have 
been able to provide a safety net that is the envy of many societies, including the United 
States, and that provides as many services as the East Germans are accustomed to. 
These lingering sentiments, however, may play a strong role in the March electio~ giving 
the Social Democrats a boost, and may be equally attractive in all-German elections. In 
that case Kohl may be unsuccessful with his Christian Democrats, regardless of how he 
handles the sensitive Polish problem. 
Even after the Germans arrange themselves internally and with Poland, there still 
remain the Allies to be considered. Whereas until half a year ago the answer to the 
German problem lay totally in their hands, this is no longer the case. Regardless of the 
opposition of France, Britain, the United States, and even the Soviet Union, all they 
would be able to prevent at this stage is the formal union of the two. But nothing would 
keep the Germans after March 18 from devising policies for open borders and economic 
and currency union. For all practical purposes they will be united. 
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It is the prospect of this unified and strong country that sends shivers down the 
back of many people inside and out of Europe. Too many remember Germany's power, 
Germany's militarism, Germany's aggressiveness and arrogance, and Germany's brutality 
toward its weaker neighbors and the Jews. How valid are these fears today? How much 
credence ought to be given to the arguments of those opposing German unification? 
Before the strength of the sentiments in favor of German unification became 
evident, there were people who argued that Germany had been unified for only seventy-
five years, from 1870 to 1945, and that this length of time was inadequate to give 
Germans the sense of national unity that other nations such as the French, the English, 
or the Americans enjoyed. What the critics overlooked was that whereas Germany did 
indeed come to national unity late, so did Italy. No one today claims that the Italians 
have not developed a national consciousness. As for the Americans, one should not 
forget that at the time of Valley Forge, Americans did not think of themselves as 
Americans as much as they considered themselves Pennsylvanians or New Jersyites. That 
was only two hundred years ago. The Civil War a hundred years later was nothing more 
than a war to determine America's national cohesiveness. Interestingly, America's unity 
was preserved by the force of arms at about the same time that Germany was created 
by force of arms. No one today will argue that the divisions between the American 
North and the American South are strong enough to split the country. Neither are the 
divisions betweeen Germany East and Germany West. 
As for Germany's aggressiveness, it is more a myth than a fact. It requires 
historical amnesia not to see that it was France which was the most aggressive country 
in Europe from about 1635 to 1815, when France was the great disturber of the peace 
and Napoleon attempted to control all of Europe. Contrary to what people like to 
believe, Germany was not solely responsible for the outbreak of the First World War. 
If one insists on singling out one country, Austria was much more of a culprit than 
Germany. But the more perspective we gain on those events, the more we see that all 
European countries went to war with more or less reluctance. Social Darwinism was very 
much alive in those days, and in fact continued to inspire Adolf Hitler. 
That brings us to the Second World War which clearly and without a doubt must 
be put at Hitler's doorstep. Even if we wish to regard the two world wars as the Thirty 
Years War of the 20th century, there was no compelling necessity for Germany to go to 
war in 1939. But because it did anyway, is it still (or again) a militaristic country, likely 
to go on a binge of aggression? The answer is clearly no. First of all neither West 
Germany alone nor a combined Germany would have the slightest reason to go to war. 
For the past forty years West Germany has been a trusted partner in NATO (unlike the 
others, Germany's command structure is integrated with that of NATO), contributing 
more in money and in men than any other NATO partner with the exception of the 
United States. Is this trust all of a sudden no longer justified? Anyone familiar with the 
attitude of German youth knows that no other young people in Europe are less interested 
in the military than the West Germans. For that matter many people are not aware of 
the exient to which national antagonisms no longer exist for the young Europeans who 
in this respect are far ahead of their leaders. 
More serious and more valid is the concern with the economic power the new 
Germany will wield. Not immediately, of course, as West Germany's economic strength 
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will be fully occupied for the foreseeable future in curing East Germany's economic woes. 
Eventually, though, the new Germany will dominate the European economy even more 
than West Germany does now. Is continued division the -answer? One might as well 
argue that because America is as powerful economically as all of Europe (including 
Germany) combined, it is posing an economic threat to the rest of the world and ought 
therefore to be divided along the Mississippi River or possibly along the Mason-Dixon 
line. Or should Russia, which also can be expected eventually to become a strong 
economic competitor once it gets its economy converted to capitalism, be divided in two? 
How about the Japanese, who seem to have the capital to buy almost anything they want? 
The silliness of the attempt to render Germany economically less strong by keeping it 
divided becomes apparent when it is seen in analogy to the other economic powerhouses. 
One way to meet the threat of any economic superpower, be it Japan or Germany, 
is through economic competition. There is nothing inherent in the Germans or the 
Japanese that makes them special. What they have achieved can also be accomplished 
by the British, the French, and the Americans. Secondly, making a united Germany a 
partner in the European Community will assure that its economic power is of benefit not 
only to itself but to the other states as well. California or New York state are 
economically vastly stronger than South Carolina, for example. But no one will argue 
that their strength would justify separating them from the rest of the United States. To 
keep the two Germanies separate on economic grounds is equally indefensible. 
With the major worries removed, there is still the question of how best to satisfy 
Europe's, Russia's, and America's security concerns. America's determination to keep 
armed forces in Europe is motivated in part by the strategic interests of the United 
States. Having been involved in two costly wars and their aftermath, the United States 
has earned and must maintain its connection with Europe. President Bush's agreement 
with Mikhail Gorbachev concerning troop strength in Europe tends in that direction. 
At first sight, the pronouncements of the two countries with respect to a unified 
Germany may seem incompatible, with the Russians insisting on German neutrality and 
the United States insisting that a unified Germany be part of NATO. Both proposals in 
essence want to assure that Germany's military potential remains under control. Under 
the agreement the Russians will be permitted to keep 195,000 troops in Europe, the 
United States 225,000, of whom 30,000 are going to be distributed among Britain, Spain, 
Italy and Turkey. The remaining 195,000 men will remain in central Europe (read West 
Germany). Similarly, as the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians are asking the Russians to 
withdraw Russian troops from their soil, the 195,000 Russian troops will also be·stationed 
in central Europe (read East Germany). Such an arrangement essentially will be 
equivalent to the continuing occupation of Germany by another name, albeit by fewer 
Russians and Americans than before. Yet it also will provide the stability which all sides 
desire. 
Once the West Europeans and the Russians acknowledge that a united Germany 
poses no threat to them and once tensions between the Soviet Union and the United 
States relax further, the number of troops on both sides can be reduced correspondingly. 
The ideal situation would be one in which the troops of the Soviet Union are withdrawn 
to within its own borders and those of the United States, considerably reduced from 
195,000 men, are equally distributed among all west European states, including France. 
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America's troops would then play in Europe the same trip-wire role that the American 
brigade now plays in Berlin: not strong enough to avoid defeat in case of an attack, but 
of sufficient moment to assure America's involvement in the defense of Europe. 
The conclusion is justified that Gorbachev is interested not merely in restructuring the 
Soviet Union and diminishing the threat of military confrontation in Europe, but also of 
becoming a partner in the "common European home." The envisioned Europe of 1992 
will not happen in 1992; it will take a few years longer than that. But when everything 
works itself out, it will be a Europe that reaches from the Atlantic to the Urals, that is 
not only European but Russian and North American as well. 
The ideals that inspired the revolution of 1848 are finally coming to fruition in 
central and eastern Europe and, it is to be hoped, in Russia as well. The people of 
1848 thought that Europe was experiencing a Spring; conservative frosts killed the bloom. 
We can hope that the revolution of 1989 will flower and bring with it both political 
freedom and economic prosperity. 
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